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“Culture is a forbidding word. I have to use it, knowing of none better, to describe the 
various beautiful and interesting objects which men have made in the past, and handed 
down to use, and which some of us are hoping to hand on.” 
      E.M. Forster, “Does Culture Matter?” 
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Introduction: Education and the Pursuit of Culture  
 
“Culture,” according to Matthew Arnold, is the “pursuit of our total perfection by 
means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has 
been thought and said in the world.”1 Arnold claimed this pursuit involved his ubiquitous 
“sweetness and light,” the beauty and intellect that represent “the best” of human thought 
and behavior. He believed that careful study of classical traditions of learning, such as 
Greek philosophy, could influence contemporary behavior by imparting morality and a 
passion for doing good works.2 The pursuit of sweetness and light was an inward process 
that would encourage people to act at their own personal best. Culture for Arnold was a 
process of learning aimed at influencing social conduct, which led him to claim in 
Culture and Anarchy (1869) that culture offered “a long-term programme for the reform 
of Britain’s entire intellectual life.” 3 Arnold argued that if everyone pursued culture by 
living this “intellectual life,” they would be brought into social harmony through a shared 
understanding of the lessons from culture’s venerated past.   
Since he believed in the possibility of the widespread adoption of culture, Arnold 
had to conceive of culture in transmissible terms. His version of culture, like the one in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Ian Gregor (Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1971), 5. 
 
2Arnold found in the Greeks an intellectual flexibility he would call “Hellenism.” Hellenism in Culture and 
Anarchy refers to “spontaneity of consciousness”: “Hellenism, and human life in the hands of Hellenism, is 
invested with a kind of aerial ease, clearness, and radiancy; they are full of what we call sweetness and 
light” (112). Arnold contrasts Hellenism to Hebraism, the mechanical obedience of Christianity:  “As 
Hellenism speaks of thinking clearly, seeing things in their essence and beauty, as a grand and precious fear 
for man to achieve, so Hebraism speaks of becoming conscious of sin, of awakening to a sense of sin, as a 
feat of this kind” (113). 
3Chris Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 1848-1932 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 22. 
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this project’s epigraph, inherently depended on being “handed down,” on the preservation 
and propagation of the intellectual and artistic traditions of the past. The transmission of 
Arnoldian culture required institutional support, “an ideal centre of correct information, 
taste, and intelligence.”4 Arnold found such a centre in the ancient, exclusive institutions 
of Oxford and Cambridge: “Yet we in Oxford, brought up amidst the beauty and 
sweetness of that beautiful place, have not failed to seize one truth: the truth that beauty 
and sweetness are essential characters of a complete human perfection.”5 Culture was a 
way of thinking modeled at the Oxbridge of his day, where thought and philosophy 
formed the core of the curriculum. Oxbridge embodied culture’s transmissibility, since it 
institutionalized and taught the classical tradition of learning so central to Arnold’s idea 
of culture.  
Arnold’s formulation of the university as cultural epicenter endured at least into 
the middle of the twentieth century: F.R. Leavis claimed in his Education and the 
University (1948) that universities “are recognized symbols of cultural tradition,” a 
position he maintained in English Literature in our Time and the University (1969).6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 91. 
 
5 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 49. 
In “The Literary Influence of Academies” (1865), Arnold considered the possibility of an intellectual 
academy along the lines of the French Académie Franҁaise. Such an academy would provide a central 
authority for regulating matters of intellectual life. Arnold eventually decides against such an academy for 
the English in favor of the inner process of culture he outlines in Culture and Anarchy, and limits his 
intellectual centers of authority to the already established Oxford and Cambridge. Chris Baldick believes 
Arnold based that decision on a fear that this academy would eventually be overrun by the “philistines”: “It 
was  one thing to revere an already established academy sanctified by centuries of tradition, quite another 
to brave the stormy currents of contemporary English controversy and embark upon the messy practical 
work of constructing an academy anew” (Baldick 45).   
 
6 F.R. Leavis, Education and the University: A Sketch for an “English School.” (New York: George W. 
Stewart, 1948), 16. 
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Leavis upheld a version of culture consistent with Arnold’s: “the future must lie in the 
cultural realm,” he insisted, and “in the performance of this function the universities have 
an essential part.”7 Both Culture and Anarchy and Education and the University reinforce 
the position of the university as protector and transmitter of culture because Arnold and 
Leavis feared culture faced a particular threat. To put it in its most general terms, this 
threat was utilitarianism. A social theory made popular in the nineteenth century, the 
utilitarian movement advocated Jeremy Bentham’s dictum, “the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number.”8 “A good society,” utilitarian John Stuart Mill suggested, “is one 
that maximizes everyone’s pleasure, whatever its source.”9 With that premise, 
utilitarianism encouraged an association of education with economic advancement rather 
than with Arnold’s cultural program. The pragmatic utilitarian wanted an education that 
had practical use or provided specific training, not Arnold’s passionate morality.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The rapid expansion of universities that came about in the early twentieth century (on which I comment 
later in this introduction and in Chapter 4) encouraged Leavis to look for culture in universities beyond 
Oxford and Cambridge.  
 
7 Leavis, Education and the University, 11. 
 
8 For additional discussions of utilitarian influence on Victorian life, see Michalina Vaughan’s and 
Margaret Scotford Archer’s, Social Conflict and Educational Change in England and France 1789-1848 
(1971), Alan Rauch’s Useful Knowledge (2001), R.E. Pritchard’s Dickens’ England: Life in Victorian 
Times (2003), and Catherine Gallagher’s The Industrial Reformation of English Fiction (1985). 
 
9 J.B. Schneewind, introduction to The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: On Liberty, The Subjection of 
Women & Utilitarianism, by John Stuart Mill (New York: Modern Library, 2002), xiii.  
10 For criticism of utilitarianism contemporary to Arnold, see Benjamin Disraeli’s “Utilitarian Follies.” In 
the essay, Disraeli takes exception to utility as the paramount value because he believes it interprets “the 
greatest happiness” in starkly material and formulaic terms. The real inadequacy of utilitarian thought, he 
claimed, is that it conceives of humankind as fundamentally tyrannical and violently selfish. A limiting 
construction, utilitarianism ignores a multitude of more positive possibilities for human motives.       
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For Leavis, utilitarian philosophy began a century-long assault on a moral or 
humane tradition; it ignited a shift toward scientific approaches to social thought that he 
maintained had led to the “social and cultural disintegration that has accompanied the 
development of the inhumanely complex machinery” characteristic of his version of 
modern society.11 The university, in his view, could succeed against utilitarianism if it 
remained based in a “cultural tradition” similar to the one Arnold advocated. Culture 
according to Leavis “is a directing force, representing a wisdom older than modern 
civilization,” a wisdom with the “authority” to “check and control the blind drive onward 
of material and mechanical development, with its human consequences.”12 The “blind 
drive onward” of utilitarian thought could only be counteracted if education ensured the 
continuation of culture’s vaulted tradition. Even if utility were to creep into the university 
in ways Leavis believed to be detrimental to society, he remained confident that, because 
of the strength of its humanist tradition, the university would prevail and successfully 
transmit culture for generations to come. 
In this dissertation, however, I argue that writers across the era associated with 
modernism questioned the transmissibility of culture. In particular, they resisted the 
institutional forms of cultural transmission and preservation supported by Arnold and 
Leavis. Oxford and Cambridge, ancient institutions themselves, were vital to Arnold and 
Leavis because they protected important traditions from the past. Modernism’s 
characteristic break with literary and cultural tradition, however, stemmed from a belief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 F.R. Leavis, Education and the University, 23. 
See also Leavis’s introduction to his Mill on Bentham and Coleridge (1950). 
12 Leavis, Education and the University, 16. 
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in the impossibility and undesirability of replicating that past. In “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” (1921), T.S. Eliot attends to the emergent tension in modernism’s 
approach to culture. If culture is based on a tradition of learning and art that spans 
centuries, he asks, then to what degree is modernist innovation actually completely new? 
Eliot considers especially the particular cultural tradition, or “handing down,” outlined by 
Arnold—a long-standing intellectual and artistic heritage. In order to, as Ezra Pound put 
it, “make it new,” Eliot “challenged tradition and attempted to reconstruct it out of the 
contributions of the individual talent.”13 The high modernism that Eliot represents, in 
other words, needed a culture to set modernism against; modernist writers could not pull 
away altogether from the traditions of their intellectual past, since one must receive 
culture in order to know how to manipulate and change it. Modernist writers could, 
however, refigure these traditions in innovative and fragmented ways, which Eliot does in 
his landmark poem, The Waste Land (1922). The poem’s “heap of broken images” 
imaginatively pieces together the “cunning passages” and “contrived corridors” of history 
Eliot considered earlier in Gerontion (1920).14 
History and tradition in The Waste Land are notoriously complicated matters. As 
Michael Levenson argues, Eliot’s engagement with history is not some “consistent or 
continuous” inheritance; rather, the poem constructs a history “whose unity can be no 
more assumed than the unity of personality. The poem expands its historical view and 
just when it seems to have established a coherent temporal standpoint, it expands 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Malcolm Bradbury, The Modern British Novel (London: Penguin Books, 2001), xv. 
 
14 T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land and Other Poems (New York & London: Penguin Books, 1998), 32; 55..  
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again.”15 An unstable “temporal standpoint” indicates Eliot’s ground-breaking 
engagement with tradition and history more generally, but it also, I suggest, has 
implications for conceptions of culture as transmissible—as a tradition from the past 
being preserved as it is brought into the present and handed down to the future. To 
rethink one’s engagement with a cultural past is also to consider how this past can be 
passed on. In this project, I revise Eliot’s question from “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent” in terms of a tension between culture and specifically the institutions that had 
historically been tasked with transmitting it: what does the modernist drive for innovation 
mean for the university that preserved and propagated an old tradition of culture? Culture 
for the modernists relied upon the well-trained elite brought up in the halls of Oxford or 
Cambridge, but it simultaneously rejected the idea that culture could be transmitted as the 
particular knowledge or values that had been long associated with the university.16 At 
stake in my argument is the possibility of institutional cultural transmission, as 
modernists begin to doubt whether the experience of education accurately reflects a 
transmissible culture at all.     
I suggest that modernist-era writers articulate the difficulty in transmitting culture 
by turning to unforgiving depictions of the figure historically tasked with cultural 
preservation: the mentor. Encouraging personal achievement through the affirmation of 
particular cultural values and traditions, mentors effectively represent the culture they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism: A study of English literary doctrine 1908-1922 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 199; 204. 
 
16 For overviews of the complicated relationship between modernism and its longer literary tradition, see 
Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence (1973) (a fairly direct refutation of Eliot), Malcolm Bradbury’s 
The Modern British Novel (1993), Michael Levenson’s A Genealogy of Modernism (1984), and Perry 
Meisel’s The Myth of the Modern (1987). 
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intended to pass on. The incremental failure of fictional mentorship across the period I 
describe thus indicates modernist-era writers' sense of a culture that can no longer be 
sustained or transmitted. In the novels I discuss in the following chapters—Thomas 
Hardy’s Jude the Obscure (1895), E.M. Forster’s Howards End (1910), Virginia Woolf’s 
To the Lighthouse (1927), and Muriel Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1961)—
mentorship is figured in a negative way, either as a stumbling block to the attainment of 
culture or as rendering culture inaccessible to those who seek it. In particular, these 
authors associate failed mentorship with the institutions of education charged with the 
task of cultural transmission. Through depictions of failed mentorship, they express a 
growing fear that culture and education have become progressively distinct. Despite so 
many of its Bloomsbury group constituents having come through the Cambridge 
corridors, English modernism had difficulty locating in those halls a usable model for the 
continued transmission of culture. Celebrations of Oxford and Cambridge in Hardy’s and 
Forster’s novels are celebrations of a memory, of a treasured past as Arnold may have 
had it, but they are not the future Leavis envisioned. Rather than use the university to pit 
culture against utilitarianism in the ways that Arnold and Leavis did, modernist-era 
writers question whether culture can remain an institutionally transmissible entity at all. 
Essentially, institutional education cannot offer a viable mentorship in which culture as 
those writers understood it remained the subject of meaningful and sustained 
transmission.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17Because this project considers education reform that occurred on the outer edges of the period associated 
with modernism, I use the more expansive terms “age of modernism'” and “modernist era.” Further, while 
Hardy and Forster are not canonical high modernists, I situate them in relation to the high modernist 
concern for cultural preservation—a concern I examine from the perspective of specifically culture’s 
9 
	  
My argument speaks to two particular trends in current modernist criticism. 
Firstly, I consider studies of how the propagation of culture became necessary for 
modernist writers wanting to project an image of cultivated taste. Lois Cucullu, Melba 
Cuddy-Keane, and Sean Latham, for example, conduct scholarly inquiries of “matters of 
production, dissemination, and reception” of both high art and popular forms of culture 
across the period.18 Secondly, modernist studies in the past two decades has begun to read 
further into the institutional and cultural contexts of the period. These contexts have been 
particularly well explained by Lawrence Rainey, Michael Levenson, and Michael North, 
who have argued that the modernist involvement in the production of high art could not 
be completely separate from simultaneous developments in mass culture.19 While these 
studies illustrate well how the modernist preoccupation with high culture was enmeshed 
in other concerns of the period, none consider at length the role of institutions of 
education. In finally considering the role of institutional higher education in modernism, I 
ask especially how these institutions offer a yet unstudied narrative of the problems 
modernist-era writers had with the dissemination of culture; the problems of cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
transmissibility. By looking more carefully into the politics of education reform taking place contemporary 
to modernism, Hardy and Foster help to illustrate the particular problem of cultural transmission Eliot 
alludes to in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and addresses explicitly in Notes towards a Definition of 
Culture. Spark, although an early postmodernist, is an appropriate ending point for a project about 
modernism because she refigures the modernist question about cultural transmission in light of increased 
anxiety over cultural transmission after World War II.  
18 Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz “The New Modernist Studies,” PMLA 123.3 (2008): 738.  
 For other work addressing the production and dissemination of culture, see Lois Cucullu’s Expert 
Modernists, Matricde, and Modern Culture (2004) and Melba Cuddy-Keane’s Virginia Woolf, the 
Intellectual, and The Public Sphere (2003).   
 
19 See Michael Levenson’s A Genealogy of Modernism: A study of English literary doctrine 1908-1922 
(1984); Lawrence Rainey’s Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites and Public Culture (1998);and 
Michael North’s Reading 1922: A Return to the Scene of the Modern (1999).  
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transmission were manifested in the educational advancements thought to be inimical to 
cultural preservation.  
My particular concern is with how cultural transmission in the age of modernism 
came to be influenced by matters of educational policy. While Victorian studies has long 
considered the impact of education reform on the development of the Victorian novel, 
modernist studies lacks a comparable perspective.20 By focusing on mentorship and 
institutions of education, I hope to add to the recent critical discussions of the cultural 
institutions involved in the production of literary modernism to include the important 
legislative changes made to education during the period. The policy changes and 
educational debates that took place in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth affected class accessibility to education, contributed to the credentializing 
function of schooling, and resulted in a significant increase in the amount and variety of 
universities. Education reform radically changed who attended schools and universities, 
and what they learned while there. For the modernists, this refigured the content of what 
these institutions of education were passing on as something separate from culture. The 
novelists I study here further conclude that if the university, at one point a cultural 
touchstone, can no longer transmit culture, it is because has ceased to be a transmissible 
entity. Mentorship is the appropriate framework for this type of study because mentors 
are part of a longer tradition of cultural preservation and propagation; where mentorship 
breaks down, so do the cultural values that the mentor had preserved. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Richard Altick’s Victorian People and Ideas: A Companion for the Modern Reader of Victorian 
Literature (1973) and The Presence of the Present: Topics of the Day in the Victorian Novel (1991), 
Herbert Tucker’s A Companion to Victorian Literature and Culture (1999), Dinah Birch’s Our Victorian 
Education (2008), and Alan Rauch’s Useful Knowledge: The Victorians, Morality, and the March of 
Intellect (2001). 
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I argue that the modernist-era interest in culture reached beyond “culture” qua 
high art and extended into the vibrant social debates about education that were occurring 
in the period. Where Arnold and Leavis responded to utilitarianism’s dismissal of 
culture’s value by reaffirming the value and transmissibility of culture, however, 
modernist-era texts express a more deep-seated anxiety over culture’s fate. Their 
response is to remove culture from institutional forms of education altogether, calling 
into question whether culture could ever be properly handed down. The historical period I 
consider begins with the 1870 Forster Education Act, arguably the single most important 
piece of education legislation in Britain. The Act mandated education for all of Britain’s 
children of ages five through twelve within their home districts and under the oversight of 
Inspectors and School Boards. My study follows British educational reform through to 
the nationalization of education in the immediately postwar period, the early years of 
Britain's modern welfare state. My intent is to move the narrative of education out of the 
confines of the nineteenth century and into current critical discussions of the cultural 
institutions that shaped modernism. In doing so, I hope to add another layer of definition 
to culture as the modernists may have considered it. When contextualized in its long-
established affiliation with the university, culture refers to more than simply the artifacts 
of high art or intellectualism and includes a particular tradition that was conceived of in 
terms of transmissibility. Investigating the contemporary debates the changes to 
education elicited offers a new way of looking at the difficulty the writers of the period 
confronted in conceiving of culture as a valuable entity that, as my epigraph from Forster 
implies, can be “handed” on. 
 
12 
	  
I. Education Reform and the Victorian Novel  
Before I demonstrate how these writers considered education reform in their 
identification of a breakdown in cultural transmission at the university, I offer by way of 
prologue an outline of the most significant efforts at education reform that took place in 
the nineteenth century. Education became an area of particular concern in the nineteenth 
century given the rapid social changes attendant on the industrial revolution.21 Innovative 
forms of technology in the previous century made possible diverse types of labor, which 
opened up paths for economic advancement and social mobility. Newly available wealth 
helped establish a rising middle class, while increased scrutiny of industrial work also 
began to expose the vast injustices and abysmal conditions of an underprivileged working 
class. Although it would not be the subject of far- reaching legislation until 1870, 
education reform was precipitated by this social upheaval and consequential calls for 
reform. The Reform Act of 1832 responded to a newly industrialized Britain’s early 
attempts to recognize the middle class and to provide more representation for the poor 
and working classes.22 Even if education was not part of the language of the actual 1832 
Reform Bill, the Act’s passage reflected a growing insistence upon legislative change that 
would increase governmental representation of the middle and lower classes, an 
insistence on equality that would further develop into the eventual education mandates.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See R.E. Pritchard’s Dickens’s England: Life in Victorian Times (2003), Richard Altick’s Victorian 
People and Ideas (1973) and The English Common Reader (1957), and Catherine Gallagher’s The 
Industrial Reformation of English Fiction (1985). 
 
22 Most notably, the Reform Act of 1832 changed the electoral system and more than doubled the number 
of individuals granted the right to vote. While the bill may not have been particularly effective in granting 
additional rights to the working class, it is considered a landmark event in terms of advancing democracy in 
Britain (Altick, The English Common Reader, 85-9).  
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Continuing the reforms put in place by the 1832 Reform Bill, the 1867 
Representation of the People Act, which Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli famously 
called the “leap into the dark,” nearly “doubled the number of parliamentary voters, and 
in particular gave the vote to great numbers of working-class men in the large towns.” 23 
The Act’s passage indicated a particularly striking shift—hence Disraeli’s dramatic 
phrase— in the power granted to the working class, and intensified conversations 
regarding the accessibility of education. H.C. Dent uses the example of Robert Lowe of 
the Conservative Party, who “had fought the Bill furiously from first to last,” to illustrate 
the bill’s implications for education reform:   
In a memorable speech, which in quotation is usually telescoped into five words, 
‘We must educate our masters’, he [Lowe] said: It appears to me that before we 
had intrusted the masses—the great bulk of whom are uneducated—with the 
whole power of this country we should have taught them a little more how to use 
it, and not having done so, this rash and abrupt measure having been forced upon 
them, the only thing we can do is as far as possible to remedy the evil by the most 
universal measures of education that can be devised. I believe it will be absolutely 
necessary that you should prevail on our future masters to learn their letters… 
From the moment that you intrust the masses with power their education becomes 
an absolute necessity.24 
Lowe’s speech implies that with the enfranchisement of the middle and working classes 
came the obligation to educate them so that they might make informed choices.25 All 
classes should have at least some access to education so that all citizens could learn to act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 H.C. Dent 1870-1970: Century of Growth in English Education (London: Longman, 1970), 3. 
 
24 Dent, Century of Growth, 3-4 (Dent’s emphasis). 
 
25 See Pritchard, Dickens’s England pages 77-114 and 144-179 and Altick’s Victorian People and Ideas 
pages 73-113.  For a comprehensive view of the many different reforms undertaken in the Victorian period, 
see Asa Brigg’s The Age of Improvement (1960). 
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responsibly. If education fosters social responsibility, then educational reform must 
accompany any increase in rights for the working class.  
What education for the lower classes might look like, however, was not clear. 
England lacked a nationalized system of education that would see to the widespread and 
standardized education of the country’s youth: “The early part of the century,” R.E. 
Pritchard suggests, “showed little of an educational system: a few ‘public’ schools, dame 
schools, a scattering of private, voluntary schools and governesses.”26 Up until the 1870 
Forster Education Act, education had been largely haphazard and inconsistent; formal 
schooling was unregulated and not widely available. Lowe’s claim in his 1867 speech 
that “future masters” needed “to learn their letters” was not wholly an oversimplification, 
as even basic literacy was scarcely attainable to the lower classes. At the turn of the 
nineteenth century, the working class had an appallingly low literacy rate of 
approximately 33%; even the general population had a literacy rate “scarcely higher than 
in the Elizabethan period.”27 In 1851 “fewer than half the school-age children attended 
school.”28 Lowe’s call for universal education would require significant reform to the 
country’s educational infrastructure, since access to education had been widely restricted 
for so long.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26R.E.  Pritchard (ed.), Dickens’s England: Life in Victorian Times (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 
77. 
 
27 David Vincent, Literacy and Popular Culture : 1750-1914 (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 12. 
 Richard Altick, Victorian People and Ideas: a companion for the modern reader of Victorian literature 
(New York: Norton, 1973), 30. 
 
28 Pritchard, Dickens’s England, 77. 
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How to go about systemizing education was an exceptionally complicated matter 
given the varying needs of a diverse population. Considering the different career paths 
made possible by the industrial revolution, there was no single curriculum that could 
provide universally relevant training. Gregory Castle suggests that education reform was 
considered as part of the larger issue of social reform that came about after the industrial 
revolution: “The creation of new routes for social mobility necessitated a change in the 
function and nature of education, insofar as new job opportunities required new modes of 
training or former credentials.”29 There came to be new forms of instruction, with state-
sponsored education expanding to include “modes of modern apprenticeship, 
certification, and on-the-job training that accompanied many occupations, especially 
those involving skilled office work and general literacy.”30 Expounding further on the 
development of new types of education accessible to the working class, David Vincent 
writes that “informal mechanisms of training and recruitment were gradually being 
challenged by more structured, meritocratic, and bureaucratically mediated routes into the 
labour market.”31 These developments in education speak especially to the utilitarian 
movement, which asked for educational programs to include specifically technical and 
scientific curricula. Interpreting Lowe’s call for social responsibility in terms of 
economic success, utilitarian thinkers argued that such programs would teach practical 
skill and result in economic gain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Gregory Castle, Reading the Modernist Bildungsroman (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of 
Florida: 2006), 54. 
 
30 Castle, The Modernist Bildungsroman, 54. 
 
31 Andrew Miles and David Vincent, “The Past and Future of Working Lives,” in Building European 
Society: Occupational Change and Social Mobility in Europe, 1840-1940, eds. Andrew Miles and David 
Vincent (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 13. 
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The changing scope of education indicates a corresponding change in perceptions 
of the value of a more traditional “gentleman’s education”; utilitarian reforms uprooted 
preconceived notions of education previously tied to the upper class. The aristocracy and 
gentry had access to public schools, which provided “training in the classics and in 
gentlemanly manners and principles.”32 From roughly the eighteen forties, more and 
more young men from the professional and business classes became potential candidates 
for such an education, seemingly on the principle that a gentleman’s education could turn 
them into gentlemen, or at least provide a gentleman’s income.33 Rather than providing 
purely economic gain, this education was intended to, as John Ruskin maintained, create 
a refined, honorable, and ordered society: “There is only one cure for public distress—
and that is public education, directed to make men thoughtful, merciful, and just.”34 The 
gentleman’s education, anchored in a liberal, humane tradition, offered another way of 
promoting social responsibility. Ruskin believed that education should have lasting 
ethical, social, and political implications; it should provide a sensibility, a moral 
backbone that supports the interworking of all society’s limbs.35  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Pritchard, Dickens’s England, 77. 
 
33 Pritchard, Dickens’s England, 77. 
 
34 Richard Ruskin, Sesame and Lilies, ed. Deborah Nord (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 
2002), 61. 
 
35  The Victorian debates over education are an extension of those begun in the century before. Among the 
most notable early contributors to the debate are Richard Edgeworth, most famous as an inventor, and his 
daughter, novelist and writer Maria Edgeworth, who, in Practical Education (1798), draws from social 
philosophers such as Locke and Rousseau, as well as more specialized writers of education such as Joseph 
Priestly and William Godwin. As we move closer to the mid-nineteenth century, the discussion is furthered 
by Lord Henry Brougham, a politician, who would advocate education reform based on his belief that 
scientific and difficult literature should be adapted for a rapidly expanding literate group, and social theorist 
Harriet Martineau, who in Household Education in 1848, applies to education her sociological insights 
about freedom and rationality.  
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Both utilitarian reformers and proponents of a traditional curriculum agreed that 
cross-class education was a burgeoning necessity. The debates leading up to and 
following from the Forster Education Act stemmed from disagreements over what the 
content of education should include and who should have access to certain types of 
education.36 Those same debates play out in the Victorian novels of education, which 
clarify the stakes of Victorian educational reform, putting their characters in often 
untenable situations that highlight both the pressing need for reform and the potential 
complications of change. Access to education is a central issue for many of these novels; 
social inequality prompts further consideration of who should receive an education of 
culture. My argument that modernist-era writers found education to be illustrative of the 
of the impossibility of cultural transmission is an extension of the Victorian novelists’ 
examinations of whether cultural transmission should occur across class lines. The 
modernist complication to the Victorian question of “who should have culture” is the 
additional question, “is culture something that can be given?”  
George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss (1860) is an especially notable example of 
how the English novel critically examined different approaches to middle class education, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36In addition to providing increased educational opportunities to the poor, reformers also often proposed 
that women should receive education, as well. A woman’s education in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, to the extent that it existed, was superficial and disjointed, subject to the whim of private 
governesses and unregulated boarding schools. In Sesame and Lilies (1865) Ruskin outlines his plan for 
educating both boys and girls. He believes their education should be distinct from one another in order to 
reflect men and women’s different social roles: a man’s command of education should be “foundational 
and progressive,” while a woman’s should be “general and accomplished for daily and helpful use.” While 
Ruskin did not advocate a traditional “gentleman’s education” for young girls, he hoped to spread to them 
what he saw to be the essence of that tradition, asking educators to “appeal to the same grand instincts of 
virtue in them [girls]; teach them, also, that courage and truth are the pillars of their being” (Ruskin 61).   
For different perspectives on the education of boys and girls, see William Henry Hadow’s report , 
“Differentiation of the Curriculum for Boys and Girls” (1923) and George Eliot’s essays “Silly Novels by 
Lady Novelists” and “How we Encourage Research.” 
 
18 
	  
particularly the contrast between utilitarian and traditional curricula. When Mr. Tulliver 
proclaims “What I want, you know…what I want, is to give Tom a good eddication: an 
eddication as’ll be a bread to him,” he means he wants to give his son the opportunities 
he himself had not been afforded in his youth.37 Representative of the burgeoning middle 
class, Mr. Tulliver is situated in a moment that had no precedent, no clear educational 
path for training Tom for a life of business. Mr. Tulliver knows his son needs education 
in order to advance to a life of business, but he does not know what that education should 
entail: “Education was almost entirely a matter of luck—usually of ill-luck—in those 
distant days,” Eliot reminds her readers, “The state of mind in which you take a billiard-
cue or a dice-box in your hand is one of sober certainty compared with that of old-
fashioned fathers, like Mr Tulliver, when they selected a school or a tutor for their sons” 
(176). Mr. Tulliver’s confusion about what an appropriate education looks like is put into 
a more directly political context a few years later in Eliot’s Felix Holt, the Radical 
(1866), which, like The Mill on the Floss, takes place around the Reform Act of 1832. 
Felix Holt engages much more forcefully with overtly political themes, as Eliot asks for a 
kind of civic accountability in the wake of social reform. As workers are bribed for their 
votes and political rallies result in physical violence, she asks if there might be types of 
knowledge that are dangerous for the working class to have if they are not fully and 
properly—according to her definition— educated. Novels such as Elizabeth Gaskell’s 
North and South (1855) and Charles Kingsley’s Alton Locke (1850) also explore the 
social injustices suffered by the working classes, confronting the question of what forms 
of knowledge could bring them real benefit. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 11. Hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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 These novels illustrate Lowe’s point that new access to education would invite 
increasing questions about how to use that education responsibly. Part of that 
responsibility included a consideration of which types of education would be best suited 
to the middle and lower classes. The most obvious conflict in The Mill on the Floss is 
between education as a humane pursuit and as a utilitarian program. Tom’s existing 
knowledge is useful and sensible: “He knew all about worms and fish and those things; 
and what birds were mischievous and how padlocks opened, and which way the handles 
of the gates were to be lifted” (43). But the novel’s young protagonist, the spirited and 
impetuous Maggie Tulliver, searches for a knowledge different in kind from that of her 
brother: she demonstrates a markedly different intellectual capacity that is founded on 
curiosity and creativity, “remembering what was in the books” and comparing the 
injustices of her own daily life to the rich, imaginative world offered in literature (43). 
This contrast in learning styles is echoed in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times, which 
criticizes utility taken too seriously. Dickens highlights the pressures of a fully utilitarian 
lifestyle, as the harsh and overly pragmatic Thomas Gradgrind sees his daughter, Louisa, 
suffer as she learns the limits of such dry factuality. Sissy Jupe’s free spirit, on the other 
hand, compensates for her lack of academic success. Culture in these novels is contrasted 
starkly to the terms of a utilitarian program. Eliot, Dickens, Kingsley, and Gaskell all 
continue to support culture, advocating an educational program that teaches the values 
that inspire their own literary craft.      
When it appears in these novels, mentorship generally affirms the value of 
culture, often indicating the shortcomings of overly rigid approaches to utility. Sissy 
Jupe, for example, becomes a positive mentor to the Gradgrind children, while Mr. 
20 
	  
McChoakumchild is a detrimental one, a caricature of utilitarianism at the cost of 
creativity. Eleanor in Alton Locke tutors the poor tailor in theology, eventually 
encouraging Locke to become a poet, so he can “help to infuse some new blood into the 
aged veins of English literature” and “bring home fresh conceptions of beauty, fresh 
spiritual and physical laws.”38 In The Mill on the Floss, however, mentorship is an 
elusive and conflicted resource. Maggie feels stifled, held back from the opportunity to 
learn because she is unable to find a mentor, while Tom is forced into Mr. Stelling’s 
mentorship, which he does not want. Stelling’s Oxbridge degree may be useful, 
according to Eliot, but it may not be useful for everybody. Eliot’s portrayal of Maggie 
and Tom’s conflicting experiences of mentorship encourages the reader to consider that 
there may be different curricula appropriate for different students. Tom’s “worms and 
fish” calls for discussion about whether education should be overtly useful to someone 
like him, or more traditional, as in the liberal or humane practice of culture better suited 
to Maggie’s intellectualism and curiosity.  
Through her depiction of conflicts in mentorship, Eliot questions whether the 
newly educated are being transmitted an education appropriate to their needs. She uses 
mentorship to depict the particular frustrations in acquiring a meaningful education, but 
she also finds no resolution to the problem of mentorship she outlines. Mr. Stelling’s 
attempts to mentor Tom prove futile and Philip Wakem’s mentorship of Maggie does not 
actually bring her any lasting benefit. Philip’s mentorship offers Maggie very little; the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Charles Kingsley, Alton Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 384.  
See Alan Rauch’s reading of the novel in Useful Knowledge: The Victorians, Morality, and the March of 
Intellect (2001). 
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natural conclusion to their relationship is his marriage proposal. Like Rachel Vinrace in 
Virginia Woolf’s The Voyage Out, Maggie dies before her mentor could become her 
husband, indicating that marriage is not really a viable solution to a wider problem of 
access to education. While Woolf, I will argue, revisits mentorship in more complicated 
ways in her later novels, Eliot cuts off any sustained examination of mentorship as soon 
as Maggie drowns. Still, her treatment of mentorship in The Mill on the Floss grants an 
expansive view of culture that highlights its attempts as a program of social welfare. 
Mentorship in the novel is not aimed at validating the worth of Mr. Stelling’s Oxford 
culture as much as it represents the enormous difficulty of making such culture benefit 
everyone. In my next section, I elaborate on a specific conception of Oxford and 
Cambridge culture as having precisely such value. In my examination of how mentorship 
fails in twentieth-century fiction, I argue that these later authors are able to denounce 
mentorship more radically than Eliot does because they resist more forcefully this 
particular notion of culture as a larger social curriculum. 
 
II. Education as Culture: the Gentleman’s Education and the University 
In a practical sense, education in the nineteenth-century English novel is clearly 
wrapped up with Victorian debates about class. Many of these novels ask how the state 
should systematize education so that more may receive it. As reformers called for 
increasing and systematized access to education among all classes, there remained those 
who wanted to preserve education’s relationship to the cultivation of what might be 
called upper class sensibilities. According to these arguments, even though an education 
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based on culture had typically prepared a student only for a life of leisure or purely 
intellectual pursuit, this education could be made suitable for people of a wider range of 
class backgrounds. One of the most vocal proponents of such an education was Arnold, 
whose writings went on to inspire an entire century of critics committed to what Chris 
Baldick calls “the social mission of English criticism.” In tracing the foundation of 
English studies in its modern institutional aspect, Baldick drawn a line from Arnold to 
Leavis; he explores the development of literary criticism as “practical criticism” in that it 
“seeks a real practical effect upon society, directly or indirectly.”39 Arnold was as much 
concerned with the creation of a healthy society as the reform and utilitarian movements 
had been. Just as such movements responded to class disparity, Arnold’s arguments in 
favor of culture were rooted in his own formulas regarding class. When he 
“recommend[ed] culture as the great help out of our present difficulties,” he intended 
culture to unite a society divided among the “Barbarians” (upper classes), “Philistines” 
(middle classes), and “Populace” (working classes).40 The cultural program he proposed 
was centered on the humane learning associated with the academy—a learning that he did 
not feel needed to be made immediately accessible to all in order to bring benefit.  
  In his introduction to Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy, Ian Gregor paraphrases 
Arnold’s point as “In Victorian England, we have a society in which the aristocracy is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Chris Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 4. 
Baldick also notes that Arnold himself was opposed to the term “practical criticism,” associating it with the 
overly mechanical or short-sighted engagement with only economic concerns. “As part of his withdrawal 
from the sphere of practice, it is to be noted that the term ‘practical criticism’ appears in Arnold’s writing 
as a description of the worst kind of criticism, an interested criticism tied to one or another class or political 
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40Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 5.  
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longer in effective control of a nation destined to be ruled by the populace, a nation 
which has been checked in its true development by the selfishness and commercialism of 
a complacent middle class.”41 So in Culture and Anarchy, Arnold proposes a resurgence 
of upper class values even though the tradition the upper class enjoyed had lost its former 
dominance. The “aristocratic class,” as Arnold called it, had a “well-known politeness, a 
kind of image or shadow of sweetness.” 42 As part of its decline, the aristocratic class had 
been “lured off from following light by those mighty and eternal seducers of our race 
which weave for this class their most irresistible charms—by worldly splendour, security, 
power, and pleasure.”43 Even if members of the aristocratic class use their wealth to 
procure items of luxury, Arnold maintains that at one time they were able to use their 
class position to further their interest in beauty and intellect. It is that lifestyle—one in 
which free time was devoted to learning and the appreciation of art—that Arnold wishes 
to revive.  
He believes, however, that these aristocratic values, with proper training, can 
emerge from members of any class. These “aliens” will pass on to others only the best of 
what the aristocratic class has to offer.44 Culture can potentially belong to anyone, and, in 
turn, support a society in which all classes exist in harmony. The aristocratic class (albeit 
of his own construction) offers a useful model for all society since the type of knowledge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ian Gregor, introduction to Culture and Anarchy, by Matthew Arnold (Indianapolis & New York: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), (xvii). 
 
42 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 84. 
 
43 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 84. 
 
44 “Aliens” is Arnold’s term for the intellectuals who can be born from any class, who together will form 
the “cultured” state. 
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it has is oriented not toward—as Arnold would have it— the fleeting and short-sighted 
motives of utilitarian reform, but toward a long and rich English history that Arnold 
thinks can mediate present social unrest. Arnold locates in utilitarianism an economic 
motive that subverts a nobler social mission: “In his school reports and in the public 
debates about state funding of education [Arnold] deplored the Gradgrindery of crammed 
instruction and the Liberals’ short-sighted educational policy of ‘payment by results’.”45 
Even (or perhaps especially) in the absence of a ruling aristocracy, Arnold proposed a 
concerted effort to continue to disseminate the particular aristocratic values that could 
reassert virtue, or the “shadow of sweetness,” and work against what he saw as an 
alarming educational trend that he believed would result in the social unrest he termed 
“anarchy,” the danger of “doing as one likes.”  
Arnold maintained that the kinds of knowledge to which the aristocratic class had 
previously received exclusive access could actually serve a social mission of universal 
benefit. His goal is social harmony and class transcendence, a “quest for a principle of 
authority in a democratic society” that “[brings] into one harmonious and truly humane 
life… the whole body of English society.”46 Arnold’s ubiquitous “sweetness and light” 
may seem to be at first blush a “disengagement from practical politics,” but they are 
actually long-range planning tools: “He intends to have an effect upon the world, but an 
effect that is necessarily delayed by its detour through history.”47 Arnold’s formula is a 
sustained theory of social reform meant to change the future for all classes by advocating 
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46 Gregor, introduction to Culture and Anarchy, xiv. 
 
47 Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 23. 
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the sustained cultivation of a particular history of humane thought that had hitherto been 
characteristic of or accessible to only one class.  
For Arnold, culture had two defining characteristics: first, even though it had the 
ability to reform future society for all, it uniquely and historically belonged to members 
of the aristocratic class who had access to generations of criticism and philosophy so as 
to inform their own understanding of the world; and, second, it was a dynamic process 
that relied on an active engagement with one’s own present and past. Arnold maintained 
that the process of culture could bring people out of their class, making their 
distinguishing characteristic humanity. Culture could “make the best that has been 
thought and known in the world current everywhere”; it removed the bounds of class by 
bringing “sweetness and light” to all.48 Arnold’s argument about culture culminated in his 
claim that education should be tasked with disseminating culture. For all his memorable 
poetry and criticism, Arnold focused much of his work on education as an institution: in 
1851 he became part of an inspectorate that was part of a highly controversial 
government department that looked at the connections among Government, Church, and 
“Dissent over the minds of the rising generations.”49 In 1875, he told the Royal Academy, 
“My life is not that of a man of letters but of an Inspector of Schools.”50 Indeed, 
education as an institution offers Arnold a useful metaphor for society as a whole. Dr. 
Arnold of Rugby, Matthew Arnold’s father, famously viewed schools as microcosms of 
society, and, according to Baldick, his son “often seems to envisage society as a large 
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49 Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 33. 
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school in which the exemplary conduct of teachers and monitors is decisive.”51 Arnold’s 
version of education, like his version of culture, relied on the knowledge of the few to be 
spread to the many. Education and culture both work through a system of thought-
modeling, and serve the same function as the antidote to anarchy.  
Thus Arnold conceived of education “as a civilizing agent rather than just a 
transfer of information.”52 To that end, he proposed a model for education that went 
beyond simply reproducing information and actually transmitted it through mentorship. 
He encouraged personal role models capable of training other individuals to become their 
own “best selves.” In order to ensure the transmission of culture—a transmission 
necessary for social preservation—Arnold offered an education premised on the idea of 
formative training. If people could be brought into contact with good literary models, 
then there might emerge a newly trained corps of teachers who could be brought “into 
intellectual sympathy with the educated of the upper classes.”53 Arnold was looking “for 
an example to lead the multitude now that priesthoods and aristocracies were losing their 
power,” and makes culture and education, at one point the intellectual capital of the 
aristocracy, stand in for the aristocracy itself. 54  In his attempt to transmit these values to 
the middle class, Arnold appealed to “their duty as the ‘natural educators’ of the eager 
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Baldick quotes Arnold’s father’s argument about the need for a “mentoring” aristocracy: “It seems as if few 
stocks could be trusted to grow up properly without having a priesthood and an aristocracy to act as their 
schoolmasters at some time or other of their national existence” (33). 
 
52 Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 34. 
 
53 Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 34. 
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and irrepressible working masses,” even though he feared that the middle classes would 
likely not succeed in this endeavor. “The middle classes,” Baldick continues, “ must 
embrace state education, not just to assimilate the masses, but to cure their own lack of 
exemplary governing qualities, otherwise ‘a great opportunity is missed of fusing all the 
upper and middle classes into one powerful whole’.”55 The harmony of that “whole” was 
Arnold’s main imperative; it was the primary task of culture. 
Culture for Arnold moved away from the ordinary or the mechanical and toward 
transcendence of one’s limited class or other experience. Arnold was comfortable 
prescribing this system of culture with limited admission as an antidote to “anarchy” 
among all the classes because he felt confident that his select group could adequately 
disseminate this culture by modeling the appropriate behavior for those unable to get 
more direct access: 
Therefore the true business of the friends of culture now is…to spread the belief 
in right reason and in a firm intelligible law of things, and to get men to try, in 
preference to staunchly acting with imperfect knowledge, to obtain some sounder 
basis of knowledge on which to act.56  
Culture was not only something that one has, but a subject that could be taught; culture 
lent itself to his mentorship model since it was intended to be passed on through a 
combination of dutiful study and personal reflection. Furthering his argument that culture 
could be spread through education, Arnold labeled his cultured elite the “sovereign 
educators,” whose task was to work “decisively and certainly for the immediate future.” 
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Baldick refers especially here to Arnold’s The Popular Education of France (1861). 
 
56 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 176. 
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This work required the development of their “best selves,” through which “we are united, 
impersonal, at harmony.”57 Culture was an inward operation involving personal behavior 
rather than state regulation, encouraging one to live in harmony with the state: “Everyone 
of us has the idea of the country, as a sentiment; hardly anyone of us has the idea of the 
State, as a working power. And why? Because we habitually live in our ordinary selves, 
which do not carry us beyond the ideas and wishes of the class to which we happen to 
belong.”58 Here Arnold asks for social responsibility and encourages people to move 
outside of their class and consider how to enact actual social change; mentorship was his 
version of legitimate social reform. His sovereign educators, then, operate in line with the 
traditional obligations of mentorship, intended to pass on an agreed-upon standard of 
values. As they promote the “best self,” the sovereign educators reproduce shared social 
and national values in those around them, encouraging other individuals to become their 
own “best self,” continuing the cycle of acculturation.  
Culture for Arnold cannot be separated from the institution that fosters it; the 
university is a kind of hallowed ground for the cultivation of the mind that he believes, 
with the help of mentorship, can eventually cultivate the nation. The university was, as it 
would become later for Leavis, Arnold’s last and only hope. Because of its well-
recognized association with the upper classes, the only ones granted access to the expense 
and unpaid leisure of Oxbridge, the university had a longtime association with the 
allegedly upper-class sensibilities that Arnold hoped to disseminate among the entire 
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population. Castle identifies the university during Arnold’s time as relatively immune 
from the pragmatism coming to dominate schooling at lower levels: “intellectual 
discourse remained committed to the goals of humanistic education. This was true 
especially in the ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge, which continued to offer 
a curriculum grounded in [transmitting] the humanist ideal…to a middle- and upper- 
class clientele.”59 Mill, too, would claim that the university “is not a place of professional 
education.”60 As it was for Leavis, the university was for Arnold the bastion of the 
tradition of humane learning, and so the only institution appropriate for transmitting the 
culture that he believed this tradition could promote.61   
Writing a century later, Leavis reiterated Arnold’s argument that Oxbridge not 
only promoted culture, but constituted it. Though criticized for his often overzealous 
defense of the moral value of English literature, Leavis believed in a version of culture 
that has endured for centuries. Leavis argued in Education and the University that 
specialization at universities overshadowed liberal education; he offered a model for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Castle, The Modernist Bildungsroman, 55. 
 
60 John Stuart Mill, qtd. in W. Kenneth Richmond, Education in Britain Since 1944: A Personal Retrospect 
(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1978), 115.  
 
61Arnold’s contemporary Cardinal John Henry Newman likewise charged the university with the task of 
cultural preservation, arguing in his The Idea of a University (1852) that knowledge is its own end, a 
valuable pursuit even if it does not satisfy more overtly pragmatic goals. While Newman’s ultimate vision 
would require Church assistance, the fundamentals of his argument coordinate nicely with Arnold’s belief 
that education and culture share a particular relationship when brought together in the university. The 
university, Newman maintains, “is a place of teaching universal knowledge,” not the scientific 
advancement advocated in a utilitarian curriculum (Newman 3). To the extent that it has a function, it is 
that liberal education “brings the mind into form” (Arnold 7). As for Arnold, there is a real benefit in an 
institution that is a “seat of universal learning” because it brings together bright minds and academic 
debate. It fosters, Newman claims, an environment of “pure and clear” thought, “which the student also 
breathes,” and that in turn “A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are, 
freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom” (Arnold 77). 	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“University English School” based on a liberal studies curriculum designed to bring 
together various disciplines. Leavis believed a university education had the potential to 
offer experiences that could not be matched elsewhere: 
I assume that the attempt to establish a real liberal education in this country—to 
restore in relation to the modern world the idea of liberal education—is worth 
making because, in spite of all our talk about disintegration and decay, and in 
spite of what we feel with so much excuse in our many despondent moments, we 
still have a positive cultural tradition. Its persistence is such that we can, in 
attempting at an ancient university an experiment in liberal education, count on a 
sufficient measure of agreement, overt and implicit, about the essential values to 
make it unnecessary to discuss ultimate sanctions, or provide a philosophy, before 
starting to work.62 
Here, Leavis explains that the assumption behind his entire argument is that liberal 
education restores a “positive cultural tradition,” and this tradition is still seen as valuable 
even in his own day. If the universities focus on what he calls the “cultural realm,” they 
can work against modern society’s “decay.” It seems significant that Leavis felt the need 
to defend the relationship between “positive cultural tradition” and the university in ways 
that Arnold did not feel necessary—likely because Arnold could take that relationship as 
a given.63 His halting prose, replete with qualifying clauses, reveals that Leavis wanted to 
remind the reader that this relationship still exists. While the first few lines of the passage 
could almost belong to Arnold himself, Leavis’s “we still have” implies that he may have 
perceived the relationship between culture and the university to be increasingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Leavis, Education and the University 18. 
English literature, however, was not specifically part of the centuries-long tradition of education that Leavis 
celebrated; it did not become a subject of study at Oxford and Cambridge until the end of the nineteenth 
century.  
 
63 Lord Alfred North Whitehead offers in “The Aims of Education” an interesting formula that combines 
Arnoldian and utilitarian thought. His calls for specialization ask for a knowledge base built by general 
versions of culture, which is then accompanied by an education focused on utilization, or a specific skill. It 
is worth noting that Whitehead’s version of culture and education had religious overtones, as well, although 
his version of religion is hardly equivalent to Newman’s. Whitehead does make it clear, however, that his 
definitions of culture and education are indebted to the nineteenth century. 
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precarious as the twentieth century progressed. He even defends culture itself by 
supplementing “cultural tradition” with the term “positive,” a qualifier Arnold would not 
have needed, having assumed that culture is inherently good. Leavis felt that the 
specializations of the modern day curriculum threatened to unseat the university as a 
keeper of positive cultural traditions. For Arnold, the university and the “sovereign 
educator” worked in tandem, but as the university moves away from liberal education and 
culture, mentorship, I will show, characterizes an increasingly pervasive concern for the 
loss of cultural transmission Leavis so vocally feared. 
 
  III. The Social Uses of Mentorship: Bildung and Habitus 
Greek in origin, “Mentor” appears in The Odyssey as the man into whose care 
Odysseus places his son, Telemakhos. Encouraging Telemakhos to search for his father, 
Mentor initiates the boy’s quest for “identity and adulthood,” as Thomas Simmons puts 
it. Mentor “identifies and nurtures the traits that most distinguish Telemakhos: …faith in 
self, trust in the gods. Mentor draws Telemakhos further into his own Ithakan tradition by 
giving him a chance to prove himself.”64 According to this foundational model, a mentor 
promotes personal, individual achievement while also encouraging awareness and 
acceptance of a set of shared social values. A mentor in this classical sense is a guide 
rather than an imitable subject; the mentor makes possible a journey in which the mentee 
comes into his own while also becoming the embodiment of a tradition. This process, 
Simmons clarifies, depends on active, livable experience as a means of transmitting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64Thomas Simmons, Erotic Reckonings: Mastery and Apprenticeship in the Work of Poets and Lovers 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 4. 
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culture: “Mentor does not teach abstract values, or lecture about the gods… [He] invokes 
a cultural tradition that cannot be passed along in abstract or philosophical speculations. 
It must be achieved through living.”65 Mentorship, according to its original principles, 
facilitates the acquisition and transmission of culture by joining the process of individual 
human maturation and experience with the continuation of shared cultural traditions and 
values. Through mentoring the individual, the mentor preserves key social principles and 
ideals.  
Mentorship in these terms is not far removed from a literary tradition especially 
popular in the nineteenth century: the Bildungsroman, loosely translated as a novel of 
development. The Bildungsroman illustrates fully mentorship’s task of cultural 
preservation and transmission from the perspective of the mentee. As Bildungsroman 
protagonists become more conflicted across the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, 
they anticipate the more dramatic failings of mentorship that I highlight in the novels of 
Hardy, Forster, Woolf, and Spark. While its roots are in eighteenth-century Germany 
(Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre is considered the archetype of European 
Bildungsroman), the Bildungsroman was popular among the Victorians because it offered 
a model of social order or harmony through the establishment of a shared set of cultural 
values. Typically, a mentor would facilitate this process for the protagonist through what 
Castle calls “a mystical apprenticeship and induction.”66 Similar to the primary task of 
the classical mentor, the Bildungsroman traces the development of a self that matures in 
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the context of prescribed social norms.67 In its most traditional form, Bildungsroman sees 
no conflict between Bildung and culture: Bildung translates to “education” or “training,” 
and through such education or training the protagonist finds resolution with the cultural 
values of his society. 
This resolution is complicated, however, as the nineteenth century progresses. 
Franco Moretti’s influential The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European 
Culture (1987) argues that by the eighteen thirties, the self began to be brought into 
conflict with society in increasingly irresolvable ways.68 Todd Kontje elaborates, “Youth 
acquired new significance during this period as individuals could no longer expect to 
mature into the stable world of their parents…the evolving protagonists of the new 
Bildungsroman do more than reflect the uncertainties of the age; they also help to shape 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre (1795-6), gained popularity following Carlyle’s 1824 English 
translation (see Todd Kontje’s The German Bildungsroman: History of a National Genre for more 
information about Goethe’s contribution to the form in Germany and England, and Martin Swales’s The 
German Bildungsroman from Wieland to Hesse for an additional overview of the traditional 
Bildungsroman). 
Wilhelm Dilthey, who coined the term “Bildungsroman” in 1870, claims that a leading characteristic of the 
form is the way it portrays the individual internalizing society: Bildungsroman maintains “the emphasis on 
the uniqueness of the protagonist and the primacy of his private life and thoughts” while considering 
“whose age and culture these inner thoughts reflect”(Castle 8). Similarly, Mikhail Bakhtin identifies the 
two characteristic features of the genre as the depiction of a character “in the process of becoming,” and 
that it is possible to trace historical change by tracing the development of the Bildungsheld (protagonist) 
(Kontje 111). 
 
 
68 Moretti argues that the ascendency of the Bildungsroman was a response to sweeping historical changes 
in eighteenth-century Europe, and that Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice is one of the best representations 
of English Bildungsroman. According to Moretti, the “miracle, or mirage perhaps” of Bildungsroman is the 
“beautiful balance” it portrays “between the constraints of modern socialization, and its benefits” (vi). 
“Modern socialization” in these novels “is a process,” Moretti contends. This process first encourages 
“dynamic, youthful,” and “subjective” individualism, then later emphasizes that such individualism is mere 
“irresolute wandering” (59). As he undergoes that process, the individual learns to subject his individual 
desires to the will of society. 
34 
	  
an understanding of the events that produced them and to which they respond.”69 In 
novels such as Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, Dickens’s David Copperfield and Great 
Expectations, and Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre, protagonists undergo the process of 
socialization only with great difficulty; this leads Moretti to claim that these novels 
critique particular social norms and values as oppressive or interfering with one’s 
individuality.70 Moretti identifies the Industrial Revolution and Chartism as the specific 
political revolutions that shaped these novels and brought about the tensions between 
personal satisfaction and social imperatives one finds there. In light of such social 
upheaval, he believes, Bildungsroman protagonists could not locate a stable or desirable 
system of social values.  
In response to those same political movements, however, Arnold only tried to 
reaffirm his belief that the self and society could be brought into harmony. Fearing a 
breakdown into violence or “anarchy” after the Hyde Park demonstrations of the eighteen 
sixties, Arnold turns to culture as restorative Bildung.71 As Baldick notes, Arnold 
considered “culture” to be a translation of Bildung; the “sweetness and light” of Arnold’s 
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70 The protagonist of English Bildungsroman “is certainly not expected to establish a moral universe that 
already exists, eternal and unchangeable, and even less to question that universe. His most typical function 
lies rather in making that world recognizable for any and all readers” (Moretti 189). In other words, the 
nineteenth-century English Bildungsroman does not seek to establish the tenets of a moral code, but to 
demonstrate the difficulty a protagonist might have in achieving morality given particular social unrest. 
 
71In Culture and Society, Raymond Williams is quick to point out the fallacy of Arnold’s assumptions of 
violence: “But now the Hyde Park railings were down, and it was not Arnold’s best self which rose at the 
sight of them. Certainly he feared a general breakdown, into violence and anarchy, but the most remarkable 
facts about the British working-class movement, since its origin in the Industrial Revolution, are its 
conscious and deliberate abstention from general violence, and its firm faith in other methods of advance” 
(125).   
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culture come from a specific education or training rooted in classical texts.72 Arnold’s 
culture included, as I have outlined, a literal education, and he believed it could 
accomplish what Bildung could accomplish in the classical Bildungsroman: encourage 
individuals to work toward a peaceful and harmonious social State. Arnold’s sovereign 
educators are, like traditional mentors, charged with the perpetuation of cultural values, 
only they transmit a specific version of culture. While the protagonist of the mid-
nineteenth-century Bildungsroman lacks a clear sense of how to reconcile himself with 
possibly evolving cultural values, Arnold maintained that his specific program of culture 
fostered at Oxbridge was the only truly restorative version of Bildung.  
In my argument that mentorship fails in the novels of the twentieth century, I 
identify a developing belief in the ultimate inadequacy of culture, specifically in the form 
of Bildung Arnold had envisioned. Moretti also examines a crisis in Bildung, arguing that 
the Bildungsroman as a form collapsed in the modernist age. Seeing that the tension  
between self and society reached a climax in the years leading up to World War I, 
Moretti identifies modernism’s particular failure to conform to the demands of the 
traditional Bildungsroman.73 He looks to the modernist difficulty with the Bildungsroman 
in order “to discover how this failure signals a successful resistance to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 33. 
 
73 Moretti uses James Joyce as representative of the modernist Bildungsroman. The “decentered 
subjectivity” and “more developed form of bourgeois identity” of Leopold Bloom, for example, “sets the 
pattern for twentieth-century socialization” (244). In his reading of Portrait of the Artist, Moretti argues 
that the novel’s merit “lies in its being an unmistakable failure”; Joyce intentionally follows the discovery 
of Stephen Dedalus’s artist’s “soul” with a “strikingly blank and pointless” final chapter to illustrate the 
irresolvable conflict between “meaningless everyday” and “meaningful revelations” (241-3). 
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institutionalization of self-cultivation (Bildung).”74 The modernist Bildungsroman, Castle 
finds, ultimately cannot get around a contradiction between Bildung in its traditional 
sense and the tenets of modernism: the type of self-cultivation Bildung requires relies on 
an acceptance of social parameters that modernists would resist in favor of a more 
radically asserted and experimental selfhood. Developing these arguments about the 
irresolvable conflict of Bildung, I show in the following chapters that the ready 
association between Bildung and cultural transmission also comes to an end. Self-
development and education may still be possible in the twentieth century, but they can no 
longer occur in tandem with the acquisition of a socially agreed upon culture. This, in 
turn, complicates the preservation and propagation of culture.    
The self-development and education that had once been part of Bildung are part of 
a larger and more complex system of value dictated by one’s social class and experience. 
In place of Bildung, I contend the novels I study more accurately align culture with Pierre 
Bourdieu’s “habitus.” Bourdieu’s habitus refers to “dispositions,” or the social values 
that have been passed on in a particular group.75 Related more to social performance than 
personal feeling or behavior, habitus is a disposition, an attitude or preference shaped by 
exposure to the everyday experiences typical of one’s social group. Habitus addresses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74Castle, The Modernist Bildungsroman, 1. 
 
75 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
6. 
Bourdieu calls habitus a “generative and unifying principle which retranslates the intrinsic and relational 
characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods, 
practices” (Practical Reason 8). In Outline of a Theory of Practice, he qualifies this “generative principle” 
as being “durably installed” and tasked with “regulat[ing] improvisations” and “produc[ing] practices 
which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their 
generative principle” (78). 
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one of the questions Bourdieu asks in his In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive 
Sociology: “how can behavior be regulated without being the product of obedience to 
rules?”76 Habitus does not rely on obedience, but emphasizes the reconciliation of 
individual agency with social structure in ways that consider the interworking of one’s 
class, background, family and other diverse elements of what Bourdieu calls “social 
field.” The question I ask is how might one aspire to Bildung if doing so goes against the 
expectations of one’s social field? If habitus formulates the social self as helping shape 
the “inner” self, what happens if these two selves are brought into conflict? In particular, 
I ask how studying cultural transmission from the perspective of habitus makes 
impossible the type of cultural transmission Arnold envisioned as part of Bildung. 
Habitus requires a more careful consideration of class and experience than Arnold may 
have been willing to account for, and it opens the possibility that matters of class and 
educational policy impact the viability of a Bildung spread among all classes. The authors 
I study consider culture in the context of the whole of their protagonists’ life experiences, 
and this exposes the vulnerabilities of cultural transmission in an age replete with social 
conflict.    
Mentorship is particularly appropriate to such a study since, as I have shown, it 
unites cultural transmission with the harmonizing of self and society. How can the mentor 
transmit culture if he cannot bring an individual into harmony with social values? If, as 
Moretti implies, shared cultural values are increasingly more difficult to establish in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Karl Maton, “Habitus,” in Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, ed. Michael Grenfell (Stocksfield: Acumen 
Publishing Limited, 2008), 50. 
 Habitus is more formally defined in Bourdieu’s Reproduction, Outline of a Theory of Practice, and The 
Logic of Practice. 
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modernist period, and, as Bourdieu implies, cultural values are largely determined by an 
evolving habitus that reflects class-based expectations, then the modern mentor and the 
modern mentee may be placed in an impossible position. Like Moretti and Bourdieu, I 
believe the conflicts of Bildung and habitus are expressed most clearly in institutions of 
education. Moretti senses the beginnings of this conflict in his analysis of the 
representations of schools in the late Bildungsroman: “school…teaches this and that, 
stressing the objective side of socialization—functional integration of individuals in the 
social system. But in doing so it neglects the subjective side of the process: the 
legitimation of the social system inside the mind of individuals, which had been a great 
achievement of the Bildungsroman.”77 Values are replaced by coercion; students must 
learn facts but need not believe their truth. Schools, Moretti claims, depict a stifled 
individuality; the institution encourages social order without regard for the individual—
an untenable imbalance in Bildungsroman.  
Similarly, Bourdieu’s observations of the French school system in the 1930s led 
him to believe education was a “mechanism for consolidating social separation…The 
pedagogy and the curriculum were of a piece with this controlling ethos.”78 While 
education had been intended as a means of achieving an inclusive society, Bourdieu 
instead found that it “imbibed a cognitive culture which procured him ‘distinction’, 
potentially elevating him above the process of mass democratization.”79 Bourdieu felt 
that the effects of formal education are reproductive in that those who benefit from it the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Moretti, The Way of the World,  230. 
 
78 Derek Robbins, “Theory of Practice” in Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, ed. Michael Grenfell  
(Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2008), 29. 
 
79 Robbins, “Theory of Practice, 29-30. 
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most are already in possession of economic advantage and social standing. Rather than 
promote solidarity, education encourages division. Bourdieu’s observation identifies the 
ultimate failure of Arnold’s vision for education and mentorship: Arnold depended on the 
transmission of culture through Bildung, with the assumption that differences in habitus 
would become irrelevant. In practice, though, as education reforms met middle class 
demand for expanded economic opportunities, culture became increasingly defined in the 
context of one’s habitus, as social performance fitting to one’s economic status. In the 
novels I examine, Bildung can be encouraged through mentorship, but habitus cannot. 
That mentorship fails for these protagonists, I argue, points to modernist-era authors’ 
sense that culture could not be transmitted across classes in the ways that Arnold had 
imagined.  
 
IV. The Incremental Failure of the Modernist Mentor 
Even as they famously identified failures of institutional education, Victorian 
novels could typically still find the successful transmission of culture for their 
protagonists, especially with the help of a mentor. But in the later novels I analyze in this 
dissertation, mentors seem to subvert rather than promote both social harmony and 
individual advancement. Mentorship acts as an impediment to cultural transmission, 
rather than a facilitator. I suggest that these novels contextualize mentorship’s inability to 
transmit culture in a meaningful way within a greater framework of institutional 
education. These novels do not point to the specific failures of educational institutions 
themselves, but to the very assumption that culture could be transmitted by any 
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institution. Each of the following chapters is aligned with a particular landmark moment 
in the history of education reform as I trace the incremental failures of mentorship in 
these novels to the incremental nationalization of education that took place in the first 
half of the twentieth century, culminating in the arrival of the British welfare state. This 
does not imply a relationship of direct causation, but demonstrates that both the 
nationalization of education and the modernist-era concern over the transmission of 
culture are symptoms of a widening gap between education and culture that these writers 
attempted to address.   
The tenets of education reform highlight the particular challenges to cultural 
transmission that Hardy, Forster, Woolf, and Spark identify; culture’s foundations in 
education mean that problems of cultural transmission cannot be far removed from 
evolutions of education’s parameters. As education reform considered especially class-
based differences in educational experiences, modernist-era writers could locate similar 
challenges to transmitting Arnold’s celebrated Oxbridge culture, while also arguing more 
radically that cultural transmission is an increasing impossibility. Therefore, when 
speaking of the institutional and cultural contexts surrounding literary modernism, one 
should also consider education—especially the university.80 A consideration of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80The university is occasionally considered in arguments about the relationship between modernism and 
postmodernism. In their introduction to Bad Modernisms (2006), Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz 
relay an anecdote from Susan Stanford Friedman to demonstrate how the university has tended to portray 
modernism: Friedman’s first “sketch” is “that of the graduate student she was in 1965, for whom 
modernism ‘was rebellion’ modernism was ‘make it new.’ Modernism was resistance, 
rupture…Modernism was the antidote to the poison of tradition.’ The second is that of her own students 
thirty years later. Who found their own antidote to tradition in postmodernism and for whom ‘Modernism 
was elitism. Modernism was the Establishment. ‘High Culture’ lifting it skirts against the taint of the ‘low,’ 
the masses, the popular’” (6). 
Lawrence Rainey, too, identifies in Institutions of Modernism: Literary Elites and Public Culture the 
perception of the university as a site of the transmission of modernist values—a perception he believes to 
be flawed because it relies too much on the high and low culture dichotomy he overturns: “The current 
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university as I present it also allows us to consider a more nuanced version of what 
“culture” meant to modernist-era writers. Not only a term encapsulating the artifacts of 
high art and intellectualism, “culture” for these writers also referred to a particular 
tradition that had been defined by its very transmissibility in historical institutions. Even 
as they insisted on the preservation of art, these writers would question the institutions of 
its production as they endeavored to “make it new.”  
I begin my analysis with Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure, a novel published in 
1895, twenty five years after the Forster Education Act. At this point, it had become 
obvious that the Act had been only marginally successful in creating opportunities for 
educational advancement among the lower classes. J.F.C. Harrison calls the Forster Act 
“wretchedly inadequate,” in part because it was incomplete.81 The 1870 Act had made 
education compulsory only at the primary level, which resulted in rates of illiteracy 
dropping sharply, but prompted very little reform at the secondary school level.82 As a 
result, while the government finally extended grants to university colleges (including 
technical schools) in 1889, “even the small number of students fluctuated up and down in 
a disconcerting way.”83 By the 1890s, in other words, it had become apparent that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
narrative around structures of modernism and postmodernism is flawed, and leads to arguments like those 
of Charles Newman” (3). Newman argued in The Postmodern Aura that in “the twentieth century… 
universities and other cultural institutions appropriated modernism’s formal repertory, canonized its works 
and artists, and sapped its political energies” (Rainey 3).  
 
81J.F.C. Harrison, A History of the Working Men’s College 1854-1954 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1954), 147. 
 
82 Pritchard, Dickens’s England, 77. See also H.C. Dent’s Century of Growth in English Education, 42.  
Prtichard specifies that as a result of the Act, the illiteracy rate dropped from 31 per cent of males and 45 
per cent of females, to 19 per cent and 26 per cent. 
 
83H.C. Dent., Century of Growth in English Education, 42.  
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educational opportunities given to the country’s youth had not sustained them all the way 
to the university. 
Jude Fawley of Jude the Obscure seems to have taken to heart Ruskin’s dicta 
about the benefits of educating the masses, but he suffers as a result of reform’s 
shortcomings. Published two decades after the Act’s passage, he is a symbol of its 
inability to enact any real change, especially with respect to university-level education. 
He dreams of attending Christminster, Hardy’s version of Oxford, despite his humble 
origins. While the sweeping changes to education made in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century seemed poised to allow students like Jude further educational access, these were 
ultimately only surface reforms: “Opportunities for ambitious ‘poor students’ like Jude 
Fawley were not uncommon in the nineteenth century, though resistance to the 
‘overeducation’ of the working classes defined the nature of education available to those 
classes.”84 As a result, education reform only increased lower-class access to education at 
the secondary and vocational levels, while “access to the ancient universities remained 
foreclosed.”85 Educational reform may have, in theory, encouraged personal growth, but 
only to the extent that it did not lead a student too far outside his class, and left Oxbridge 
as the ultimate and exclusive educational triumph. 
 In the aftermath of the 1870 Education Act and the realization in the early 1890s 
that the poor were still unable to advance to the universities, Jude the Obscure diagnoses 
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University of Liverpool, and later wrote a book on British universities. 
 
84 Castle, The Modernist Bildungsroman, 79.  
 
85 Castle, The Modernist Bildungsroman, 79.  
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a disparity, I believe, between two accounts of culture. On the one hand, culture is the 
Arnoldian ideal achievement of a “best self,” a process of humane development. On the 
other hand, culture refers to the acquisition of a particular type of education, namely an 
Oxbridge degree. The downfall of Hardy’s protagonist is that mentorship grants him 
access only to the first kind of culture; his lower-class status shuts him out of a class-
stratified institutional reality. My reading of the novel is premised on Raymond 
Williams’s definitions of “culture” in Keywords and Culture and Society. He identifies 
two separate definitions of culture, one that is related to a process, “the tending of natural 
growth,” while the other refers to a specific acquisition: “But this later use, which had 
usually been a culture of something, was changed, in the nineteenth century, to culture as 
such, a thing in itself.”86 Williams places this shift in the nineteenth century, and I 
suggest that this modification in meaning is the first step toward identifying culture as, to 
use Bourdieu’s term, cultural capital. 
Education in the novel is used to depict defining moments in Jude’s development 
as his needs come into conflict with social expectation; education as a formalized system 
of knowledge fails to account for an institution that is inherently rife with inequalities and 
that often cannot provide knowledge even to those who seek it. Mentorship fails Jude at 
every turn, especially in the shape of his teacher, Phillotson. While Phillotson and even 
Sue Bridehead can help arm Jude with specific forms of knowledge, they cannot grant 
him access to the institution that would provide him with cultural capital. Mentorship, in 
fact, becomes harmful as it leaves Jude in a kind of cultural no-man’s-land: he lacks the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976), 16. 
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ability to find social acceptance anywhere and is left both impoverished and alienated. 
Because Jude the Obscure is often read as a precursor to the modernist novel, the failures 
of mentorship in the novel effectively lay the groundwork for the eventual denunciation 
of mentorship that I explore in later chapters.87  
 My second chapter, a reading of E.M. Forster’s Howards End, also explores the 
ways in which access to culture is class bound. Despite their best efforts at mentoring the 
working-class Leonard Bast, the intellectual Schlegel sisters succeed only in enabling his 
death. Bast, a clerk, has aspirations of cultural acquisition, reading Ruskin and attending 
the Queens Hall concerts. When the Schlegel sisters attempt to imbue him with their own 
version of upper-class culture, however, it becomes apparent that he will never be able to 
attain it. Mentorship in the novel is set against heritage, a lived experience. The 
mentorship the Schlegel sisters offer Bast is nothing but a false piety, since they cannot 
also give him heritage, which proves to be intransmissible. 
In particular, the Schlegels’ mentorship of Bast evokes the motivation behind the 
Working Men’s College and other adult education programs. F.D. Maurice, one of the 
founders of the Working Men’s College, attempted a “more spiritual analysis of 
education” than had been offered at more technical-type programs, such as the 
Mechanics’ Institutes.88 Alongside the rise of the University Extension Movement from 
Cambridge, the Working Men’s College was part of a wider movement for adult 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Both Malcolm Bradbury’s The Modern British Novel (2001) and Perry Meisel’s The Myth of the Modern: 
A Study in British Literature and Criticism after 1850 (1987) position Hardy as a proto-modernist. Hardy 
also makes a pronounced appearance in Paul Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory (1975).  
88 Harrison, A History of the Working Men’s College, 1854-1954,  xvii.  
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education that, as Ruskin had, often sought to extend some of the cultured lessons of 
Oxbridge to laboring men. Additionally, the Education Act of 1902 abolished the old 
School Boards and contained a provision for secondary schools. Rapid educational 
expansion at all levels soon followed, including higher education, as there appeared a 
marked increase in new universities that had offered a variety of different types of 
programs.89 Forster’s critical presentation of the Schlegels’ mentorship calls to mind the 
Liberal landslide of 1906, where increased Liberal political successes was accompanied 
by greater scrutiny of liberal programs, as well as a loss of working class support. 
Universities extended the amount and variety of programming available to working men, 
but the education they offered remained distinct from the Cambridge experience Forster 
enjoyed. The question Forster asks in response to these developments is not whether the 
curriculum of working class students should overlap in places with those of Oxford and 
Cambridge. The question he asks, in fact, is whether what is transmitted to these 
students—even if the content is the same—is actually culture at all, or whether culture 
remains dependent on the particular heritage he associates with Oxbridge.         
  In the end, Bast is mentored by the Schlegels according to certain Cambridge 
principles, but without the benefit of institutional heritage— all Helen can reproduce 
through her mentorship comes in the form of Bast’s illegitimate child. Culture, Forster 
argues, is increasingly wrapped up with a very specific kind of lived experience; it cannot 
be duplicated. This is not a condemnation of adult education or the Working Men’s 
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Dent also explains that in the first decade of the twentieth century, the number of English universities 
doubled from five to ten, thanks especially to the work of Joseph Chamberlain (74-79). 
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College; rather, Forster acknowledges that the state of higher education has changed in 
irreversible ways, and to go on with culture as before is disingenuous. Forster’s 
ambivalent resignation in Howards End leads him to reflect much later in “The Challenge 
of Our Time” that while he experienced at Cambridge a wonderfully “humane and 
intellectually curious” education, it was blind to economic disparity. With the spread of 
parliamentary reforms, “[t]he poor have kicked…and more power to their boots.”90 He 
develops the argument he began in Howards End, where Bast was not yet poised to 
“kick” since he is merely a passive object of the Schlegels’ own interest. Ignoring Bast’s 
economic status is a mistake because it leads the Schlegels to think he should be grateful 
for any sort of crumbs of culture being tossed his way. So when Forster later reflects, 
“life has become less comfortable for the Victorian liberal,” it “has lost the basis of 
golden sovereigns upon which it originally rose, and now hangs over the abyss,” he is 
looking back at the liberal programs that the Schlegel sisters evoke.91 The “abyss,” a 
loaded term in Howards End, is where Bast ends up as a result of an education that was 
more of a charity. Ultimately, the Schlegel sisters represent a culture that Forster enjoyed 
but does not think can or should be reproduced exactly, a conclusion he comes to in part 
because of his own engagement with working-class education programs. 
 Virginia Woolf, the subject of my third chapter, changes Forster’s sovereigns for 
guineas but draws a conclusion no less concerned with Oxbridge inaccessibility. Woolf’s 
criticisms, though, are gender based, linking Oxbridge exclusivity to tyrannical 
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91 Forster, “The Challenge of Our Time,” 57. 
 
47 
	  
patriarchy. My argument begins with her late pacifist manifesto Three Guineas, in which 
I argue she uses mentorship to characterize the relationship between higher education and 
war that she elucidates in the text. Woolf identifies male exclusivity as the cultural value 
transmitted to the sons of educated men, the transmitted material of an outmoded 
mentorship. She incriminates Oxbridge for a reproduced patriarchal and exclusionary 
male discourse that shuts out from education the “daughters of educated men” identified 
in Three Guineas. Oxbridge comes to symbolize for Woolf the absence of a viable, 
transmissible entity, a culture worth passing on.  
 For Woolf, the prime historic motivating factor was not a specific reform act or 
even institutionalized higher education for women (although she delivered addresses on 
these topics on several occasions).92 Instead, she uses mentorship as a means of 
criticizing what she believes were the social values that led to the Great War and were 
liable to result in World War II. War informs her view on the tangible danger presented 
by the transmission of a gender-bound culture. To help explicate the links among 
mentorship, patriarchy, and war, I first examine male education in Jacob’s Room, where 
Jacob Flanders’s walk through the Cambridge corridors seems to lead him straight to 
Flanders Field. In To the Lighthouse, Woolf reveals a more complete argument regarding 
education and the transmission of patriarchy and tyranny as she links Mr. Ramsay’s 
oppressiveness and Charles Tansley’s blind worship to the university that encourages 
such behavior among male mentors and mentees. In this novel Woolf further defines 
mentorship as a masculine tradition that is also overly concerned with materiality. She 
depicts mentorship in To the Lighthouse as both male-based and thing-based, as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 See especially Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own (1929). 
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educated men of the novel transmit only objects that will decay with time. Theirs is not a 
lasting mentorship, but a self-eroding one; as such it is not a viable or lasting cultural 
tradition. 
 I think Woolf struggles, though, in defining this cultural tradition. Castle reads 
Mrs. Dalloway as a Bildungsroman and believes that the novel “embrace[s] the core 
value of Bildung” and “retrieves it from a recent history of institutionalization within 
state educational systems.”93 I am not so convinced, however, that Woolf is able to reach 
back to a completely desirable version of culture or education. In To the Lighthouse, 
Woolf berates the exclusivity that was fostered at institutions of higher education long 
before any “state” or truly standardized educational system came into play. So while her 
novel is a sharp critique of Oxbridge’s relationship to war, an implied militarism that she 
believes is the result of an inherently masculine type of transmission, she also poses the 
possibility of a mentorship that would belong exclusively to women and produce its own 
model of a transmissible culture predicated on feeling and lasting emotion. The 
relationship between Lily Briscoe and Mrs. Ramsay seems poised to offer a viable 
alternative of cultural transmission, only to be ambiguously cut short at the end as Lily 
asserts her own selfhood. Woolf concludes To the Lighthouse with the eventual 
condemnation of mentorship altogether, seeming finally to do away with any system of 
cultural transmission at all. 
Notwithstanding Woolf’s pronouncement that mentorship is effectively dead, 
mentorship remains a topic of inquiry in later novels concerned with cultural 
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transmission. I turn in my last chapter to Muriel Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie, 
published in 1961, to see her look back at a century’s worth of national and political 
reform that had completely re-imagined the role of education in the state. Spark’s novel 
marks the end of the journey for the 1870 Forster Education Act, having been taken all 
the way to its possible conclusion. Spark, who is often viewed either in relation 
to France's late modernist "nouveau roman" or as an early postmodernist, demonstrates 
the early twentieth-century anxiety about cultural transmission that developed after 
World War II and the relative democratization of education in the United Kingdom. If 
Woolf saw in World War I the end of a culture that could be transmitted through 
institutions of education, then she may, had she lived, seen late in World War II an even 
more radical separation of the two than she even began to imagine in “The Leaning 
Tower,” where she suggested that the war left the writers of the thirties with feelings of 
guilt over their own privilege, which they depict in critical self-reflections of their 
educational experiences.  
Spark’s novel is set in the early thirties, just a few years before the outbreak of 
World War II and the subsequent reform legislation. Spark reminisces over the vestiges 
of an unregulated education, the lingering rebellion Miss Brodie represents at the Marcia 
Blaine School. The novel is set in a primary school, the particular division brought under 
mandate back in 1870. The school’s stern headmistress Miss Mackay, attempts to shape 
the students into a nationally approved version of the proper young lady, dictating their 
dress and lessons and helping them map their futures. But Miss Jean Brodie, whose 
culture is based in the perceived superiority of her own taste, offers her own approved 
version with her visions for her girls’ futures. Education and culture divided, the Marcia 
50 
	  
Blaine School and Miss Jean Brodie battle it out to see whose version of social value will 
prevail. The character who emerges in a pyrrhic victory is Sandy Stranger—Miss 
Brodie’s mentee who had betrayed her to Miss Mackay. Sandy, who had at one point 
sympathized with and admired Miss Brodie, becomes famous for writing The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace, a title that seems to reflect decisive change. 
Through Sandy, Spark finally advocates a “transfiguration” of culture, where culture 
moves out of the institution altogether.  
 Such decisive change also characterizes the sweeping educational reform 
movements of the nineteen forties. One of the most significant pieces of education 
legislation since the 1870 Forster Education Act, the 1944 Education Act mandated a 
number of noteworthy reforms. Its fundamental changes included a mandate for 
secondary education, newly defined as beginning at age eleven and lasting until fifteen or 
sixteen. Additionally, free secondary education would be extended to all children in 
schools maintained by the public authorities.94 The act was designed to overcome the 
noticeable lack of students enrolled in secondary education, a lingering problem of the 
Forster Education Act.  As social historian Angus Calder notes in his post-war history 
The People’s War, even as late as in 1938 “the proportion of children eligible by age for 
secondary education who had actually obtained admission to secondary schools had been 
only fourteen per cent.”95   
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But one of the most significant parts of the bill was based on a recommendation 
of the 1926 Hadow report, which had, “[urged] the reorganization of the elementary 
schools into junior (or primary) and senior (or modern) schools, with a break at eleven.” 
In a response to the findings of the report, the 1944 Butler Education Act instituted the 
“eleven plus” examination. The results of a student’s eleven plus exam would dictate his 
or her track in the tripartite secondary school system, which divided students into either 
academic, technical, or functional programs.96 The eleven plus system, Calder chides, 
“ensured that privilege was perpetuated behind a façade of democratic advance.”97	  Here, 
the Education Act of 1944 moves beyond earlier reforms which had focused on providing 
access to students of all classes and expanding higher education to the working class. The 
Act also solidified a progressive system of levels that would lead to increased scrutiny 
regarding what was taught at each level and also how it would be measured.  
Miss Brodie approaches the primary school with the same task of cultural 
preservation that had once belonged to Arnold’s sovereign educator; only it is not clear 
why her version of culture is worth having. Miss Brodie teaches her six girls, the “Brodie 
Set,” that only her version of culture is education, and only she understands how to 
transmit and measure this culture. While Miss Brodie believes she is mentoring her girls 
in order to ensure the continuation of an appreciation for the high arts, her mentorship 
actually devolves into a culture too much removed from social welfare, as what Miss 
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Brodie passes on to her protégés is essentially fascism. I argue that Spark points to the 
educational policies of the mid-century as indicative of the final break between 
educational institutions and culture; these institutions transmit a version of a culture no 
longer worth preserving. If education had, at one point, signified individual cultural 
achievement, it now refers to an abstracted elitism that cannot be transmitted in any 
relevant way. Mentorship, a once viable demonstration of the link between education and 
culture, is finally rendered obsolete—even laughable.   
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Chapter One 
Culture’s Anarchy: Mentorship and Cultural Capital in Jude the Obscure 
 
“‘Let me only get there,’ he had said with the fatuousness of Crusoe over his big 
boat, ‘and the rest is but a matter of time and energy.’” 
-Thomas Hardy, Jude the Obscure 
 
Thomas Hardy makes it clear on the first page of Jude the Obscure that Jude 
Fawley is meant to suffer. The novel opens with the loss of Jude’s teacher, Mr. 
Phillotson: “The schoolmaster was leaving the village, and everybody seemed sorry.”1 
No student, however, is more unhappy than Jude. When Phillotson asks, “Sorry I am 
going, Jude,” the young boy responds only with tears (10). Phillotson, too, is sorry to 
leave his eager pupil and gives the boy a book as a parting gift. Jude, however, wants to 
know where his teacher is going. Despite his protestations that Jude “wouldn’t 
understand my reasons,” Phillotson shares with his student his own plans to attend 
Christminster, the Wessex incarnation of Oxford: “Well—don’t speak of this anywhere. 
You know what a university is, and a university degree? It is the necessary hall-mark of a 
man who wants to do anything in teaching. My scheme, or dream, is to be a university 
graduate” (10). In a final goodbye, Phillotson urges Jude to continue his studies and 
smilingly asks his pupil to come visit him should he ever come to Christminster.  
In this simple exchange between a student and his teacher, Hardy sets in motion a 
string of heartbreaking events that are the unintended consequences of Jude’s attempts to 
follow his teacher to Christminster. Jude’s working-class origins prevent him from ever 
gaining admission to the university and he pays a steep price for having even tried. His 
                                                
1 Thomas Hardy, Jude the Obscure, ed. Norman Page (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1978), 9. Hereafter cited parenthetically. 
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failures at Christminster lead him to a life of wandering and poverty, unable to find 
happiness in love or career. Upon embarking for Christminster, Jude reconnects with 
Phillotson, but his former mentor—who never made it to the university— is now his 
romantic rival. At the end of the novel, Phillotson is married to Jude’s love, Sue 
Bridehead, while Jude dies alone and impoverished, having already outlived all of his 
children. While the mentorship between Phillotson and Jude begins in the novel as a 
teacher’s inspiring gesture toward an education evocative of Arnoldian culture, their 
relationship eventually becomes the source of Jude’s social isolation and personal 
alienation.  
As a result of mentorship, Jude is encouraged to seek a higher level of education, 
but he is given no real way to achieve it on account of his class. The educational 
aspirations of Bildung fail to bring Jude any socially recognized capital. In this chapter, I 
argue that this failure points to a contradiction inherent to cultural transmission: Hardy 
uses the problematized mentorship among Sue, Phillotson, and Jude to depict the tension 
that exists between culture as a process of self-cultivation and culture as Bourdieu’s 
cultural capital, a set of definitive knowledge marked only by acquiring a socially 
recognized asset, in this case a Christminster degree. Phillotson initiates Jude’s quest 
toward academic learning, but this learning cannot grant him access to Christminster, an 
institution outside his class. Reflective of this irresolvable conflict, mentorship in the 
novel is ultimately useless in the face of deep-seated class distinctions that consistently 
fail to grant the lower classes full educational admission. In a damning critique of the cost 
of culture’s inaccessibility and the consequences of that inaccessibility, Little Father 
Time, Jude’s supposed protégé, commits murder-suicide as a result of his father’s 
                                                                                                            
55 
 
misfortunes; Little Father Time abolishes any likelihood of mentorship’s espousing 
Arnold’s “harmonious expansion of human nature” as he illustrates the unsustainability 
of this conflicted account of culture.2 Hardy’s protagonist fails as both apprentice and 
mentor, unable to develop either as an individual or as a member of a social group. When 
Jude dies sick and alone at the novel’s end among the sounds of the Christminster 
Remembrance Day celebration, he warns of the impossibility of Arnold’s celebrated 
institutional culture and the mentorship tasked with transmitting it.  
 
I. An Evolving Definition of Culture  
Raymond Williams argues that we can find in the nineteenth century a moment at 
which the definition of culture was in flux. In one connotation stemming from eighteenth-
century usage, culture in the nineteenth century referred to an Arnoldian-type process of 
humane development with its “intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic” associations. With an 
emphasis on culture as a progressive improvement, culture was “the tending of a natural 
growth, and then, by analogy, a process of human training.”3 Moving into the twentieth 
century, however, culture assumed a newly dominant definition as finite and product-
oriented. Williams suggests that this second definition emphasized measurable or readily 
identifiable cultural artifacts, referring to “the works and practices of intellectual and 
                                                
2Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Ian Gregor (Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1971), 38. 
 
3 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: 1780-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), xvi. 
Chris Vanden Bossche agrees with Williams that the nineteenth century saw “culture,” in part, as 
“broadened to comprehend the general process of individual development…this development was a 
gradual, ‘natural’ process” (“Moving Out: Adolescence” 83). Vanden Bossche and Williams also explain 
that this definition of culture was, specifically, a continuation of the eighteenth-century reformers’ 
depictions of education as the cultivation of a plant.  
 
                                                                                                            
56 
 
especially artistic activity.”4 Mentorship in Jude the Obscure, I argue, brings these two 
models into conflict. Whereas the promises of mentorship early in the novel point to 
culture as a process, the novel’s subsequent failures of mentorship can be attributed to 
this additional late nineteenth-century model of culture, a model Hardy identifies as 
inimical to the first. As culture comes also to mean “the independent and abstract noun, 
which describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity,” 
Jude’s learning cannot constitute culture unless it leads to a tangible outcome.5 
Associated with human maturation or classical Bildung, mentorship initiates Jude’s 
journey toward Christminster, but as the novel progresses, this mentorship model is no 
longer sustainable as Jude learns he would have needed to have been mentored his entire 
life to succeed at Christminster and struggles to find guidance in Christminster city. 
Ultimately, Christminster betrays both mentor and apprentice, drawing them near only to 
deny them entry and guard a culture which, despite its earlier apparent egalitarianism, 
shows itself as distinctly class-bound. 
In the beginning of the novel, education is tied to mentorship in ways that evoke 
Arnold’s sovereign educator. Arnold advocated cultural transmission through the 
personal pursuit of study and the adoption of a best self that would later promote other 
best selves; Hardy positions Phillotson as such a potential mentor through his aspirations 
                                                
4Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford UP, 1976), 80.  
Williams does not imply—nor do I—a linear progression from one understanding of the word to another. 
Instead, he traces when different senses of the word came into play; the nineteenth century, in particular, 
experienced multiple perspectives on the definition of “culture,” largely due to a preoccupation with the 
topic. 
 
5Williams, Keywords, 80. 
 Williams goes on to say that this sense of culture as product is now the most pervasive: “This seems often 
now the most widespread use: culture is music, literature, painting and sculpture, theatre and film…this use 
is in fact relatively late… The decisive development of [this last sense] into English was in 1C19 [the last 
third of the nineteenth century] and eC20 [the first part of the twentieth century].”  
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toward intellectual growth and his inspiring Jude to reach beyond his small Marygreen 
village. Jude and Phillotson have enjoyed a close relationship since Jude “was not among 
the regular day scholars, who came unromantically close to the schoolmaster’s life, but 
one who had attended the night school only during the present teacher’s term of office” 
(10). Jude remembers their closeness and his dreams of Christminster are tied directly to 
his desire to imitate Phillotson: “the city acquired a…hold on his life, mainly from the 
one nucleus of fact that the man for whose knowledge and purposes he had so much 
reverence was actually living there; not only so, but living among the more thoughtful 
and mentally shining ones there” (20). In Jude’s vision, Phillotson is a “best self,” a 
model worth duplicating. Phillotson and Christminster are inseparable in Jude’s mind; 
even the wind that blows from Christminster refreshes Jude because he believes that it is 
the same breeze that “touch[ed] Mr. Phillotson’s face, being breathed by him” (21). “And 
now,” Jude reflects, “you are here, breathed by me—you, the very same.” Associating the 
wind just as much with his teacher as with Christminster, Jude phrases his educational 
aspirations as an extension of his desire to be like Phillotson.  
Illustrative of the type of culture that Arnold promoted, the education Phillotson 
encourages includes a code of behavior.6 Phillotson’s departing words to Jude, “Be a 
good boy, remember; and be kind to animals and birds, and read all you can,” are geared 
towards fostering moral adult behavior (10). Jude tries to live by his teacher’s words, 
showing sympathy to the birds while acting as a scarecrow for Farmer Troutham since 
“Mr. Phillotson said I was to be kind to ‘em” (15). Even though he does not apply 
Phillotson’s teachings reflectively, this brief display of compassion effectively shows 
                                                
6 This also references Mentor’s focus on developing Telemakhos’s personal characteristics. Having 
assumed Mentor’s form, Athena tells Telemakhos to “lack neither courage nor sense from this day on” 
(Book II, line 203).  
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Jude’s early steps in the process of self-cultivation. It does not matter if he necessarily 
interprets all of Phillotson’s teachings properly at the outset; Hardy calls to mind here the 
slow and careful process of a young Bildungsroman protagonist just beginning his 
journey. Phillotson, it appears, has set Jude on the right path toward possible cultural 
acquisition, emphasizing the importance of moral behavior (“be kind”) and continued, 
self-motivated learning (“and read all you can”). 
The education Phillotson initiates is a “private study,” paralleling the “inward 
operation” characteristic of Arnold’s culture (28). Jude commits himself to his studies 
even and especially in the absence of his teacher and requests Phillotson send him Greek 
and Latin grammars. Jude receives the grammars and studies them carefully, imagining 
his mentor is beside him: he “covered up the marginal readings [in his Grammars], and 
used them merely on points of construction, as he would have used a comrade or tutor” 
(28).  Jude’s studies are marked by hard work and determination. His task is “a herculean 
performance... The mountain-weight of material under which the ideas lay in those dusty 
volumes called the classics piqued him into a dogged, mouselike subtlety of attempt to 
move it piecemeal” (27). Although immeasurably difficult, Jude’s self-directed lessons 
are successful since he learns not only to translate Caesar, Virgil, and Horace, but also 
comes to a personal understanding of the material: “the boy…[would] plunge into the 
simpler passages…in his purblind stumbling way, and with an expenditure of labour that 
would have made a tender-hearted pedagogue shed tears; yet somehow getting at the 
meaning of what he read” (28). By emphasizing the tirelessness and difficulty of Jude’s 
studies alongside his eventual success in learning the material, Hardy seems to celebrate a 
socially transformative mentorship. Mentorship is credited with having put Jude on the 
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proper path toward self-cultivation, and because of his hard work in meeting the tasks 
transmitted to him, Jude appears poised to enter his revered Christminster. 
Phillotson is a mentor because he fosters humane behavior and educational 
motivation by promoting a personal journey for Jude towards Christminster; that he 
encourages specifically the pursuit of an intellectual and moral best self—as illustrated by 
his aiding Jude in Greek and Latin and encouraging him to read and behave well— 
indicates that these criteria constitute, at this point in the novel, “culture,” the acquisition 
of which is a mentor’s goal for his apprentice. This mentored culture of Bildung, Arnold 
maintained, was best upheld at Oxbridge, institutions dedicated to the preservation and 
transmission of that culture. It follows that Jude believes his own cultural endeavors have 
sufficiently prepared him to enter an institution with a similar emphasis on a learned 
tradition. When Jude imagines himself at Christminster, he sees himself as “her beloved 
son,” as a natural extension of the tradition of learning in which he has engaged himself 
(33). “Would it be a spot,” he wonders, “in which, without fear of farmers, or hindrance, 
or ridicule, he could watch and wait, and set himself to some mighty undertaking like the 
men of old of whom he had heard?” (23). Believing he is finally free from the difficulties 
of life at Marygreen, Jude now associates himself with the “men of old.” When he arrives 
at Christminster, Jude wanders the streets alone while imagining conversations with 
various “sons of the university,” one of whom is Arnold himself. Although Hardy does 
not name the “spectre,” Jude “hears” bits from the preface to Arnold’s Essays in 
Criticism: First Series (1865): “Beautiful city! So venerable, so lovely, so unravaged by 
the fierce intellectual life of our century, so serene!...Her ineffable charm keeps calling us 
to the true goal of all of us, to the ideal, to perfection” (66). Jude believes he can be part 
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of that “venerable” tradition; mentorship, he thinks, transmits to him culture at its fullest 
potential.  
In a passing parenthetical phrase, however, Hardy reveals that the same “spectre” 
that called Christminster a “beautiful city” would later “mourn” Christminster as “the 
home of lost causes” (66). Hardy here makes ironic the tribute to Oxford that Arnold had 
intended in his preface to Essays in Criticism. Hardy borrowed a small part of Arnold’s 
reference to Oxford’s commitment to “the ideal, to perfection” even in the face of a 
rapidly changing society: in “an epoch of disillusion and transformation,” Oxford was the 
“home of lost causes, and forsaken beliefs, and unpopular names, and impossible 
loyalties!”7 Only Oxford could resist the Philistines, Arnold believed, even if to do so 
was unpopular. But if Oxford was a haven for “lost causes,” Christminster makes Jude a 
lost cause himself; Christminster becomes the home that Jude, named for the patron saint 
of lost causes, will never be able to claim as his own. Literalizing Arnold in a way Arnold 
would never have imagined, Hardy begins to undercut Jude’s notion of Christminster as 
accessible to those who desire and appreciate its vaulted tradition.  
The depiction of Christminster itself, I maintain, puts Williams’s two definitions 
of culture in competition with each other, and illustrates the resulting limitations of 
Jude’s studies. When Phillotson explains Christminster to Jude, he frames the university 
as facilitating the acquisition of Williams’s second sense of culture: “You know what a 
university is, and a university degree? It is the necessary hall-mark of a man who wants 
to do anything in teaching. My scheme, or dream, is to be a university graduate, and then 
to be ordained. By going to live at Christminster, or near it, I shall be at headquarters…I 
consider that being on the spot will afford me a better chance of carrying it out than I 
                                                
7 Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism (London and Cambridge: MacMillan & Company, 1865), xv- xix. 
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should have had elsewhere” (10). Here, Phillotson implies that culture is tied in to a 
specific place. Only a Christminster degree will make him able “to do anything in 
teaching.” Even to become a member of the clergy, he implies, requires a “hall-mark” 
degree. The division Phillotson makes between “a university” and a “university degree” 
is telling: a university experience may point to learning itself, but it is the attainment of 
the degree, specifically, that will allow him to move toward his goal of being ordained. 
He specifies his wish to be a “graduate” rather than simply a “student,” foreshadowing 
the insufficiency of his simplistic advice to Jude to behave properly and study hard.  
Jude’s interpretation of Phillotson’s account of Christminster is a hybrid of the 
two forms of culture Williams identifies, although Jude continues to emphasize the 
importance of earnestness and self-development. He envisions Christminster education as 
the inward, humane process of Arnold’s culture and also as bringing him toward finite 
and tangible indicators of having received culture:  
Hence I must next concentrate all my energies on settling in Christminster. Once 
there I shall so advance[…]that my present knowledge will appear to me but as 
childish ignorance[…]And then he continued to dream, and thought he might 
become even a bishop by leading a pure, energetic, wise, Christian life. And what 
an example he would set! If his income were £5000 a year, he would give away 
£4500 in one form or another […] Well, on second thoughts, a bishop was absurd. 
He would draw the line at an archdeacon. Perhaps a man could be as good and as 
learned and as useful in the capacity of an archdeacon as in that of a bishop […] ‘I 
can work hard. I have staying power in abundance, thank God! And it is that 
which tells…Yes, Christminster shall be my Alma Mater!’ (32-3) 
 
Jude’s vision is one of Christian morality and economic success. He hopes to continue his 
process of self-development to the point that he can reflect back proudly on his journey, 
and he believes that simply living a “Christian life” will be enough to make him a 
Bishop. This endeavor, though, cannot be separated from economic gain, as Jude’s mind 
quickly goes to the specific titles he can receive and how much money he can earn as a 
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result of his education. To the young and eager Jude, the education of the “university” 
and the “university degree” are one and the same, so he sees no reason to think that 
anything other than hard work and thoughtful study will be necessary to get him to 
Christminster. Jude has “staying power in abundance” and he thinks this is enough to 
take him to Christminster; he believes that engaging in the process of culture, in other 
words, is enough to grant him the tangible indicators of culture described in Williams’s 
second sense of culture (32). His future seems deceptively bright: his mentor teaches him 
that culture is a process of growth, of intellectual development, and to be cultured is to 
use education to promote such growth among others. Working toward such culture can 
bring one to Christminster, where a degree will set him on the path toward monetary 
recognition of his cultural acquisition. Had Jude succeeded, he would have been the 
ultimate success story of the 1870 Forster Education Act, having worked earnestly to 
achieve social mobility. 
Jude does not, of course, live out that dream in any capacity. As soon as he arrives 
at Christminster city, he “found himself actually on the spot of his enthusiasm,” only to 
perceive “how far away from the object of that enthusiasm he really was. Only a wall 
divided him from those happy young contemporaries of his with whom he shared a 
common mental life…Only a wall—but what a wall!” (70). Jude shares with the 
Christminster students a “common mental life,” but he does not know how to get to 
where they are. Jude’s self-development and independent study are the products of 
Phillotson’s mentorship and have brought him to Christminster, but having that shared 
“mental life” with the undergraduates is not enough to actually make him part of their 
cohort. As Part Second unfolds, Christminster education itself becomes the definitive best 
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self, the actual embodiment of intellectual and artistic activity—and Jude is shut out from 
it by virtue of his class.  
 
II. Christminster as Cultural Capital 
If mentorship’s inspiration brought Jude to Christminster in the first place, its 
disappointment foreshadows Jude’s impending frustration. Shortly after arriving at 
Christminster, Jude learns that Phillotson never made it to the university. When Jude pays 
a visit to the man who inspired him to go to Christminster, he is saddened to see a sallow-
looking Phillotson, who had grown “thin and careworn since Jude last set eyes on him” 
(83). In an instant, Jude’s optimism is shattered, as “this homely complexion destroyed at 
one stroke the halo which had surrounded the schoolmaster’s figure in Jude’s imagination 
ever since they parted.” In Jude’s mind, his mentor’s failure predicts his own: “Jude’s 
countenance fell, for how could he succeed in an enterprise wherein the great Phillotson 
had failed? ...he had visions of how Phillotson’s failure in the grand University scheme 
would depress him…” (82). Jude’s binary language of success and failure, of wholesale 
acquisition or outright lack, indicates that culture here is not a process of development, 
but a specific accomplishment—the university degree Phillotson set out to achieve. Jude 
does not consider the possibility that Phillotson could be successful even without the 
degree, even though Phillotson has contentedly settled into a career as a schoolmaster.8 
                                                
8 That Phillotson could be considered a “failure” despite his other notable accomplishments simply because 
he did not attend Christminster is supported in part by Hardy’s own biography: in The Country and the 
City, Williams quotes a British Council member who refers to Hardy—as well as George Eliot and D.H. 
Lawrence—as “our three great autodidacts,” despite their having achieved high levels of formal education. 
Williams concludes, “So the flat patronage of ‘autodidact’ can be related to only one fact: that none of the 
three was in the pattern of boarding school and Oxbridge which by the end of the century was being 
regarded not simply as a kind of education but as education itself: to have missed that circuit was to have 
missed being ‘educated’ at all,” just as Jude sees Phillotson as an educational failure, despite his success as 
a schoolmaster (171). 
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Phillotson’s failure transforms Jude’s dream into the “fatuousness of Crusoe over his big 
boat” as he recognizes that “to move among the churches and halls” of Christminster, to 
be “imbued with the genius loci,” is but a symptom of “his dreaming youth” rather than 
an appreciable reality (94).  
Ultimately, Jude concludes that the knowledge taught in these institutions does 
not constitute “education” and “culture”; rather, the institution itself is culture. If culture 
progresses, as Williams suggests, in the direction of absolute, identifiable markers, it is 
scarcely surprising that the institutions of education would come to be associated with the 
acquisition of culture, since they teach those texts that are readily identified as “culture.” 
In this context, Christminster moves away from culture as Bildung and is more accurately 
Bourdieu’s “cultural capital.” Separate from economic capital, cultural capital refers to 
“the general cultural background, knowledge, disposition, and skills that are passed from 
one generation to the next.”9 Bourdieu describes cultural capital as a “trajectory,” an 
inherited sensibility that “functions as a sort of advance (both a head-start and a credit),” 
by providing each new generation with “the example of culture incarnated in familiar 
models.”10  
Cultural capital represents the accumulated cultural knowledge indicative of a 
particular group’s tastes and values; a Christminster or Oxbridge education would be one 
particular part of the cultural capital of the upper classes, who had enjoyed fairly 
                                                                                                                                            
 
9 Jay MacLeod, Ain’t No Makin’ It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood  (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1987), 12. 
 
10 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Trans. Richard Nice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 16; 70. 
Value is socially assigned to specific institutions that represent the particular “disposition” of particular 
classes. Robert Moore explains cultural capitalais “acquired in the systematic cultivation of a sensibility in 
which principles of selection through inculcation, into principles of consciousness that translate into 
physical and cognitive propensities expressed in dispositions to acts of particular kinds” (Moore 111). 
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exclusive access to the universities. Such students do not consider their degree the 
hallmark of having gained culture in the sense of Bildung, since a degree is the 
confirmation of their having received the cultural capital particular to their class.    
Given that cultural capital is transmitted by a system of values shared by a particular 
group or class, the mentorship Jude receives from Phillotson is not the same type of 
mentorship Christminster students receive. If Christminster is the cultural capital of the 
upper class, then Jude, as a member of the lower class, will have a particularly difficult 
time gaining access—just as Phillotson did. The mobility of cultural capital between 
classes, Bourdieu claims, is rarely present in educational institutions. Bourdieu argues in 
The State Nobility (1996) that an elite university education is necessary cultural capital 
for those seeking dominant positions in socially powerful fields such as the government, 
commerce, and the arts, but that class movement in education is typically restricted. That 
is, Bourdieu understands education as a particular strategy that upper-class families use to 
maintain or advance social position: “the educational system…tends to perpetuate the 
space of the differences that separate them [the students] before they enter the system.”11 
Educational institutions “pla[y] a critical role in the in the reproduction of the distribution 
of cultural capital.”12 Because of this, “[t]hose highest in cultural capital in the form of 
possession of ‘legitimate culture’ are those highest in educational capital.”13 Bourdieu 
describes this protected cultural capital in Homo Academicus (1988), where he outlines 
how a classical (i.e. public school) education, along with the support of an educated 
                                                
11 Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, Trans. Lauretta C. Clough 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 228. 
 
12 Bourdieu, The State Nobility, 5. 
 
13 Robert Moore, “Capital,” in Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, ed. Michael Grenfell (Stocksfield: Acumen 
Publishing Limited, 2008), 113 (original emphasis). 
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family, guarantees selective access to the universities. But the problem of educational, 
and thus social, exclusivity Bourdieu identified with education in 1930s France was also 
the problem of 1890s England.  
Christminster education, crucially, comes to be defined as belonging to a specific 
class, an institution associated with capital: “Such places be not for such as you—only for 
them with plenty o’ money,” Aunt Drusilla admonishes Jude (92). Williams affirms 
Drusilla’s claim, stating that only one or two percent of the population—the upper 
class—were eligible for classification as educated, “all the rest were seen as ‘uneducated’ 
or as ‘autodidacts’.”14 Lumping together the uneducated with the autodidact, the upper 
class mentality as Williams would have it has little use for lower class education of any 
sort. In agreement with Bourdieu’s claim that educational institutions are closely guarded 
by the upper class in order to maintain their own authority and power, Williams 
maintains that the upper class took a dismissive view of lower class attempts to become 
educated: motivated poor students were seen “as either comically ignorant or, when they 
pretended to be learning, as awkward, over earnest, fanatical.”15 The tavern scene, in 
which Jude proves his Greek and Latin capabilities amid the sneers of the Christminster 
undergraduates, confirms the upper class refusal to allow lower class participation in 
education. Jude is mocked into reciting Latin to entertain the Christminster men; they do 
not take him seriously. Christminster for them had significance as an institution that 
signifies the acquisition of cultural capital, but not necessarily the acquisition of the 
actual learning necessary for Arnold’s type of culture. The Christminster students, in fact, 
                                                
14Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford UP, 1973), 171. 
 
15 Williams, The Country and the City, 171. 
. 
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“had not the slightest conception of a single word” Jude spoke, but they are able to buy 
him repeated rounds of drink (99). These students did not gain admission to Christminster 
through the arduous process of self-education that Jude had undergone, but by virtue of 
their having the economic means to attend. As such, their class has granted them cultural 
capital, a Christminster degree—that, and not necessarily the education for which the 
degree was supposedly awarded.  
Indeed, despite his abilities, Jude is cut off from Christminster completely 
because of his class: T. Tetuphany, a Master at Biblioll College, explains to him “that you 
will have a much better chance of success in life by remaining in your own sphere and 
sticking to your trade than by adopting any other course” (95). By virtue of its becoming 
a “hall-mark,” culture has become commodified, a means for the perpetuation of wealth, 
and so available only to a few, bringing to the forefront the class distinctions which 
Arnold had hoped to move beyond. By exploring the persistent class implications 
associated with the evolving definition of culture, Hardy eventually resists the synonymy 
of culture and mentorship laid out in the beginning, arguing against those attempts that—
like Arnold’s—present culture and cultural transmission as a way finally out of class 
distinctions. Mentorship in the novel illustrates the shifting definition of culture across 
the period from an inward process available to all to a version of cultural capital that 
denotes a specific set of culturally referential indicators. However mentorship also 
reveals Hardy’s criticism that attempts around that distinction between culture and 
cultural capital, between the processes society privileges and the markers it sets to see if 
those processes have been completed, are not only unrealistic, but dangerous to the social 
order that they try to promote.  
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If culture had become wholly equivalent to cultural capital, mentorship would be 
a bit of a ruse— to learn Greek and Latin, to learn how to live, even, are irrelevant 
without an accompanying Oxbridge degree. Mentorship would be largely unnecessary 
when the English public school system already sends upper-class students, and only 
those, to Oxford. But mentorship’s cultural significance as a way of transmitting 
knowledge is still insisted upon in the novel, since Hardy maintains that mentorship still 
remains necessary for the achievement of that cultural capital: Jude learns that  
to qualify himself for certain open scholarships and exhibitions was the only 
brilliant course. But to do this a good deal of coaching would be necessary... It 
was next to impossible that a man reading on his own system, however widely 
and thoroughly, even over the prolonged period of ten years, should be able to 
compete with those who had passed their lives under the trained teachers and had 
worked to ordained lines” (93-4; emphasis mine).16  
 
Schooling here substantially entails mentorship. Hardy argues that the wealthy acquire 
cultural capital through mentorship, but this mentorship is distinct from the mentorship 
that would inspire a lower class mentee to achieve culture. The ambitious poor are then 
left with a conflict between a sense of culture that implies the ability to move beyond 
their class—culture as process—and the cultural capital from which they are cut off.  
Jude, to his detriment, remains deluded by the earlier version of culture held out 
to him by his mentor, still believing that a mentorship-type relationship would make a 
difference: “He felt that he wanted a coach—a friend at his elbow to tell him in a moment 
what sometimes would occupy him a weary month in extracting from unanticipative, 
clumsy books” (92). But, as Tetuphany’s letter suggests, Jude cannot be expected to 
                                                
16 The other possibility for his entrance, “that of buying himself in… seemed the only one really open to 
men like him, the difficulty being simply of a material kind… [He] ascertained, to his dismay, that, at the 
rate at which, with the best of fortune, he would be able to save money, fifteen years must elapse before he 
could be in a position to forward testimonials to the Head of a College and advance to a matriculation 
examination” (94). In either case, Christminster is marked as available only to those with material means, 
rather than those with forms of humanist knowledge and appetite. 
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attain an education given his “sphere.” What is worse, even when Jude gives up his 
Christminster aspirations and seeks instead the position of a lowly cleric, he is reminded 
once more that real capital ultimately determines cultural capital: as he seeks a 
relationship with a certain composer, he is again shut out again when the man realizes 
Jude’s lack of material wealth (156). Jude, in short, has been indoctrinated with the idea 
that to engage in culture is to strive towards a personal best, but is continually frustrated 
by his inability to gain any actual capital—either economic or cultural— as a result of 
that process. Mentorship not only provides a vocabulary for culture, but models the 
problems of cultural transmission in actual practice. Jude, keenly aware of the impact his 
lifelong “struggle with material things” has had on his educational aspirations, is led to a 
dangerous place, “the hell of conscious failure” (101). Rather than facilitate cultural 
transmission, mentorship only raises Jude’s awareness of its impossibility.  
In Arnold’s text, Williams explains, the two nineteenth-century definitions or 
evolutions of culture as process and product are “indistinguishable” to the author; I 
maintain that Hardy, however, found the relationship between these models to be 
exceedingly problematic in practice, and the primary cause of his protagonist’s downfall. 
In invoking both mentorship and Bildung, Hardy, as I have suggested, recalls Arnold’s 
sovereign educator and his task of encouraging everyone toward culture. When actually 
put into practice in Hardy’s novel, however, the sovereign educator reveals the non-
viability of the Arnoldian paradigm precisely because it refuses to acknowledge the 
contradictions inherent to its arguments. For all Arnold’s emphasis on culture as an 
inward pursuit and study, he assigns the academy the role of “recognized touchstone for 
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the intelligence of society.”17 It is that “generally recognized touchstone” that makes the 
implementation of his model so difficult, as this education was unavailable to people of 
the lower classes, who were, as Castle puts it “effectively barred from higher 
education.”18 Jude’s insistence that “I can do without what it [Christminster] confers” is 
made only grudgingly because he actually does require a degree to achieve the capital 
that would promote social mobility (121). His declaration that he does not “care for social 
success” is the only way out of this problem; he realizes that social success without a 
Christminster degree is unattainable, so he can only reject social success outright. Jude 
sets out, in all earnest, to achieve a best self, to learn exactly what Arnold would have 
him learn, but for all the language around educational reform—from Ruskin, Arnold, 
Mill, even Eliot— encouraging personal growth, in practice education stopped short of 
leading a student outside his class. Jude had been, as Sue puts it, “elbowed off the 
pavement by the millionaires’ sons” (121).  
Baldick explains that Oxford was the object of Arnold’s “extremes of adulation… 
a particularly clear example of the lengths to which he went in creating an imaginary 
spiritual and intellectual ‘centre’ for English culture.”19 But it is this very idea of a 
“centre” that frustrates Hardy because Arnold’s ambitions really required a stronger 
                                                
17Ian  Gregor, introduction to Culture and Anarchy, by Matthew Arnold (Indianapolis & New York: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), xx. 
 
18Gregory Castle, Reading the Modernist Bildungsroman (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), 
73. 
 
19 Chris Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism1848-1932 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 46. 
It is significant that some of Arnold’s enthusiasm for Oxford may have been performative. Chris Baldick 
explains: “In his private letters and in some of his lesser known educational reports Arnold admitted that 
Oxford was little more than a glorified finishing school for the Barbarians, with a stagnant intellectual life. 
Yet in his more public pronouncements, all his rhetorical gifts are brought into play to weave a myth of a 
completely different Oxford. This Oxford, despite the passionate theological controversies of Arnold’s own 
student days, is described as ‘so unravaged by the fierce intellectual life of our century, so serene!’ This 
serenity, whether or not it corresponds to the real Oxford, is clearly important to his purpose” (46). 
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social mandate in order to be realized—and the State, as it had demonstrated in the 
educational reform movements of the 1870s and beyond, had stopped far short of 
granting access to this hallmark of educational cultural capital to all of its classes. And 
while Arnold, as an Inspector of Schools, was keenly aware of the politics surrounding 
education, he could not set up a tangible system for enacting the mentorship he 
advocated. Arnold relied on institutions already recognized for their cultural 
association—affirming the idea that to be cultured, one requires an Oxbridge education. 
Williams, sympathetic to Arnold in many ways, admits the “ambiguity” in Arnold’s 
position: 
For it is not merely the influence of the best individuals that Arnold is 
recommending; it is the embodiment of this influence in the creation of a State… 
as a ‘centre of authority and light’…Yet the existing State, loaded with such an 
agency, is in fact, on Arnold’s showing, subject to the deadlock of the existing 
and inadequate social classes. The aristocracy uses the power and dignity of the 
State as a means to protect its own privileges. The middle class, reacting against 
this, seeks only to diminish State power, and to leave perfection to those ‘simple 
natural laws’ which somehow arise out of unregulated individual activity.20  
 
Arnold’s mentorship model fails because it tries to have culture in both ways: mentorship 
encourages personal development but then holds individuals to a class-bound standard 
that recognizes such growth only selectively. Although Arnold would see culture as 
ideally bringing people out of their class (by paradoxically promoting cross-class 
privileging of upper class values), he infamously could not get around stock notions of 
class. His model collapses in on itself because it is bound to institutions while pretending 
to be beyond institutions. Abstract to the point that it cannot be reproduced, culture is not 
a model that a mentor realistically can transmit across class lines.  
 
                                                
20 Williams, Culture and Society, 122-3. 
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III. Mentorship and Anarchy 
Williams links the failure of Arnold’s vision to a State that was ill-suited to such a 
program of culture, lacking the structures and power to implement his vision. “It scarcely 
seems likely,” Williams concludes, “if Arnold is right about these classes, that any actual 
State, expressing the power of one or other of them, or a deadlocked compromise, could 
undertake the all-important function which he proposes.”21 Arnold’s culture depended on 
an inward process that still needed State regulation, which created real confusion for 
Arnold, Williams suggests, because he was unable to “find the material” of the process of 
culture “in the society of his own day, or, fully, in a recognition of an order that 
transcended human society.”22 Williams emphasizes here the ways in which the State 
undercuts cultural transmission. Hardy’s response to this is to test a mentorship that 
reacts against the State.23  If the mentorship between Phillotson and Jude shows the 
persistent disparity between culture and cultural capital, then the mentorship between Sue 
and Jude tries to offer an alternative cultural transmission that disregards the conventions 
of a State that has frustrated Jude. Culture in this context is not separate from anarchy, 
but a possible cause of it. As a result of his failures, Jude is led to a form of anarchy; he 
must do as he likes because he has no longer has a social group to reference. Anarchy 
becomes Jude’s only viable option, since his indoctrination with a culture only available 
                                                
21 Williams, Culture and Society, 123. 
 
22 Williams, Culture and Society, 127.  
Having difficulty locating in the State the appropriate means to disseminate culture, Arnold’s own 
definition of culture begins to contradict itself. Williams clarifies that culture for Arnold “is right knowing 
and is right doing; a process and not an absolute,” but on the other, “his emphasis in detail is so much on 
the importance of knowing, and so little on the importance of doing” (125). 
 
23 Arnold defines the “State” as “the nation in its collective and corporate character. The State is the 
representative acting-power of the nation; the action of the State is the representative action of the nation” 
(Passages from the Prose Writings of Matthew Arnold  161). Jude and Sue react against particular 
conventions and structures that are characteristic of the State. 
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to the upper classes has left him with a conflicted habitus that renders him unable to 
identify with the members of any class. 
Mentorship in this incarnation is antagonistic, a reaction against society rather 
than a means of harmonizing with it. As a response to his unavoidable failure at 
Christminster, Sue tries to transmit culture to Jude in a form that lacks the constraints of 
cultural capital, yet the result, I argue, is an anarchy that leads Jude only to further 
conflict and alienation and illustrates Hardy’s ultimate denunciation of cultural 
transmission. Sue mentors Jude with values distinct from those transmitted by Phillotson. 
After running away from her training school at Melchester, she cries to Jude, “I wish I 
had a friend here to support me; but nobody is ever on my side” (122). Jude, Sue 
believes, is against her because he retains his religious beliefs and refuses to share her ill 
opinion of Christminster. While she does not want to “disturb” Jude’s “convictions,” she 
“did want and long to ennoble some man to high aims,” and she believed that person was 
Jude: “when I saw you, and knew you wanted to be my comrade, I—shall I confess it? – 
thought that man might be you. But you take so much tradition on trust that I don’t know 
what to say” (122-3). Sue wants to mentor Jude away from Christminster, “an ignorant 
place,” on the grounds that it no longer promotes intellectualism, but only “new wine in 
old bottles” (120). She opposes the “traditions of the old faith” and wants “the 
medievalism of Christminster…[to] be sloughed off” (120). For Sue, mentorship offers 
the possibility of a break from tradition, rather than its continuation. Christminster, 
according to her argument, should not be seen as the “hall-mark” of culture precisely 
because it shuts out men like Jude: “You are one of the very men Christminster was 
intended for when the colleges were founded: a man with a passion for learning, but no 
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money, or opportunities” (120-1). Sue recognizes that Christminster has become a 
privileged cultural capital, so she rejects institutions outright, calling herself an 
“Ishmaelite” who prefers to live “outside all laws except gravitation and germination” 
(111).   
Sue hopes to pass on to Jude a version of culture that supports his commitment to 
learning but removes it from the rigid and medieval confines of Christminster. Sue 
herself had been mentored in this way by a Christminster graduate, “the most irreligious 
man I knew, and the most moral” (120). Like Maggie Tulliver and Rachel Vinrace, Sue is 
intended to receive an educated man’s mentorship alongside a romantic commitment, as 
the graduate “wanted me to be his mistress” (118). Whereas Maggie and Rachel die in 
lieu of reconciling mentorship and marriage, however, Sue simply rejects the latter. The 
graduate dies instead, left brokenhearted. Sue and the graduate offer a refigured 
mentorship: he uses his traditional Christminster knowledge to mentor Sue, but at the 
moment his mentorship would only reinforce a social institution (here, marriage), Sue 
resists and turns down his proposal.24 Thoroughly “unconventional,” Sue manipulates the 
terms of mentorship to reflect how cultural transmission could occur in a society that she 
believes has lost touch with culture’s fundamentally humane purposes. The graduate 
taught her a great deal of Greek and Latin classics (though through translation), among 
others: “Lemprière, Catallus, Martial, Juvenal, Lucian, Beaumont and Fletcher, 
Boccaccio, Scarron, De Brantôme, Sterne, De Foe, Smollett, Fielding, Shakespeare, the 
Bible, and other such” (118). While this bizarre mix of texts casts Sue as forward-
                                                
24Cut off from the type of mentorship that would bring her the cultural or economic capital associated with 
a Christminster education, Sue still gets capital from mentorship: her boyfriend bequeaths to her a small 
amount of money that she invests. She invests it unsuccessfully, however: “I invested his money, poor 
fellow, in a bubble scheme, and lost it” (119).  
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thinking (Oxford was not, at the time, considering seriously English novelists), it reflects 
a mentorship that is entirely premised on personal taste, an eclectic mix that hardly 
reflects any agreed upon notion of cultural value. Christminster here still has value, but 
only as one possible means of transmitting culture; Sue thinks herself just as qualified to 
teach Jude as her boyfriend was to teach her. Culture here is separate from the State, and 
so is finally exempt from the conflict between culture and cultural capital.  
Under Sue’s guidance, Jude ultimately rejects the narrative of cultured self-
improvement that had guided him for so long precisely because it has led him away from 
society itself: “It had been his standing desire to become a prophet, however humble, to 
his struggling fellow-creatures, without any thought of personal gain. Yet with a wife 
living away from him with another husband, and himself in love erratically… he had 
sunk to be barely respectable according to regulation views” (173). Upon denouncing 
such “regulation views,” Jude throws into the fire the books that had marked his 
ministerial pursuits: “leaves, covers, and binding of Jeremy Taylor, Butler, Doddridge, 
Paley, Pusey, Newman and the rest had gone to ashes.” And here he finds comfort, “as he 
turned and turned the paper to shreds with the fork, the sense of being no longer a 
hypocrite to himself afforded his mind a relief which gave him calm. He might go on 
believing as before, but he professed nothing, and no longer owned and exhibited engines 
of faith” (173). When Sue and Jude live together unmarried and finally reject the 
conventions of the social order the State was to preserve, she believes she has finally 
reclaimed the Hellenism so central to Arnold’s philosophy: “I feel that we have returned 
to Greek joyousness, and have blinded ourselves to sickness and sorrow, and have 
forgotten what twenty-five centuries have taught the race since their time, as one of your 
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Christminster luminaries says” (235). Culture, Sue teaches, can only be transmitted when 
social order is disregarded.    
The problem, however, is that Sue’s version of culture is intertwined with the 
force Arnold places in opposition to culture: anarchy. And while Sue may disregard the 
problem of “doing as one likes” initially, even she cannot get past the eventual isolation 
she suffers. Whereas Arnold’s culture and mentorship had been intended to bring 
together people from all classes and also unite members of an individual class, Jude’s 
attempts at culture have led him to become a social pariah who struggles to find work and 
even basic lodgings. The novel’s pessimism is obvious given the amount of corpses that 
collect by the end, so it is unlikely that Hardy found Sue’s mentorship any more viable 
than Phillotson’s. Instead, Hardy illustrates a moment of paralysis, unable to find a way 
to reconcile the individual who is, Dale Kramer explains, “struggling in the context of 
both universal and temporal forces that work in tandem to restrict happiness and 
freedom.”25 Jude, Kramer maintains, suffers “unfocused despair” that “could have been 
avoided had someone come along to give comfort and sound advice at the time Jude 
realizes there is no system of transmutation between languages.” 26 Mentorship has failed 
Jude at every turn. When the narrator reflects, “But nobody did come, because nobody 
does,” Hardy resigns his protagonist to isolation and suffering. Mentorship and culture 
have put individual achievement and social harmony at odds—an unintended 
consequence that leaves the pursuit of culture uncomfortably similar to the effects of 
anarchy that Arnold feared. 
                                                
25Dale Kramer, “Hardy and Readers: Jude the Obscure,” in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Hardy, 
ed. Dale Kramer (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), 150. 
 
26 Kramer, “Hardy and Readers: Jude the Obscure,” 150. 
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Sue’s attempts at a cultural transmission that exists outside the realm of social 
propriety lead her only deeper into anarchy. The joy of her Hellenism is false; after the 
fleeting happiness brought about by “doing as one likes,” she falls into what Arnold 
called Hebraism, meaning an overly strict view of moral conduct, and returns to 
Phillotson, her husband, out of a sense of religious guilt. Once described as his “protégée 
and betrothed,” Sue— like Maggie Tulliver and Rachel Vinrace— must now face the 
possibility of marriage to her mentor (121). Trying to circumvent the clash between 
society and cultural transmission, Sue is led back to the same impossibility Jude faced in 
his attempt toward Christminster; her attempts to break free from social expectation have 
brought her only intense pain. When she finally submits herself to Phillotson physically, 
she does so out of a sense that she “ought to do this,” and swears her fidelity to her 
husband on the New Testament. Reverting to convention and religion, Sue “must drink to 
the dregs” and immerse herself in the lifestyle she had fought so desperately to escape 
(314). Mentorship, it seems, lacks the power to transmit a meaningful culture in the face 
of a repressive social system. 
To return to Williams’s critique of Arnold, “sweetness and light” had been for 
Arnold an attempt at ordering society other than the divine: 
Human thought ‘makes’ and ‘saps’ all institutions, yet must rest, finally, in 
something ‘absolute and eternal’: that is to say, by his own argument, in 
something above and beyond ‘institutions’. In Newman, this position might make 
sense; he could at least have said clearly what the ‘absolute and eternal’ was. 
Arnold, however, was caught between two worlds. He had admitted reason—
‘human thought’—as the maker of institutions, and thus could not see the 
progress of civil society as the working of a divine intervention.27 
 
Although a critique of Arnold, Williams’s insightful reading into the ordering principle 
behind “all institutions” provides a clue as to why Jude finally rejects religion—and why 
                                                
27 Williams, Culture and Society, 128. 
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Sue later embraces it. For Jude to believe in a divine system of ordering society is to 
believe that his society actually is ordered, that even if he cannot understand its principles 
or prejudices, that they do serve some higher purpose. But, Hardy claims, they do not. It 
is a particularly harsh blow to mentorship, as it removes it from the type of ameliorative 
and harmonious work accomplished by Mentor and in the Bildungsroman. Instead, 
mentorship only offers Jude indoctrination into values that lack absolute significance or 
even moral aims—mentorship only perpetuates the “artificial system of things.” Jude 
turns to religion when his Christminster hopes were originally dashed, because 
mentorship had failed him. Sue turns to religion when her belief in Hellenist liberty is 
crushed, because mentorship had failed her. In the absence of an “absolute and eternal” 
value that culture can reasonably transmit, Hardy’s characters cannot move beyond the 
conflicts created by their attempts to gain culture. 
But the kind of isolation that Jude experiences at the hand of Phillotson’s and 
Sue’s mentorships is of a particular kind—the result of a habitus that cannot find a means 
of reconciling opposing social and personal forces. Although he does not use Bourdieu’s 
terms, Williams does share with Bourdieu the belief that “We see and learn from the 
ways our families live and get their living; a world of work and of place, and of beliefs so 
deeply dissolved into everyday actions that we don’t at first even know they are beliefs, 
subject to change and challenge. Our education, quite often, gives us a way of looking at 
that life which can see other values beyond it: as Jude saw them when he looked across 
the land to the towers of Christminster.”28 This is the constitution of habitus, of learning 
tastes and values from one’s own class. “But…again and again,” Williams continues, 
                                                
28 Williams, The Country and the City, 197. 
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“comes another idea: that the world of everyday work and of ordinary families is inferior, 
distant; that now we know this world of the mind we can have no respect—and of course 
no affection—for that other and still familiar world. If we retain an affection, 
Christminster has a name for it: nostalgia. If we retain respect, Christminster has another 
name: politics or the even more dreaded ‘sociology.’”29 Williams here alludes to the 
conflict between culture and cultural capital I have outlined—Jude has been taught to 
pursue an education that will either reject him for his class, or, if it allows him in, will 
require him to change to the point that he no longer shares tastes or values with his earlier 
life. Because of the conflict between culture and cultural capital, Jude’s habitus cannot 
reconcile his personal values with his social field. Cultural capital and habitus are both 
related to a transmitted background, and together present a system for understanding the 
long and constant process in which an individual may come to acquire and develop his or 
her own personal taste in the context of his or her own class. If, as I have argued, culture 
and cultural capital are at odds in the novel, then Jude, who develops tastes outside of his 
own class, is put into an interminable position. 
Mentorship has put Jude in an untenable situation, since the “sovereign educator” 
who could unite individual study and the advancement of social harmony among classes 
now puts those very missions at odds instead. Since mentorship is predicated on harmony 
and social acceptance, the conflict caused by attempts to integrate culture into a habitus 
shaped by working-class experience is particularly problematic because it greatly limits 
                                                
29 Williams, The Country and the City, 197. 
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the possibilities for cultural transmission.30 In light of the conflict between culture and 
cultural capital— and the conflicts I describe in later chapters among culture, educational 
experience, and gender— mentorship certainly espouses feelings such as the “general 
crisis of relations between education and class” that Williams identifies, but also connects 
this crisis to cultural transmission.31 Jude, with a habitus so oddly constructed and self-
conflicted, has no idea how to go about transmitting the values of that habitus to the next 
generation, to his son Little Father Time.   
 
IV. Little Father Time and the Crisis of Mentorship 
At its core, mentorship involves transmission, the “invocation of the father” as 
Simmons puts it, and this invocation, as articulated earlier, “cannot be passed along in 
abstract or philosophical speculations.”32 But mentorship as the invocation of the father 
does not bode well for Little Father Time, the enigmatic “Age masquerading as 
Juvenility” (218). Upon the boy’s arrival, Jude immediately projects onto him his own 
aspirations: “We’ll educate and train him with a view to the University. What I couldn’t 
accomplish in my own person perhaps I can carry out through him?” (220). Hardy 
establishes here a kind of cyclicality, setting up a system in which culture—or dreams of 
it—are passed down. It is, Bourdieu would say, the propagation of suffering or “symbolic 
violence,” as “contemporary social hierarchies and social inequality, as well as the 
suffering that they cause, are produced and maintained less by physical force than by 
                                                
30 Habitus, according to Bourdieu, should be “generative and unifying”: “One of the functions of the notion 
of habitus is to account for the unity of style, which unites the practices and goods of a single agent or class 
of agent” (Social Space and Symbolic Space 8). Jude, of course, cannot achieve such unity.  
 
31 Williams, The Country and the City, 206. 
 
32 Thomas Simmons, Erotic Reckonings: Mastery and Apprenticeship in the Work of Poets and Lovers 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 4. 
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forms of symbolic domination.”33 This “symbolic domination” is formed by “specific 
organizational structures and mechanisms, and in the mental structures adapted to 
them.”34 Bourdieu’s symbolic violence is especially important in his work on education, 
since he sees education, as I explained above, as a particularly notable site for the 
preservation of class dominance. So when Jude attempts to mentor Little Father Time 
with his own ideals of education, he will also transmit that same conflict between 
“organizational” and “mental” structures, between those same conflicting cultural models 
that caused him so much pain. The result in the novel is literal violence. In a perversion 
of Arnold’s call for a “stock-taking of our assumptions,” Little Father Time notoriously 
reflects too well on society’s assumptions and their ramifications when he decides to 
hang his siblings and then himself. 35 After taking stock of his family’s poverty, Little 
Father Time writes a suicide note that reads simply, “Done because we are too menny” 
(266). 
Jude’s “They are making it easier for poor students now, you know” is vague at 
best and naïve at worst, because education had not actually gotten substantially easier for 
poor students (220). Taking his family to see the graduates’ processional on 
Christminster Remembrance Day, Jude gathers a small crowd and tells them his only 
fault was “It takes two or three generations to do what I tried to do in one” (257). Jude’s 
optimism becomes frightfully naïve in light of Little Father Time extreme action at the 
end of the novel. Jude mentors Little Father Time in a world of unachievable aims, just as 
                                                
33 Daniel Schubert, “Suffering/ Symbolic Violence,” in Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, ed. Michael 
Grenfell (Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2008), 183. 
 
34Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
40.  
 
35 Gregor, introduction to Culture and Anarchy, xvii. 
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Jude himself had been mentored by Phillotson. Jude accepts that he has suffered “mental 
and social restlessness” and “a chaos of principles,” but he fails to see that he transmits 
these signs of a conflicted habitus down to his child in ways that make it impossible for 
Little Father Time to even imagine a life in which he can be free of such complaints. As 
Jude and Sue reproduce, they only propagate their awkward social position, no longer 
fitting the mold of the lower class because of their extensive academic knowledge and 
dedication to the personal growth Arnold associates with Bildung.36 Little Father Time, 
eventually christened “Jude,” looks onto their situation with the dire urgency at which 
Arnold looks at his own. But since the enigmatic boy is “Age masquerading as 
Juvenility,” he might also be seen as the grim consequence of forcing opposites together. 
While embracing a life of learning and intellectual discussion, Jude and Sue are forced to 
live in anarchy; they bring their children up in a conflicted environment that is somehow 
both culture and anarchy, and there is no clear way to transmit culture out of that conflict. 
Just as culture in Arnold’s paradigm is not a religious or social “body of belief,” 
but a way of looking at anarchy, “a way of responding to the world in which we live,” 
Little Father Time is the embodiment of the conflicted culture that fills the previous 
pages; he is the response to anarchy, and the response is deeply troubling.37 Little Father 
Time’s corpse reflects “the whole tale of their situation”:  
On that little shape had converged all the inauspiciousness and shadow which had 
darkened the first union of Jude, and all the accidents, mistakes, fears, errors of 
the last. He was their nodal point, their focus, their expression in a single term. 
                                                
36 In a postscript to Jude the Obscure written sixteen years after the novel’s original publication, Hardy 
alludes to the profound consequences of not fitting into social molds: “Artistic effort always pays heavily 
for finding its tragedies in the forced adaptation of human instincts to rusty and irksome moulds that do not 
fit them” (7). Arnold was responding to a hostile review of the novel, which he paraphrases as “Your 
picture may not show the untrue, or the uncommon, or even be contrary to the canons of art; but it is not the 
view of life that we who thrive on conventions can permit to be painted” (7).    
 
37 Gregor, introduction Culture and Anarchy, xxvi. 
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For the rashness of those parents he had groaned, for their ill-assortment he had 
quaked, and for the misfortunes of these he had died. (266)  
 
Little Father Time’s death is the result of Jude’s entire journey. Hardy here exposes the 
risk of smoothing over class ruptures with acts of parliament that do not ultimately 
change class attitudes, as he takes that prejudice to its furthest possible conclusion. 
Arnold dismisses anarchy too quickly, preventing the necessary consideration of the 
impact of disparities in access to education. The conflicted habitus that arises from the 
tension between culture and cultural capital invites a more sympathetic response to 
anarchy than Arnold is willing to give. Arnold sees anarchy only in opposition to culture, 
failing to see the ways that it also points to the tensions that emerge from within culture 
itself. The actual offspring of a couple who lives in anarchy, Little Father Time represents 
the unsustainability of a society that fails to recognize the ways in which anarchy and 
culture can be brought together to reflect fundamental tensions in habitus. If kept 
confined to institutions of privilege and the cultural capital of the wealthy, culture will 
continue to create irresolvable conflict.  
When he kills his siblings and then himself, Little Father Time dramatically cuts 
off any possibility of mentorship and reveals a kind of paralysis: attempts at culture breed 
only more anarchy, but the resulting culture sees no way out of present difficulties other 
than personal annihilation. Indeed, Hardy’s response to anarchy is unsatisfying as he has 
no solution, nor any seeming optimism, as illustrated by Sue’s unsure response to Little 
Father Time: “I couldn’t bear deceiving him as to the facts of life. And yet I wasn’t 
truthful, for with a false delicacy I told him too obscurely…Why didn’t I tell him pleasant 
untruths, instead of half realities?” (267-8). Inherent in Sue’s lament is not that Little 
Father Time’s suicide was unwarranted or that he misconstrued reality, only that she was 
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not able to lie better. Mentorship in this last act has taken to misrepresenting society in 
order to ensure its survival. Sue has no viable alternative to offer Little Father Time; the 
ultimate tragedy of Jude the Obscure is its inability to locate any kind of knowledge 
which a mentor might pass down. 
Hardy’s strange compounding of orphaning is in many ways even more sad than 
the figure of the orphan would typically suggest, as he creates an “orphaned parent” in 
Jude who, in addition to having no parents, sees visions of his own familial continuance 
literally dangling lifelessly before his eyes. Because he articulates the cultural 
circumstances that made the advent of a new kind of literary protagonist a necessity, 
Hardy’s text resists an overly pessimistic or optimistic reading and instead evokes the 
“the ache of modernism” so beautifully articulated in Tess of the D’Urbervilles. Hardy 
asks his audience to consider the “human consequences of living out the modernist 
premises” and “harbored a certain concept for, and distrust of, the optimistic ideal of a 
modern secular and rational culture.”38 That is to say, Hardy focuses on the implantation 
of ideals, and so his model of mentorship senses the impending need for a more fully 
heightened awareness of what culture has come to mean. What is culture’s power? What 
else might culture symbolize? Looking to the chapters ahead, Hardy’s preoccupation with 
what the present generation can transmit to the next lays the foundation for continued 
analyses of how culture becomes increasingly difficult to pass on.  
                                                
38 David DeLaura, “The Ache of Modernism,” ELH 34, no.3 (1967): 399. 
Hardy’s “ache of modernism” in his latter novels ushers out what David De Laura, in his analysis of Tess’s 
famous phrase, calls “the collapse of Victorian secular idealism” and their “outdated and destructive moral 
scruples” (397; 394). De Laura, like Perry Meisel and Randall Stevenson, positions Hardy on the cusp of 
modernism, noting in particular the isolation Jude feels and his inability to mesh his more modern ideas 
with his less-progressive society. “To commit oneself to life on the premises of a freer and more personal 
morality was also to accept the ache of modern dislocation, without the sustaining optimism of the older 
rationalists” (399). 
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Chapter Two 
 
“An Instinct Which May be Wrong”: Cross-Class Education in Howards End  
 
 
O Cambridge! Cambridge! small the need 
Of plighted faith to honour thee; 
Thine is the hand that sowed the seed, 
The gathered fruit thy guerdon be; 
‘Twere wasted breath to bid thee take 
The creature though thyself didst make. 
      -Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, 1887  
 
 
 Written three years after his 1884 graduation from Cambridge, Goldsworthy 
Lowes Dickinson’s exalted ode to his college days credits his alma mater with molding 
him into the person he had become. The poem is certainly true at the literal level: funded 
by a scholarship, Dickinson’s years at Cambridge eventually turned into a career, as he 
returned there as a lecturer in 1886 and served for over thirty years.  Figuratively, though, 
the sentiment behind the short poem is that to matriculate at Cambridge is, as Jude 
Fawley always dreamed, to be afforded unique intellectual opportunities that have 
tangible rewards—“gathered fruit.” The poem’s traditional, agricultural motif is well-
suited to a celebration of education: the “cultivation” of young, promising minds that are 
eager to be shaped under the guidance of esteemed scholars so they can one day thrive on 
their own. While the poem may seem overdramatic or sentimental in its praise of 
Cambridge, the feelings behind it were shared by Dickinson’s longtime friend and 
biographer, E.M. Forster. In his 1934 biography of Dickinson, Forster muses that 
Cambridge “seems too good to be real.”1 While Forster wrote Dickinson’s biography as a 
farewell salute to an old friend, his sympathy for Dickinson, an unremarkable character 
                                                
1 E.M. Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), 22. 
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with a conservative academic past, reveals Forster’s own nostalgia for the Cambridge of 
his youth, “the magic years,” and his cherished memory of his time there.2 For Forster, 
the Cambridge experience is education par excellence; the strongest, most admirable 
qualities in his dear friend had been cultivated at the institution they both revered.   
One mark of the Cambridge man’s cultivation, Forster muses later in Dickinson’s 
biography, is his happily made claim on some kind of emotional and intellectual 
birthright bequeathed to him through the Cambridge corridors: “He was often to be 
exquisitely happy. He was always to have a choice before him which alleviated his 
miseries. To be a man was, in itself, a satisfaction to him, and he set himself to occupy, 
so far as he could, our heritage.”3 While speaking about Dickinson, specifically, Forster 
implies more generally that Cambridge education frees up young men’s minds, opening 
conduits to this idea of “heritage,” some continuously and generationally communicable 
kind of cultural knowledge. Indeed, this heritage seems to be a transmissible entity that 
can affect even those outside the grand halls of the Cambridge tradition: Goldie, Forster 
continues, “seems not only to epitomize Cambridge but to amplify it, and to make it the 
heritage of many who will never go there in the flesh.”4 Forster construes heritage as a 
type or subset of culture to which Cambridge grants both direct and indirect access. 
Heritage is, on the one hand, a state which can be “occupied,” a present-tense 
                                                
2 E.M. Forster, The Longest Journey (Connecticut: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922), 195. Hereafter cited 
parenthetically. 
 
3 Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, 22 (emphasis mine).  
Since the task of carrying on this heritage falls upon Cambridge men, it isn’t surprising that carrying on 
such tradition is the mark of success among those dedicated to the intellectual life.  In his essay on T.S. 
Eliot, Forster celebrates one of the greatest artists of the century by crediting him with the preservation of 
heritage: “But he who could turn aside to complain of ladies and drawing-rooms preserved a tiny drop of 
our self-respect, he carried on the human heritage” (Abinger Harvest 88). 
 
4 Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, 29-30. 
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involvement with certain cultural pursuits; on the other, it is future possibility, a prospect 
that can be passed down. Despite the term’s vagueness here, it is clear from his 
description of Dickinson’s “occupation” that Forster figures heritage as intertwined with 
the Cambridge experience, part of its inherent value, and a necessary precursor to 
obtaining “gathered fruit.”  
 Given how closely the Dickinson biography links heritage to higher education, it 
seems odd that in his novels Forster typically separates heritage from Cambridge or 
institutional education of any sort: while his plots make frequent references to culture, 
inheritance, and tradition—all conceivably linked to the notion of heritage briefly 
sketched in Dickinson’s biography—he takes on few university men as serious 
characters. The notable exception to this is Rickie Elliot, the ill-fated Cambridge graduate 
in The Longest Journey (1907). Certainly not one of Forster’s most popular or critically 
admired, the novel pits the traditional Cambridge education against a rapidly reforming 
English landscape where the traditions to which Rickie clings no longer seem relevant or 
sufficient. The novel was met with harsh reviews by Forster’s contemporaries, who saw it 
as a “dreary fandango” rife with “terrible faults” (although Desmond MacCarthy gives 
Forster credit for being able to “hit off those miserable muffs the Cambridge Apostles 
pretty well”). 5 Part of the difficulty of The Longest Journey is that Rickie Elliot is simply 
a judgmental snob. For all his embracing Cambridge and its associated heritage, and for 
all his growth throughout the novel when he comes to realize the limits of that heritage, 
Rickie remains an unsympathetic character whose unexpected death is tragic, yet 
                                                
5Qtd in P.N. Furbank, E.M. Forster: A Life. Volume One: The Growth of the Novelist (1879-1914) 
(London: Secker & Warburg, 1977), 150. 
Lytton Strachey is to be credited with the “dreary fandango” comment. The faults are further illumined in 
Furbank’s biography (150).  
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uncomfortably melodramatic. His legs are crushed beneath a moving train, but he 
manages to eke out a dying whisper to the wealthy Mrs. Failing that confirms her 
suspicion that he “has failed in all he undertook” (319). Despite his time at Cambridge, 
he is “one of the thousands whose dust returns to the dust, accomplishing nothing in the 
interval.” While the beginning of the novel manifestly argues that heritage and 
Cambridge are both worth having, by the end it is not obvious why, or what one must do 
to realize the potential of this heritage.   
 Part of this ambiguity may originate in Forster’s own complicated relationship to 
that very heritage he valued at Cambridge. Rickie’s snobbishness—the root of his disdain 
for Stewart Ansell, a Cambridge colleague of humble birth— is of the kind that Forster 
also detected in his friend Goldie Dickinson. While a well-received teacher at Cambridge, 
Dickinson struggled in his lectures for the University Extension program, an outreach 
series designed to spread some of the “cultural heritage” of Cambridge to the lower 
classes. “His idea,” Forster says critically of Dickinson, “was that he should reveal their 
beauties to enthusiastic working men, who would be grateful for any crumbs from the 
academic banquet.”6 Like Rickie Elliot and his brother-in-law, Herbert Pembroke, 
Dickinson’s love for heritage and tradition is short-sighted, too wrapped up in its own 
preservation to be of any real use outside of the institution itself. Having himself lectured 
for the Working Men’s College for twenty years, Forster may have felt conflicted: how 
can one pass on the knowledge of Cambridge to those not actually there if the “gathered 
fruit” of the Cambridge experience is so entwined with the institution itself?  
 This question is met head-on in one of Forster’s most celebrated novels, Howards 
End (1910). Whereas Stewart Ansell is used to probe the implications of working class 
                                                
6 Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, 46. 
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men physically present at Cambridge, the characterization of Leonard Bast asks the 
reader to consider more carefully what exactly it is that a Cambridge-type education can 
bring to those less privileged. How is it that someone like Dickinson could make 
Cambridge “the heritage of many who will never go there in the flesh”? Forster creates a 
cast of characters outside of Cambridge who seem, as the Schlegels do, to somehow 
reside in its heritage, and he sets them against one family that has no use for such cultural 
knowledge, and one man who is desperate to learn, but gets no easy path. As the 
business-like Wilcox and culture-minded Schlegel families battle to see whose way of 
life is more viable or more worthy, poor Leonard Bast, an autodidactic clerk, gets caught 
in the crossfire, becoming more destitute as a result of the efforts of both families. While 
the universities are notably almost completely absent from the novel (save for the vapid 
Tibby Schlegel’s matriculation at Oxford), the culture it protects—seemingly a tradition 
of high art and intellectualism— is studied by both the Schlegel sisters and Bast. As in 
The Longest Journey, questions of cultural value and preservation remain paramount to 
the plot as the Schlegel sisters unsuccessfully attempt to take Bast under their wing.  Due 
to their interference (as well as a misguided career move made at the advice of Henry 
Wilcox), Bast loses the meager job that he has and, after a tryst with Helen Schlegel that 
results in her pregnancy, dies at the hand of Charles Wilcox, Henry’s son.  
Bast is a complete anomaly in Forster’s corpus. Not only is he the sole working-
class character Forster ever undertakes with seriousness in any of his novels, but even his 
rudimentary familiarity with art and literature (he attends the Queen’s Hall concerts and 
is an avid reader of Ruskin) make him a most unusual case study for the working-class 
student. Poised to gain access to some type of heritage with the help of the Schlegels, the 
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underprivileged Bast complicates Forster’s own observation in “Liberty in England”: 
“The hungry and the homeless don’t care about liberty any more than they care about 
cultural heritage. To pretend that they do is cant.”7 While Bast might not be so destitute 
as to be hungry or homeless in the beginning of the novel, it seems Forster is positing an 
inverse relation between cultural heritage and economic means. Given his obviously 
paltry income, Bast seems an unlikely candidate for a sustained study of cultural heritage. 
What, then, if anything, prevents Howards End from becoming “cant”? Is Bast’s meager 
existence somehow just comfortable enough to facilitate the acquisition of cultural 
heritage?  
The answer, I contend, comes from an important distinction: the relationship 
explored in the novel between culture and class is not rooted in the amount of wealth Bast 
does or does not have, but in a more sustained analysis of heritage. Bast pursues that 
same heritage problematized in The Longest Journey far more actively than he pursues 
material gain, and that heritage eludes him while simultaneously making him both tragic 
in his death and ultimately unrealistic in his depiction. Even though heritage in Howards 
End is associated with cultural preservation—a relationship that has already been well-
argued by critics ranging from Malcolm Bradbury to, more recently, Lois Cucullu—
heritage in the novel is distinctly not mentorship. I argue that Forster pits the cultural 
transmission of heritage against the failed type of transmission offered by mentorship. 
The reason that mentorship becomes a kind of false piety in the novel is precisely 
because it is not equivalent to the transmission of a heritage, nor can it ever be so. The 
mentorship that the Schlegel sisters attempt to offer must fail because part of 
Cambridge’s value comes from a heritage that is, ultimately, not transmissible in the form 
                                                
7E.M. Forster, Abinger Harvest (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1936), 62-63. 
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of mentorship. Not a negation of Forster’s claim that Goldie makes Cambridge “the 
heritage of many who will never go there in the flesh,” Howards End is actually a 
resigned confirmation: heritage must necessarily be transmitted by Goldie and men like 
him because he experienced heritage in the flesh. Forster’s veneration of the kind of 
educational experience afforded by Cambridge confounds him as he tries to confer this 
type of education to Leonard Bast, who is mentored by the Schlegels according to 
Cambridge principles, but without the benefit of heritage. As a privilege of their class, the 
Schlegels received a first-hand acculturation from their father (a university professor), 
who brought up his daughters in the tradition of passionate intellectualism that he thought 
the university, at its best, had also promoted. Heritage here becomes an integral part of 
one’s habitus; it relates to a particular lived experience that shapes one’s disposition. The 
Schlegels can encourage Bast’s self-cultivation, but they ultimately cannot reshape the 
life experience afforded to him by his class. The lack of heritage, not simply the lack of 
wealth or access to learning, is what perpetually complicates Bast’s attainment of the 
cultural tradition he studies. 
 This chapter argues that Howards End offers the conflict between heritage and 
mentorship as a criticism of a long history of educational reform that sought to mentor 
the working classes according to upper class principles, but then denied them the rights of 
that privileged heritage. For Hardy, as I argued, mentorship is an ideal, a rite of passage 
or key to Oxbridge. For Forster, I argue that mentorship is a kind of mediocre and 
ineffectual replacement for the heritage offered by Oxbridge. Whereas Hardy 
characterizes mentorship as the education of the upper classes, Forster characterizes it as 
the education of the lower classes. Yet for both it symbolizes something fundamental that 
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is denied to those for whose benefit the reform measures were enacted. Margaret Schlegel 
mirrors the efforts of the Mechanics’ Institutes and University Extension programs that 
eventually led to the Working Men’s College in which Forster was involved, as her 
conversations with Helen and Henry re-enact decades’ worth of debates regarding what 
and how to teach a motivated and growing segment of the population. While Margaret 
clings to the humanist traditions of the universities, she seeks to align this culture with 
more profound forms of human sympathy of the liberal spirit, and to mentor Bast with the 
former, and Henry Wilcox with the latter. That she fails miserably in both regards—Bast 
ends up dead, crushed beneath a bookcase, while Henry becomes a weakened invalid 
incapable of much independent activity or thought—speaks to the problems of 
transmitting heritage via surrogacy, since heritage cannot be separated from lived 
experience. Like Jude, Bast is taught to appreciate a culture that will forever deny him 
any kind of meaningful access. But where Forster advances the debate is in his 
questioning of the very motivations behind these reform movements as he ushers out the 
Victorian and Edwardian liberalism that had shaped his own writing and experience, and 
ushers in a period of political and intellectual uncertainty that would remove his own 
beloved Cambridge heritage to a place that is decidedly more past than passed down. 
  
I. The Case for Heritage  
Malcolm Bradbury’s 1966 collection of essays in celebration of Forster includes 
his own reading of Howards End. In an argument that has now become critically 
axiomatic, Bradbury claims that the novel grasps toward unity and harmony while 
navigating morality in a complicated society: “Howards End is…about the circumstances 
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in which the moral life, which is also the full life of the imagination, can be led in 
society, about the compromises which it must effect with itself if it is to do so, and about 
the moral imaginative value of making such compromises.”8 In a corresponding claim, 
Bradbury continues, “[t]he Wilcoxes are associated with a practical English heritage, the 
Schlegels with an intellectual, deraciné one.” 9 Bradbury’s latter statement, on the 
surface, is a simple illustration of the type of compromise he locates in the novel: the 
“practical English heritage” of society is a concession for which the “intellectual, 
deraciné” heritage of the imagination must allow. This reading assumes a ready 
connection between “heritage” and the novel’s overt engagement with culture more 
generally, as heritage here is only part of the novel’s more general self-proclaimed 
staging of the battle between “Intellectualism” and “Materialism.”10   
Andrea Zemgulys, however, proposes in Modernism and the Locations of Literary 
Heritage a different possibility for heritage. Her argument rightly emphasizes heritage as 
a particular relationship that characterizes a fraught relationship between the present and 
past. “Heritage,” she argues, “is the creation of a past that is patently ideological and 
(thus) nostalgic, defining of collective and individuated subjects and rationalizing of 
unsettling social change. It is a past entirely fitted to the present.”11 With its orientation 
towards nostalgia and pastness, this heritage seems distinctly anti-modernist; Zemgulys 
                                                
8 Malcolm Bradbury, “Howards End,” in Forster: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Malcolm Bradbury 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1966), 130. 
 
9Malcolm Bradbury, “Howards End,” in Forster: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Malcolm Bradbury 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1966), 132-133. 
 
10 See especially Howards End, page 25. 
 
11 Andrea Zemgulys, Modernism and the Locations of Literary Heritage, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 1. 
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associates it with the uniquely Victorian and Edwardian fascination with history and 
memoriam.12 With an emphasis on landscape and architecture, she argues that modernists 
must write against this “visibly and even ostentatiously mediated past,” and that this 
process is proof of modernism’s necessary and continual engagement with its Victorian 
predecessor even as it seeks to turn away from it.13 Modernism, as it breaks from the past, 
must simultaneously “retell” the past “in ways transformative of the present,” forming an 
account of the past that resists the traditional Victorian heritage narrative of nostalgia and 
rationalization and instead can actually alter how one understands the present.14 
According to Zemgulys’s framework, heritage is useful to the modernist even as he or 
she rejects it, as it frames new ways to examine how the present reshapes the past, and 
how the past has shaped the present.  
Zemgulys’s reading of Howards End, an Edwardian novel only on the cusp of 
modernism, identifies Forster’s farewell to heritage. She believes that for him “it 
represented a memorialized past best superseded,” a gesture away from what she 
considers Victorian nostalgia. “Howards End,” she argues, “strains to represent life in 
new and better ways, to be modernist, in short.”15 Like Bradbury, Zemgulys reads with an 
eye toward unity and argues that the novel positions art and the appropriate appreciation 
of it by an acculturated public as ameliorative forces finally able to supersede heritage. In 
her extended reading of the Chelsea Embankment, Zemgulys identifies Forster “with 
liberal, even utopian modernist ambitions: the scene projects an author who, like nearly 
                                                
12 Zemgulys, Modernism and the Locations of Literary Heritage, 5. 
 
13 Zemgulys, Modernism and the Locations of Literary Heritage, 2. 
 
14 Zemgulys, Modernism and the Locations of Literary Heritage, 1. 
 
15 Zemgulys, Modernism and the Locations of Literary Heritage, 118. 
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every major modernist of the early twentieth century, imagines that art can make a better 
world (democratically ‘open’) if that art has a public which can meet it (who use it 
‘rightly’).”16 The elite space of the Chelsea Embankment is, in her argument, an oasis 
away from the noisy and crowded Queen’s Hall, a space depicted as fraught with 
reminders of disparities in class and culture.   
While Zemgulys is correct to argue that Howards End is about moving past a 
heritage that is passé or outdated, she puts heritage and culture too much at odds. In her 
emphasis on art and art appreciation, Zemgulys dismisses the means through which such 
appreciation is cultivated and transmitted. Although she mentions public works projects, 
she pays little notice to education reform movements, those efforts that addressed the 
divided society that she claims spurned the Victorian and Edwardian reliance on heritage 
narratives, and also to spread the kind of cultivation that she argues is necessary to 
Forster’s enduring vision of art. Zemgulys addresses a heritage that is based on the need 
for stability in the wake of reform and she sees the novel as envisioning an open and 
liberal space that emerges on the other side of such movements, but she misses that it is 
Forster’s nostalgic Cambridge—his own heritage—that reflects his first model of such an 
open and liberal space.  
This particular heritage, I maintain, is the subject of its own sustained inquiry in 
the novel, and the preservation of such a space would depend on more than just the 
enduring vision of art that satisfies Bradbury and Zemgulys. Just as Forster sought a “past 
best superseded,” he also mourns in Howards End the loss of a specific heritage 
associated with lived experience. He questions in the novel how to transmit a specific 
                                                
16 Zemgulys, Modernism and the Locations of Literary Heritage, 118. 
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heritage of one’s past, one that for him marked the “gathered fruit” so necessary to a 
cultivated and humane life. Finding this heritage impossible to transmit, he wonders if it 
is ultimately best superseded, as well.  
 
II. Constructing Heritage at Cambridge   
If this heritage is mourned in Howards End, it is created in his earlier novel The 
Longest Journey, where Forster sentimentalizes Cambridge and, ultimately, turns it into a 
nostalgic heritage of the type Zemgulys identifies. The Longest Journey is the only novel 
in which Forster takes on outright the value of the education that Cambridge offers, 
outlining his contemporary vision of what his “magic years” had brought him. As such, it 
is the best place to locate what exactly it is about the Cambridge education and 
experience that Forster thought worth having and that he would want future generations 
to have as well. In the novel, Forster articulates a version of Cambridge that combines his 
nostalgic memories of a venerated past with questions of how that same memory can be 
refigured in the present and, in a crucial addition to Zemgulys’s framework for thinking 
about heritage, passed on into the future.  
The Longest Journey famously opens with a group of young Cambridge 
undergraduates in a dormitory, engaged in a polarizing and intense discussion about 
cows. Despite the mundane subject matter, their conversation is important: “It was 
philosophy. They were discussing the existence of objects” (11). Given that the topic is 
presented as inane, the value of the discussion must stem from the very nature of debate 
itself. In pondering whether or not cows have “a real existence of their own,” Ansell and 
Tilliard are involved in a process that Forster positions as unique to university life, for “at 
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Oxford, just at the same time, one was asking, ‘What do our rooms look like in the vac.?” 
Forster makes the subject matter seem obviously irrelevant; what matters is that the 
young men have the luxury to “honestly think the matter out,” to test the limits of their 
philosophical abilities and ponder the abstract, fundamental questions of existence (12).17 
Whether Tilliard or Ansell prevails is irrelevant—indeed, neither is claimed the victor—
yet both feel triumphant by virtue of having gone through the steps of the mental 
exercise: “I have proved it to myself,” claims Ansell, to which Tilliard retorts that he has 
proved to himself the exact opposite conclusion (11). From the outset, Cambridge is 
revealed as a kind of gymnasium for the mind, a forum for open thought and self-
understanding. As he does later with Dickinson, Forster casts these men as “exquisitely 
happy” because they have the freedom to choose a perspective and work with it until they 
reach whatever conclusions they deem satisfactory.  
During this debate, Rickie Elliot, the novel’s protagonist, remains silent. A 
passive receiver, he absorbs information, taking in the conversation as part of his physical 
environment. On the one hand, this reflects his perceived limited abilities—“It was too 
difficult for him… If he spoke, he should simply make himself a fool” (12). On the other, 
though, it is a confirmation of Cambridge’s value as a space hospitable to heritage. Even 
as a quiet observer, Rickie is taking part in a rich tradition of open discourse simply by 
virtue of his presence. It is his room in which the debate takes place, and in his later 
reflections on the discussion that had unfolded, he has the chance to begin to draw his 
                                                
17 This is not to say that these kinds of discussion do not also have intrinsic educational worth: “subject, 
object, and the nature of reality” are indeed the stuff of Mr. Ramsay’s research in Woolf’s To the 
Lighthouse. Here, however, the intellectualism of the debate is seconded to the fellowship it fosters—but it 
is, crucially, still an academic discourse that unites the young men. The topic may be inane, but it is not 
irrelevant.  
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own conclusions about the cow, to test both hypotheses. His very lack of conclusion is 
itself an accomplishment: he, too, shares Dickinson’s freedom to “have a choice before 
him which alleviated his miseries.” Rickie here does not need a mentor; he only needs to 
live at Cambridge. 
Indeed, Rickie—like Dickinson—finds Cambridge a welcome academic oasis. 
His picture of university life is in sharp contrast to that of, as Forster would have it, 
public school humiliation and drudgery.18 Forster’s distinction between public schooling 
and higher education centers on a distinction between isolation and companionship: 
A year ago he had known none of these joys. He had crept cold and friendless and 
ignorant out of a great public school, preparing for a silent and solitary journey, 
and praying as a highest favour that he might be left alone. Cambridge had not 
answered his prayer. She had taken and soothed him and warmed him, and had 
laughed at him a little, saying that he must not be so tragic yet awhile, for his 
boyhood had been but a dusty corridor that led to the spacious halls of youth. In 
one year he had made many friends and learnt much, and he might learn even 
more if he could but concentrate his attention on that cow. (14)  
 
Sociality and warmth personified, Cambridge wraps together young men in the embrace 
of her spacious, commodious halls.19 Public schooling is dull and lifeless by virtue of its 
emphasis on the individual, solitary journey, whereas Cambridge is vivacious and 
comforting because it both provides social activity and allows one to engage in self-
reflective activity (i.e. debates and philosophical discussions) in the company of others. 
                                                
18 See John Colmer’s E.M. Forster: The Personal Voice (1975) for a fuller accounting of Forster’s disdain 
for the British public schools. “Forster’s experience of his public school,” Colmer explains, “provided him 
with two vital elements of his vision of life: first, a hatred of the conventional values that were taught there; 
second, a recognition that the public school system was responsible for the characteristic weakness of the 
English middle classes—their inability to give to the emotional life its proper importance” (5).  As Sarah 
Cole notes, this sentiment was shared by several of Forster’s contemporaries:  “…the idea of the university 
as an attractive alternative to the brutal public schools became something of a commonplace among many 
of Forster’s contemporaries. When Forster describes this movement into collegiate harmony in The Longest 
Journey, his attitude is more representative than idiosyncratic” (51). 
 
19 Forster makes later reference of his disdain for public schooling in A Passage to India: “Ronny’s religion 
was of the sterilized public-school brand, which never goes bad, even in the tropics” (286).  
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Inherent to Forster’s claim here is that to gain knowledge about oneself, one must interact 
with friends. As had been true of the debate between Ansell and Tilliard, the lively and 
social manner in which that subject matter is discussed is more important than the subject 
matter itself.20 Forster, as would the writers of the 1930’s campus and varsity novels, 
ignores the transfer of book-knowledge from professor to student in the Cambridge 
classrooms, celebrating instead the exchange of meaningful reflections among gathered 
friends in the dormitory. The essence of the Cambridge experience is, as the Schlegel 
sisters will later offer Leonard Bast through mentorship, intelligent conversation. 
The centrality of these relationships to the Cambridge experience is further 
demonstrated in Sarah Cole’s Modernism, Male Friendship, and the First World War, 
where she analyzes “normative ideas of masculinity” in late-Victorian cultural politics as 
espoused by public schools and universities.21 Cole’s study of male friendship leads her 
to conclude that public schools and universities are “crucial sites of male community and 
identity.”22 The fellowship that Cambridge allows for is, in her argument, an ideal 
relationship, one that Rickie will try unsuccessfully to recreate: Rickie “and his peers will 
pursue the idea of creating new social forms for men, with their own symbolic repertoire, 
into post-Cambridge life. If the university offers a humane and compassionate alternative 
to the public school, what looms after the men go down is a kind of aporia: the dreariness 
                                                
20 Lois Cucullu acknowledges the “social space of the university,” although her focus is on “the aesthetic 
pairing of the sexual and affective from the Classical Studies that socialized him at Cambridge” and his 
application of that Hellenized model to the domestic novel in Howards End: “He effectively traduces the 
romanticized social contract of institutionalized monogamy and the domestic woman’s power over it with a 
same-sex amative and affective alliance” (28). 
 
21 Sarah Cole, Modernism, Male Friendship, and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), 
31. 
 
22 Cole, Modernism, Male Friendship, and the First World War, 23. 
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of marriage, the meaninglessness of many forms of middle-class labor, the slow 
dissolution of the friendships that alone had been accorded value in the novel.”23 The 
starting point of Cole’s argument is the end of one’s time at Cambridge; Cambridge is a 
kind of preparation for adulthood, where the fellowship Forster enjoyed would be also an 
ideal model for post-Cambridge life. The tension central to The Longest Journey, Cole 
argues, stems from the fact that Cambridge friendship is incompatible with other social 
norms. Cambridge is an idealistic or utopian model unsustainable outside of its own 
context. 
 Cole’s argument is, in many ways, a refutation of Herbert Pembroke’s claim that 
“school is the world in miniature” (182). As Rickie claims, Cambridge “is wonderful, 
but—but it’s so tiny,” and so he fears that once he and his peers go out into the world, 
they will forget one another (76). Rickie’s fears come true, as Cole reads each subsequent 
relationship in the novel as a failed attempt to recreate the ones forged at Cambridge. The 
rest of the world simply does not measure up: Rickie continues to grasp for a society that 
is not capable of or suited to Cambridge’s youthful idealism, nor does it allow for the 
luxury of fraternal philosophical musings. As Rickie’s marriage fails, his career sputters, 
and he avoids his lone living relative, he consistently fails to regain the pleasure of his 
time at Cambridge. Cole’s point is that educational institutions operate under a social 
code that is distinct from middle-class values, so their values are not applicable to society 
at large. Her argument is very present and future tense: she is concerned with men who 
attend Cambridge and how their lives after graduation are unable to reclaim the 
fellowship they formerly enjoyed.  
                                                
23 Cole, Modernism, Male Friendship, and the First World War, 58. 
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What, then, is the long term value of attending Cambridge? To answer this 
question, Forster does not look forward in the way Cole imagines, but backward. Forster 
has only ambivalence about the future in The Longest Journey, yet there he greatly 
venerates the past, and I argue that we can look at the ways in which Forster does so in 
order to see how Cambridge fellowship is both a literal experience and part of a greater 
tradition that extends far back into the past. In the novel, he associates the university with 
a long tradition. The heritage Cambridge provides is structured from the careful selection 
of choice parts from that tradition; Cambridge’s lasting value cannot come from the 
duplicability of the experience, but from a nostalgically formed memory. Cambridge is 
celebrated distinctly as a place that must always evoke versions of the past in meaningful 
ways that will help one make sense of—or find solace in— the present. Forster begins to 
make the case in The Longest Journey that even the memory of Cambridge is worthwhile. 
With a nod to its long-held position as a revered institution of higher learning, the 
ancient Cambridge is, from the start of the novel, steeped in images of pastness. Even the 
trees “had for generations fooled the college statutes by their residence in the haunts of 
youth” (12). In one day, Rickie can have conversations with intellectual masters both past 
and present: a typical morning consists of reading “Theocritus, whom he believed to be 
the greatest of Greek poets” and “[lunch] with a merry don…” (14). The philosophical 
bovine has grown old, the subject of discussion for many years: “As for the cow, she was 
still going strong, though turning a little academic as the years passed over her” (76). At 
Cambridge, as Forster’s biographer Nicola Beauman observes, “the past, the classical 
past, revived and the resurrected authors—Sophocles, Virgil, Theocritus—stayed with 
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him for life.”24 The present is never far removed from the very past that helped create and 
shape the curriculum and camaraderie Rickie and his friends enjoy. In their lively debates 
and philosophical discussions, the Cambridge youth not only engage in meaningful 
fellowship, but participate in a centuries-old tradition that in turn keeps alive the voices 
of even the earliest great thinkers and grants them contemporary relevance.  
Rickie, a “classical enthusiast,” learned at Cambridge to make the past live, which 
is precisely why he is never fully comfortable at Sawston, Pembroke’s secondary school. 
Pembroke is ashamed of Sawston’s past as a school for the underprivileged and works to 
project an image that directly refutes the school’s own history. Under Pembroke’s 
direction, Sawston educates only rich boys, imbuing them with the values more 
traditionally ascribed to the education and culture of the ancient Greek thinkers: 
“patriotism, athletics, learning, and religion.”25 Sawston has no vaulted past of its own; to 
increase its standing (and surely funding) it must engage with classical values of the past 
so that it may become in the present a revered institution. Through schoolmaster Herbert 
Pembroke’s lamentation that the school never can quite achieve the glorious traditions 
that an older school with a tradition of greatness could, the novel makes the case for why 
heritage matters—why it is important to have a longstanding tradition that remains at the 
forefront of one’s memory. “Tradition,” Pembroke claims, “is of incalculable value” 
(183). The tradition of which Pembroke speaks is connected deeply to institutions of 
learning—“I envy,” Pembroke bemoans, “those schools that have a natural connection 
with the past” (183). Sawston, as a secondary school rather than a university, will 
                                                
24Nicola Beauman, E.M. Forster (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), 78. 
 
25 S.P. Rosenbaum, “The Longest Journey: E.M. Forster’s Refutation of Idealism,” in E.M. Forster: A 
Human Exploration, eds. G.K. Das and John Beer, (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979), 43. 
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necessarily lack the “esprit de corps,” as Pembroke calls it, of Cambridge, but Forster 
emphasizes equally that it suffers from a lack of tradition, a history that grants it 
contemporary worth.26  
With its deeply rooted historical ties, Cambridge has value simply because of its 
connection to a rich past. Pembroke believes that regardless of present day activities, 
Cambridge will always have an edge over other educational institutions because it 
emerged from a glorified intellectual tradition—this past will stay with it and exalt it, just 
as, contrastingly, Sawston’s lower class origins will always impede its being seen as a 
vaulted institution of learning. The value of heritage, though, is not limited to just this 
tradition of grand intellectual narratives of civilization; it applies also to an individual’s 
own learning. So, in his analysis of what Cambridge offers to its students, Forster asks his 
readers to consider that the value of Cambridge learning also stems from its becoming 
part of a student’s personal past. A young man’s mere association with such a tradition is 
enough to somehow elevate him later. Rickie shares with his wife, Agnes—who had been 
engaged to Rickie’s university peer, Gerald Crich, until his untimely death—that 
fellowship is what he took away from his university years:  
You see, the notion of good-fellowship develops late: you can just see its 
beginning here among the prefects: up at Cambridge it flourishes amazingly. 
That’s why I pity people who don’t go up to Cambridge: not because a University 
is smart, but because those are the magic years and—with luck—you see up there 
what you couldn’t see before and mayn’t ever see again. (195)  
 
Most obviously, Rickie’s observation supports Cole’s claim that the Cambridge years are 
an irreproducible ideal. If we consider, however, that this revelation does not come until 
                                                
26 Pembroke’s frustration stems in particular from the presence of the day boys, those who attend classes 
and then go home. He believes that boarding students take class more seriously—in a nod to Cambridge, 
the fraternity breeds productive discussion. 
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the halfway point of the novel, just past the end of the “Cambridge” section, then it 
becomes clear that Rickie’s memory of the experience is idealized. He is unable to fully 
appreciate fellowship in the moment; instead it “develops late” and is satisfying to him in 
memory. As such, it shows that fellowship becomes the essence of Cambridge in 
nostalgia—it is the strongest memory of one’s time there, what one must cling to while 
embarking into an adult life that may be rife with uncertainty.  
So when Forster speaks of heritage in Dickinson’s biography, or emphasizes his 
“personal relations” credo in the later essay “What I Believe,” he refers to that lasting 
memory of fellowship he emphasizes in The Longest Journey; it is the root of the “magic 
years” that offers the privileged perspective Rickie attempts to articulate to Agnes. The 
memory of Cambridge, the strength of the heritage of fellowship—these do for Rickie 
what Phillotson’s mentorship had done for Jude early on. Heritage is supposed to be 
enough to guide one through the future, even if the actual experiences cannot be 
duplicated; it is a solace for the kind of loss Cole studies. Yet part of the novel’s tragic 
and problematic ending is that heritage is not enough; memory is too fleeting. Rickie, 
anxious about leaving Cambridge, knows that the bonds he has forged will not last, 
because even the mere memory of them will fade: “‘We know and like each other; we 
shan’t forget.’ But they did forget, for man is so made that he cannot remember long 
without a symbol; he wished there was a society, a kind of friendship office, where the 
marriage of true minds could be registered” (78). Not only does Rickie fear the end of his 
“magic years,” but he also fears that he will lose the mere memory of them, and that such 
a loss is somehow even more poignant.  
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My point is that Forster knew attempts to recreate Cambridge were destined to be 
futile, and so he posits the value of a mediated memory. Because applying Cambridge 
ideals to the real world is so difficult, living in the memory or heritage that he acquired at 
Cambridge becomes all that Rickie can do; he tries to apply his past to his present, and to 
use Cambridge to guide him. At the end of the novel, when Rickie is finally willing to 
embrace a character from his past—his half-brother, Stephen Wonham— he tells Mrs. 
Failing he is finally happy, “Because, as we used to say at Cambridge, the cow is there. 
The world is real again. This is a room, that is a window, outside is the night…The day is 
straight below, shining through other windows into other rooms” (313). Only back in the 
comfort of the memory of Cambridge does Rickie feel confident, and it is by channeling 
his memories that he is able to look beyond his own troubles. Cambridge has soothed 
Rickie once again, even if it is unable to protect him once he has left; the memory itself 
has a unique power in that it can bring the comfort of friendship even if it cannot 
duplicate the actual relationships forged at Cambridge. For Rickie, however, even that is 
insufficient: like Dickinson, Rickie has benefitted greatly from heritage, yet in his case 
heritage, made up of private memory and personal experience, only reminds him of what 
he has not got, and will never be able to achieve again.  
If memory is where heritage’s lasting value could conceivably come from, then 
the problem Rickie ultimately faces is that the memory is not transferable—or at least 
Rickie has not been able to figure out how to do so until his death, at which point these 
memories seem to have little benefit. And here is where The Longest Journey becomes so 
unsettling: while raising the possible shortcomings of heritage, Forster continues to grant 
importance to the memories of Cambridge. Unable to turn away from his heritage, yet 
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simultaneously unable to use it helpfully, Rickie is practically cut in half at the novel’s 
end, a fitting image in a novel dominated by unsatisfying ambivalence. The Longest 
Journey lacks the harmony that would come to characterize Forster’s later Howards End, 
as it fails to come to any clear position regarding heritage’s place and value. Forster does, 
however, successfully raise a new question: can the heritage that he associates with 
Cambridge in The Longest Journey exist outside of it? Can the experiences typical of 
Cambridge—the pleasure of fellowship and discourse—in some way be enough on their 
own? If the heritage offered by attending Cambridge is persistently insufficient in modern 
society, can a similar set of values instead be reconfigured and transmitted outside of the 
university, perhaps to greater success? 
 
III. De-Institutionalizing Culture 
  In The Longest Journey, Cambridge is celebrated on two fronts: as a forum for 
friendship and discussion and as a site of memory. Inherent to that juxtaposition is a 
concern for the future, the propagation of those values that grow out of such camaraderie. 
When Rickie worries that “[t]here isn’t any future,” he confirms his own early fear that 
his personal past would inhibit him from transplanting the Cambridge experience into his 
later life. Rickie is himself obviously connected to a more painful past apparent in his 
very biology— he suffers from a congenital deformity, a visible limp that disgusts Agnes 
at first: “This hereditary business is too awful” (18). Rickie fears that all he can pass on is 
his physical lameness and the bitterness that comes from having been bullied because of 
it. When his daughter is born lame, that fear is realized. When she dies (from an illness 
unrelated to her lameness), it verifies for him that he has not got anything worth passing 
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on: “But the lesson he had learnt so glibly at Cambridge should be heeded now; no child 
should ever be born to him again” (212). His daughter represents to Rickie the 
transmission of his own values, which are ultimately only cynicism and pain. And here is 
where the future of Cambridge begins to break down: where Forster celebrates the 
treasured past captured by heritage, he struggles to find a vision of the future where any 
of it really matters.  
Instead, the future in The Longest Journey belongs to Rickie’s half-brother, 
Stephen Wonham, who marries Rickie’s widow and has a child with her. Unable to find a 
meaningful manifestation of Cambridge fellowship in a post-Cambridge world, Forster 
unsatisfyingly and abruptly turns to a clichéd version of England’s future as a whole: “he 
believed that he guided the future of our race, and that, century after century, his thoughts 
and his passions would triumph in England” (326). As Carola Kaplan points out, Forster 
does not make clear exactly what Wonham brings to England’s future—he becomes an 
honest farmer who also arranges for the posthumous publication of Rickie’s stories. 
Kaplan concludes that “the narrative suggests that England’s salvation lies in the hands of 
honest and right-minded businessmen such as Mr. Ansell, whose money supports his son, 
and Stephen… Forster seems to place his greatest hopes in men who use their business 
acumen to support and protect art and intellect.”27 But the protection of art and intellect 
seems now separate from the institution that produced such talents in the first place. The 
ending  is unsuccessful, Kaplan continues, because the novel is caught between 
criticizing “modern and industrial development” while simultaneously “applaud[ing] the 
business acumen that has produced it and the worthier products of that money-making 
                                                
27 Carola Kaplan, “Absent Father, Passive Son: The Dilemma of Rickie Elliot in The Longest Journey,”   
Twentieth Century Literature 33. 2 (1987): 207. 
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talent: the breakdown of class barriers, social amelioration, and the patronage of art and 
intellect.”28 In the end, she believes, the novel “collapses upon itself,” unable to piece 
together a coherent vision for the future.29 Eminently unsatisfying, the ending never 
resolves why Forster went to such pains to recall a worthwhile Cambridge heritage, since 
it seems so irrelevant to the future England offered by Wonham.  
But biographically, Cambridge remained close to Forster for virtually his entire 
life, since he spent most of his final years living at King’s College. Cambridge, John 
Colmer explains, “liberated Forster from a world he despised and provided him with a 
symbol of the good life.”30 In parallel, while Rickie was ultimately never “liberated,” he 
remains, to the last, dedicated to thoughts of “[b]ooks and friends,” desperate for that 
“good life” (318-9). Where To the Longest Journey fails is in bringing together the “good 
life” of Cambridge with the “good life” that Wonham comes to experience. The world 
that Forster “despised” was one in which he felt increasingly unsure, one where the role 
of art seemed in flux, particularly in relation to modern industrial practices and economic 
concerns, which is why his endorsement of Wonham is only half-hearted at best. The 
Longest Journey leaves off with Forster wanting to harmonize the Cambridge “good life” 
with the honest, simple Wonham, but that harmony never quite takes place within the 
confines of that early novel.  
Even though Forster never grants Rickie such liberation into the “good life,” he 
does turn again to questions of the value of fellowship and discourse in one of his most 
                                                
28 Kaplan, “Absent Father, Passive Son,” 207. 
 
29 Kaplan, “Absent Father, Passive Son,” 196. 
 
30 John Colmer, E.M. Forster: The Personal Voice (London and Boston: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1975), 6.  
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famous novels, Howards End. In the novel, the values he associated with the university 
are given another chance, as the unproductively resolved conflict at the end of The 
Longest Journey between economics and cultural awareness becomes its starting point. 
Kaplan’s “business acumen” belongs to the Wilcox family, and “the patronage of art and 
intellect” belongs to the Schlegels. The novel’s harmony comes from the joining together 
of these two families as matriarch Ruth Wilcox and intellectual Margaret Schlegel reach 
out to one another. When Margaret marries Ruth’s widower, she begins a kind of uneasy 
unification, some preliminary steps toward the cultivation of appreciation for both ways 
of life in ways that evoke Stephen Wonham’s provisions for the sustenance of art and 
intellect. This, as I mentioned above, has been the focus of the majority of critical 
readings of the novel. But in an important distinction that has not yet been critically 
addressed, Howards End lacks an institutionalized educational system but echoes some of 
the same Cambridge ideals articulated in The Longest Journey. I believe that more 
sustained attention to this point can illuminate a different side of the novel’s famous 
“only connect” theme, revealing a heritage in which such connection becomes 
impossible.  
The university itself in Howards End takes on quite a different hue from the 
earlier novel, being hardly venerated at all. At the start of the novel, sixteen-year-old 
Tibby Schlegel should have all the promise that Rickie did, however instead he is “an 
intelligent man… but dyspeptic and difficile.”31 Tibby is variously described as a 
                                                
31E.M. Forster, Howards End, (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1993), 26. Hereafter cited 
parenthetically. 
 While Margaret and Helen get considerable introduction, Tibby receives a mere line and a half, “Little 
need be premised about Tibby.” 
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tiresome hypochondriac, a poor host, and an egotist (3; 36; 56).32 As the sole son of an 
intellectual father, he should presumably embrace the fellowship and learning of Oxford, 
where he matriculates soon after the novel’s start. Tibby’s father, Ernst Schlegel, had left 
Germany when, in a nod to the utilitarian threat Arnold faced, he began to feel that the 
universities there “have learned men, who collect more facts than do the learned men of 
England. They collect facts, and facts, and empires of facts. But which of them will 
rekindle the light within?” Tibby is hardly one for kindling, as he is positioned in direct 
opposition not only to his father, but also to the values associated with Cambridge in The 
Longest Journey. He does not socialize with others, nor does he exhibit any of the 
passion shown by Tilliard and Ansell in their excited debate. In fact, he does not say 
much in the novel at all, and does even less.33 
While Rickie admires the lush trees of Cambridge as he reflects on the many 
generations who had similarly lounged in their shade, Tibby’s appreciation of the Oxford 
landscape is far less reflective. Rickie’s romanticized enjoyment of nature is replaced by 
a colder, overly intellectualized aesthetic appreciation:  
Tibby was sensitive to beauty, the experience was new, and he gave a description 
of his visit that was almost glowing. The august and mellow University, soaked 
with the richness of the western counties that it has served for a thousand years, 
appealed at once to the boy’s taste: it was the kind of thing he could understand, 
and he understood it all the better because it was empty. Oxford is— Oxford: not 
a mere receptacle for youth, like Cambridge. Perhaps it wants its inmates to love 
it rather than to love one another: such at all events was to be its effect on 
                                                
32 Tibby’s portrayal as an egotist is especially interesting given Virginia Woolf’s claim in “The Leaning 
Tower” that the writers of the thirties became great egotists. These writers, as I explain in my last chapter, 
feel a lack of certainty over their own place in a tumultuous society, which leads them to write about the 
only subject they have a secure knowledge of: themselves. While Tibby obviously did not live through the 
war to which Woolf refers, it is interesting to see how Forster anticipates the egotism of a young man 
unsure of what to do with his education.  
 
33 The notable exception is that he betrays Bast’s whereabouts, leading to Charles’ accidentally killing the 
clerk. Even this, however, is done in a moment of apathy, a careless gesture without much motivation or 
thought. 
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Tibby… He made no friends. His Oxford remained Oxford empty, and he took 
into life with him, not the memory of a radiance, but the memory of a colour 
scheme. (89) 
 
Oxford here is the antithesis of Cambridge in The Longest Journey as fellowship and 
lively discourse are replaced by stone silence, reduced to an unemotional, dry aesthetic. 
As a “mere receptacle for youth,” Cambridge seems hardly immune from the 
extinguished “light within” that encouraged Ernst to abandon the German universities. 
Tibby wants “civilization without activity”; he wants the exact opposite of what 
Cambridge promised Rickie, which was civilization and activity in perfect harmony (94). 
Forster glosses over Tibby’s time at Oxford in a mere few lines, characterizing it as 
completely unremarkable.  
Tibby’s lack of motivation and enthusiasm may stem from the way that 
institutionalized university education in the novel is, in contrast to The Longest Journey, 
removed entirely from the realm of classical philosophy and its associated discourse. 
Instead, it is aligned with what Rickie struggles against in the entire second half of The 
Longest Journey: an industrialized and unfeeling society.34 In Howards End, the 
universities no longer produce Rickie Elliot-types at all. The fellowship that could not be 
duplicated in The Longest Journey is here never generated within the university itself in 
the first place. Oxford does not equip Tibby to move forward out into the world and 
attempt to duplicate his experience; instead he turns to the university as a way of turning 
away from meaningful engagement with the rest of society.  When Helen and Margaret 
agree that “money is the warp of the world,” they further concede that, for Tibby, Oxford 
                                                
34 Rickie struggles to accept his half-brother, who he believes to be the illegitimate son of his hated father 
(Stephen, in fact, is the illegitimate child of Rickie’s mother, whom he loved). The moral conundrum he 
faces because of Wonham  manifests itself in Rickie’s anger towards his students, an anger only 
compounded by his frustration over not being able to live as a writer. His Cambridge friend Ansell ignores 
Rickie’s letters, only further separating Rickie from the happiness and camaraderie he had at university.  
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is the woof (108). This is actually a fairly damning statement, confirming that Tibby’s 
desire for “civilization without activity” leads him to a worldview that lacks the optimism 
and vigor that Rickie Elliot had once had and that had motivated Ernst Schlegel to leave 
Germany. The woof, Margaret explains, is “Very much what one chooses… it’s 
something that isn’t money—one can’t say more.” For Helen, the woof is walking at 
night; for Mrs. Wilcox, it is Howards End—for both, the woof of life is a means of 
drawing closer to the world around, a meaningful and rejuvenating interaction with 
nature. For Tibby, Oxford is just an interaction with himself, an exercise for the mind that 
can be played alone and that only further encourages him to retract himself from society.  
Together, Tibby and Oxford present an image of education that is in stark contrast 
to the carefully laid out veneration of Cambridge in The Longest Journey. Whereas 
Rickie’s Cambridge puts great emphasis on the ways in which the institution revitalizes 
classic civilization through activity, Tibby’s Oxford is dryly aesthetic, as dead as the 
authors it teaches. In Howards End, the ancient university—once a symbol of learning, 
free discourse, and a great tradition carried out over many generations—is a hollow shell, 
completely devoid of character. It produces no lasting and meaningful memories; Tibby 
is unlikely to recollect it with great nostalgia. For Tibby, Oxford is simply a gift he 
receives from his father’s money, an institution he gained rights to as a benefit of his 
class.  
Despite the paucity of meaningful institutionalized education, the spirit of 
Cambridge still lives in the novel. Instead of young men in dormitories, we are presented 
with Helen and Margaret Schlegel, sisters who seem to embody the lively discourse 
exemplified in The Longest Journey. Often engaged in serious discussion both with one 
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another and with anyone who will listen—“both were tremendous talkers”—the sisters 
seem to live in a state of perpetual fellowship (26). “Discussion keeps a house alive,” 
Margaret exclaims to Mrs. Wilcox, and the sisters prove intelligent, articulate, and lively 
(65). They engage frequently in debates of the same type as Ansell and Tilliard, 
questioning matters such as outer versus inner life and the mind of God. The intellectual 
light that eluded their father, Ernst, in Germany seems to shine in them as they revel in 
the varied aspects of a joyful intellectualism. Their father, a man dedicated to what he 
saw as an enduring vision of the university’s potential, wanted to pass that heritage along 
to his children, and he seems to have at least provided his daughters with an 
intellectualized, argumentative spirit. 
Even though Helen and Margaret are able to live a comfortable life in which they 
can engage in friendship and discussion every day, they still seem to lack a heartfelt 
connection to tradition or memory; these died along with their father. As with Tibby and 
Oxford, they have little value for nostalgic memory. They rarely speak of the past and 
feel only a passing grief over losing the house in which they were raised. “There is 
nothing distinctive about it,” Margaret tells Mrs. Wilcox (70). Instead, heritage in the 
form of nostalgia comes from Mrs. Wilcox, the Wilcox family matriarch, who 
“worshipped” the past and has “the instinctive wisdom the past can alone bestow” (19).  
Introduced as “a voice from the garden,” Mrs. Wilcox is part of her surroundings, an 
institution that has taken root. So in tune with nature, with the actual property comprising 
Howards End, she seems almost old-fashioned in the company of the modern and socially 
conscientious Schlegel sisters who believe their ideas can flourish regardless of place. 
Mrs. Wilcox’s attachment to the ancestral home echoes Rickie’s attachment to 
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Cambridge—for both, the place itself bears significance, creating heritage within its very 
walls so that future generations may reside there. In her contradicting Margaret’s point 
that discussion could keep a house alive, it becomes readily apparent that heritage in this 
novel, if it is to appear at all, is going to be rather different from Forster’s earlier novel: 
this difference is marked early on by an immediate dismissal of the possibility for the 
present to interact meaningfully with the past: an old cathedral, for example, “had been 
ruined, absolutely ruined, by restoration; not an inch left of the original structure” (7). As 
with Oxford, the cathedral is a mere shell of its former self, unable to exist in the present 
as it once had in the past. With Mrs. Wilcox’s death and the subsequent shuttering of 
Howards End, which she considered her ancestral home, the possibility of a past that can 
speak to the present and future seems remote. The novel may open with pieces of 
Cambridge heritage such as intellect, sociality, and tradition, but in separating them from 
one another, heritage seems as dead as Mrs. Wilcox. Without the institution to carry it on, 
there seems to be little hope of sustained relevance.  
As a counterpoint to heritage, the novel proposes inheritance, an indication that 
such heritage has been dismantled and is no longer passed whole in its traditional form. 
Heritage uses a sentimentalized memory to shape desires for the future, while inheritance, 
a different form of transmission, seeks something more straightforward, a direct bequest. 
In 1943, Lionel Trilling famously claimed that Howards End asks “Who shall inherit 
England?”35  Indeed, the term “inherit” has become practically a cliché in critical studies 
of the novel. The subject of this inheritance, as has been well-argued, is English culture 
itself: since both the Wilcoxes and Schlegels have contributed to English society, each 
                                                
35 Lionel Trilling, E.M. Forster (New York: New Directions, 1964), 118.  
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has the possibility of earning the status of rightful heir.36 While heritage seems difficult 
for the characters to find, inheritance fuels them all: the Schlegel siblings live off an 
inheritance from their father and Charles Wilcox looks to Henry for financial support. In 
the narrative of inheritance, Forster acknowledges the intertwined nature of the two 
families, seeing that an economic concern cannot be overlooked in attempts to preserve 
art and intellectualism. Yet, in supplanting the language of heritage from The Longest 
Journey with that of inheritance, Forster also makes room for an examination of, I argue, 
deinstitutionalized heritage. By removing Oxbridge as an assumed site of transmission, 
relegating it to the stuff of inheritance only, he revives the question of his earlier novel: 
how can the actual, treasured, educational heritage be taken out of Cambridge and into 
the world itself? 
Any study of inheritance in the novel must account for Forster’s general concern 
with the balance between economy and culture, or the way in which money underwrites 
humanistic inquiry; indeed, that is the general assumption made behind the most seminal 
readings of the novel, including Trilling’s and Bradbury’s. But a myopic view of 
inheritance leaves something out, failing to see the ways that the inheritance narrative is 
part of Forster’s lingering concern over heritage in the novel, a concern which disappears 
in the critical emphasis on the battle between the Schlegels and Wilcoxes over 
inheritance. In taking heritage apart, dividing its pieces among Mrs. Wilcox and the 
                                                
36 The Schlegels, however, are not completely English; their father was German. Aunt Juley may claim 
they are “English to the backbone,” but the narrator makes it clear that they are neither wholly English nor 
“Germans of the dreadful sort” (24). Margaret resists the privileging of either an English or German 
nationalism: “To me one two things is very clear; either God does not know his own mind about England 
and Germany, or else these do not know the mind of God” (26). If the Schlegels are to “inherit England,” it 
will be with an expansive culture that is premised on the intellectualism and imagination that Ernst thought 
superseded any imperialist boundaries— he was an “idealist…whose imperialism was the imperialism of 
the air” (25).   
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Schlegel sisters while dismissing Tibby’s institutional affiliation as class-bound rather 
than intellectually motivated, Forster lays plain that what I am here indentifying as his 
Cambridge heritage needs to be reconfigured as time moves on. Significantly, the 
character in the novel with the most heartfelt connection to the art and intellectualism that 
Ernst Schlegel wanted his children to appreciate is the one who stands to inherit nothing: 
Leonard Bast. Shut out by his class from questions of inheritance, Bast still keeps the 
heritage narrative alive, since he appears poised to gain access to at least the part of 
heritage maintained by the Schlegels, and his son will eventually occupy Howards End. 
If, as Tibby illustrates, the material gain of inheritance had begun to replace heritage, 
then perhaps heritage, which cannot be transmitted through inheritance alone, can instead 
be transmitted through the mentorship the Schlegel sisters so enthusiastically offer Bast. 
Whereas humane pursuits prove to be the prerogative of wealth in Jude the Obscure, 
Forster here tries to use mentorship to separate culture from cultural capital, or to bring it 
to all classes. To preserve heritage, Forster turns to mentorship to supplement the 
inheritance narrative. 
Under the tutelage of the Schlegel sisters, I will show, Bast is seemingly afforded 
a unique educational opportunity. But unlike Goldie Dickinson or the fictional Stewart 
Ansell who were granted access to Cambridge despite their being from less economically 
privileged families, Bast is only mentored with the values Forster earlier associated with 
Cambridge; he has neither class privilege nor institutional access. As a result, he fails in 
some ways as miserably as Jude Fawley, denied full access to what the heritage once 
associated with Oxbridge and class privilege could offer. Characters such as Bast and 
Tibby, Forster argues, are the differently failed consequences of unsustainable cultural 
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transmission, as Tibby is made blind to an intellectual heritage left to him by his father 
and provided by inheritance, and Bast receives visions of a heritage he simply cannot 
fully access because instead of inheritance, he has only mentorship as a paltry substitute. 
Just as all the training and self-cultivation Jude undertakes are ultimately worthless in the 
reality of his class, Bast is unable to apply his learning and acquire heritage, a kind of 
capital from which his class is shut out. The Schlegels can share with Bast their Bildung, 
but cannot change his habitus; he can benefit from being mentored through their 
knowledge and conversation, but he cannot gain access to their heritage.  
 
IV. Mentoring Bast: The Limits of Culture 
Tibby’s overwrought intellectualism represents an institutional failure that indicts 
Oxbridge for transmitting culture in a vacuum; Tibby is unable to use his experiences and 
knowledge from his studies to understand the world around him. As John Colmer argues, 
Tibby’s experience at Oxford is a commentary on the various experiences one can have 
with culture: Tibby “illustrates that it is possible to be intelligent, cultured and well bred 
and yet be incapable of personal warmth… he exhibits the limits of culture when not 
infused with human passion.”37 “Culture” in the novel maintains its relationship to the 
arts and revered intellectual tradition, but it does have “limits.” It cannot achieve its 
highest potential without, Forster believes, some element of passion and connection, such 
as the fellowship that fueled Goldie Dickinson and Rickie Elliot. The empty and august 
outlook that Tibby has on Oxford prevents him from seeing viable ways to pass on his 
university experience. Tibby shall not, to use Trilling’s phrase, “inherit England” because 
                                                
37 Colmer, E.M. Forster: The Personal Voice, 95. 
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he inherits too limited a culture, one that lacks, as his sisters illustrate, liveliness and 
relevance.  
This is made apparent at the very beginning of the novel, when the sisters’ aunt, 
Juley Munt, uses the appreciation of “Literature and Art” as a litmus test of personal 
worth. Aunt Juley parrots the values she knows her nieces have, responding to Helen’s 
sudden (and brief) involvement with Paul Wilcox by voicing her concern over his family 
in a way that she thinks will encourage Margaret to intervene: “Are they our sort? Are 
they likely people? Could they appreciate Helen, who is to my mind a very special sort of 
person? Do they care about Literature and Art? That is most important when you come to 
think of it. Literature and Art. Most important” (8). But against her narrow-minded view 
enters Margaret, who responds, “I have it in Helen’s writing that she and a man are in 
love…All the rest isn’t worth a straw…If Helen had written the same to me about a shop-
assistant or a penniless clerk…or if she wanted to marry the man who calls for Carter 
Patterson, I should have said the same” (9). This is not a rejection of “Literature and Art” 
as the stuff of culture, but Margaret’s refusal to keep culture confined to such a trite and 
restricted definition. In this gesture, Forster makes it clear that Margaret and Helen enjoy 
a special version of culture because it inspires them to extend their knowledge of 
literature and art into a positive and liberal outlook on their world; they use culture to 
lead them to a perspective that is equitable and free of prejudice. Margaret’s assertion 
that she would accept any lover of Helen’s, regardless of class, reveals her assumption 
that whatever it is that constitutes Aunt Juley’s separatist “our sort” is actually something 
sharable, not bound by profession or background. In short, Margaret’s version of culture 
attempts to bring groups together, rather than divide them from one another.  
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Tibby’s and Aunt Juley’s stunted versions of culture have disallowed them the 
opportunity to forge the personal connections that come to characterize the sisters, and so 
neither is charged with the task of cultural transmission. Instead, that task in the novel 
belongs to the two women for whom culture is still an intellectual tradition, but one that 
is buttressed by empathy and eagerness. As Malcolm Bradbury summarizes, the Schlegel 
sisters are “emancipated, modern, humane, thoughtful, concerned with the arts for more 
or less their own sake, responsive to the plight of those less fortunate.”38 It is an 
expansive view of culture, to be sure, for in Margaret and Helen, what Forster associated 
with Cambridge heritage’s spirited fellowship has taken on a new social consciousness. 
Their distinction from Tibby is twofold: not only do they have a genuine love of art and 
learning that evokes Rickie Elliot, they are also keen to assimilate this knowledge into the 
world around them, to make it relevant in ways Rickie could not. In this sense, they are 
the ones poised to transmit culture in the way that most closely evokes the heritage of The 
Longest Journey: they seem to want to make culture a kind of touchstone to which they 
can continuously return and use to shape their daily lives.  
What the Schlegel sisters make clear is that culture is more than simply an inert 
body of knowledge; Aunt Juley’s “Literature and Art” is just as inadequate as Tibby’s 
appreciation of Oxford for its color scheme. For the Schlegel sisters, culture is most 
closely connected to what they call “personal relations.” After her brief affair with Paul 
Wilcox, Helen sheepishly regrets her ever having sympathized with his stance that art and 
intellectualism are mere frivolities and renews her prior allegiance, exclaiming “I know 
that personal relations are the real life, forever and ever” (24). Margaret’s hardy “Amen!” 
                                                
38 Bradbury, “Howards End,” 133. 
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affirms their alliance against what Margaret calls “the outer life,” “a life in which 
telegrams and anger count. Personal relations, that we think supreme, are not supreme. 
There love means marriage settlements, death, death duties” (24). The outer life, the 
world of practicality to which the Wilcox family subscribes, is by no means unnecessary, 
but Margaret believes in the superiority of her perspective. She acknowledges openly that 
she prefers to dwell in the realm of a firm commitment to the arts and culture. Their 
social consciousness, then, is the end result of a culture that bears actual significance to 
the world around them:  
They talked to each other and to other people, they filled the tall thin house at 
Wickham Place with those whom they liked or could befriend. They even 
attended public meetings. In their own fashion they cared deeply about politics, 
though not as politicians would have us care; they desired that public life should 
mirror whatever is good in the life within. Temperance, tolerance, and sexual 
equality were intelligible cries to them; whereas they did not follow our Forward 
Policy in Thibet with the keen attention that it merits, and would at times dismiss 
the whole British Empire with a puzzled, if reverent, sigh… But the world being 
what it is, perhaps they shine out in it like stars. (24)   
 
Forster offers here a glimpse into the expansive view of culture that the Schlegels would 
transmit, the kind that Tibby could not quite get his head around. They understand culture 
as also involving human passion and interaction, and so they themselves are compelled to 
act passionately and interact with varied perspectives. Their view of culture, at least on 
the surface, actively seeks to bring ancient principles alive through intelligent and lively 
debate. They apply intellect, literature, and art—the products of a cultivated education 
provided by Ernst Schlegel—to a social context.  
So, when Margaret Schlegel first meets Leonard Bast at a Beethoven concert at 
the Queen’s Hall, it is readily apparent that her interest in him is in accordance with her 
view of culture. She and Helen will be motivated to help him based on their belief that 
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one can find in the mundane outer life manifestations of the good inner life, and they will 
encourage Bast to engage in a similar process in his own life. After a brief exchange 
regarding the umbrella Helen inadvertently stole from Bast, Margaret is instantly taken 
with Bast: “But she found him interesting on the whole—every one interested the 
Schlegels on the whole at that time—and while her lips talked culture, her heart was 
planning to invite him to tea” (31). The juxtaposition of culture and tea foreshadows the 
relationship the Schlegels will attempt to cultivate with Bast: the three already share an 
appreciation for music, art, and literature, but the sisters will help cultivate these tastes 
through mentorship, advising and guiding the young clerk in an effort to build a personal 
relationship with him. Indeed, Bast appears at first only to lack the refinement and 
discerning taste that belongs to the sisters. While Helen is a bit snobbish about the 
Queen’s Hall’s shoddiness, Bast actually attempts to recreate the Hall in his flat, playing 
Grieg and decorating his mantle with cupids, those same figures Helen scoffs at for 
“inclining each to each with vapid gesture, and clad in sallow pantaloons” (28). It is 
Bast’s earnest desire to capture culture for his own personal life that makes him such a 
ready mentee, even if he cannot quite grasp which indicators of culture are genuine 
according to the standards of an upper class.  
Because Bast is poor, his early gestures toward culture have been self-initiated, 
without knowing which specific texts would grant him access to culture. As Douglas Mao 
maintains, “The cruel truth that Forster illuminates is that knowing which books are the 
right ones is almost impossible unless one is part of a social set that credibly decides 
which books fit the bill. As Londoners in the vanguard or near-vanguard of intellectual 
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life, the Schlegels would have found Leonard’s reading a thoroughly mixed bag.”39 
Similar to Sue Bridehead’s uniquely constructed reading list, Bast’s readings are a 
questionable mix of “Literature and Art,” as he is unsure whether his selections constitute 
“culture” or “common.” As with his misguided attempts at decorating his flat in a 
“cultured” way, Bast only marginally and uncomfortably exists in cultured society; he 
cannot piece together a coherent vision of culture, one that would fully adapt culture into 
his daily life. Reading Ruskin fervently, he asks, “Was there anything to be learned from 
this fine sentence? Could he adapt it to the needs of daily life? Could he introduce it, with 
modifications, when he next wrote a letter to his brother, the lay-reader? … Something 
told him the modifications would not do” (42). He recognizes the absurd disparity 
between high-style—“the spirit of English prose”— and his shabby flat and wishes for a 
“sudden conversion,” where “he would one day push his head out of the grey waters and 
see the universe” (42).   
Like Jude, Bast is motivated by a desire for the self-improvement characteristic of 
the Bildungsroman: “I care a good deal about improving myself by means of Literature 
and Art, and so getting a wider outlook” (45). Unknowingly echoing Aunt Juley’s earlier 
dogma (which had been an attempt to sound like the Schlegel sisters), Bast seems to be 
well on his way to the limited view of culture. But where Jude intended his self-
improvement and “Literature and Art” to gain him institutional access, Bast wants 
something different—he wants only the opportunity to speak the language of culture, to 
embrace it with a familiarity that will, he thinks, help him find the “good life” in his own 
mundane “outer life.” His spotty knowledge of the classics, his misguided attempts at 
                                                
39 Douglas Mao, “Afterword,” in Howards End by E.M. Forster (New York: Pearson Education, Inc, 2010), 
300. 
123 
 
recreating cultured venues—these indicate Bast’s background, but they do not address 
Bast’s true cultural lack, which is the ease with which the Schlegel sisters communicate 
their knowledge, their comfort with culture, and their ability to apply culture to their daily 
life. Margaret’s spiel on Wagner “fluttered away from the young man like birds.” “If only 
he could talk like this,” Bast thinks, “he would have caught the world! Oh to acquire 
culture! Oh, to pronounce foreign names correctly! Oh to be informed, discoursing at 
ease on every subject that a lady started! But it would take one years” (33). It is the ease 
of discussion that Bast lacks, the casual camaraderie of school-aged boys in a dormitory 
discussing cows. Unlike the spirited debates there, “There had always been something to 
worry him ever since he could remember, always something that distracted him in the 
pursuit of beauty. For he did pursue beauty, and therefore, Margaret’s speeches did flutter 
away from him like birds” (33). Bast’s discomfort here is palpable as he realizes that 
Margaret is not his peer. He feels inferior, as the worries of his class prevent him from 
devoting the full attention he would want to the kinds of discussion Margaret offers.  
Bast’s uncertainty over how to discuss and apply his readings, in other words, 
illustrates an unfamiliarity or inexperience of a more profound type: he demonstrates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of how one acquires culture. He thinks his failure to focus 
on beauty is a result of distraction; if only he had more focus, less worry, he would be 
able to understand beauty completely. Recognizing what he lacks, he thinks he can come 
to it suddenly: “Leonard…did believe in effort and in a steady preparation for the change 
that he desired. But of a heritage that may expand gradually, he had no conception: he 
hoped to come to Culture suddenly, much as the Revivalist hopes to come to Jesus” (42-
3). And, once again, Forster places great weight on the idea of heritage: it is a process, an 
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understanding, almost a sensibility. And that is precisely what Bast cannot understand; it 
is what he cannot have, even though it is hardly his fault. He fails to recognize that there 
is an undercurrent to culture, a long history, a collection of memories that inform 
culture—“Those Miss Schlegels had come to it; they had done the trick; their hands were 
upon the ropes, once and for all. And meanwhile his flat was dark and stuffy” (43). Bast 
has some version of the “Literature and Art” kind of culture; he can envision the process 
through which he might apply culture to his daily interactions, but, thinking there is a 
singular “trick,” he cannot envision a way to come to heritage because there is none. Like 
Jude, Bast cannot reach outside of his class to access culture. Reflecting on his time at the 
Schlegel home, Bast realizes that “[t]hey had all passed up that narrow, rich staircase at 
Wickham Place, to some ample room, whither he could never follow them, not if he read 
for ten hours a day. Oh it was not good, this continued aspiration. Some are born 
cultured; the rest had better go in for whatever comes easy” (46). Aware of the great 
divide between them, Bast is at a complete loss as to how to come upon the particular 
culture of his mentors.      
I will explain below what is at stake in the class implications in play here, but I 
think it important to first make it clear that Bast is not denied culture simply because he is 
poor and so lacks time for culture because he must have gainful employment, even if that 
is part of it. His class status prevents him from acquiring culture because he is shut out 
specifically from a key part of the process that simply cannot be mentored: heritage. 
Heritage is precisely what Jude Fawley was not able to ever gain since all the learning 
and personal motivation could not grant him access to the halls of the Oxford, the locus 
of heritage. So when Leonard Bast begins to follow Jude’s autodidactic footsteps, 
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immersing himself in Ruskin, we can see Forster outlining a similar fate, even if 
Cambridge and Oxford are removed as the sole site of cultural capital. Where Hardy sees 
mentorship as a key indicator of heritage, however, Forster positions mentorship as a 
kind of poor substitute. Heritage is the slow process through which Ernst Schlegel 
acquired culture, and while pieces of it live on in his daughters in a deinstitutionalized 
form, they cannot pass heritage on to Bast. So, instead, they attempt to offer him their 
own packaged view of culture as cross-class sympathy, a mentorship that never quite gets 
around its own self-righteousness. When Helen and Margaret meet Bast again, they guide 
him away from conversations about his own reading and instead encourage him to talk 
about his walk. They do not want to hear about E.V. Lucas’s “Open Road,” which they 
think unimportant, or the Pole Star, since Helen already “know[s] its little ways”; they 
want Bast to feel as inspired by walking through nature as they do, so they push him to 
discuss it in the terms that they see fit, asking him questions that they deem important. 
Even Tibby is made uncomfortable— “He knew that this fellow would never attain to 
poetry, and did not want to hear him trying”—and he slips out while the sisters 
enthusiastically continue their cultural inquest (99).  
The result is the one moment in which Bast speaks with confidence to the 
Schlegel sisters. Unable to speak from the place of heritage that is unfamiliar to him, he 
turns to his own experience of being poor. Describing his walk, Bast surprises Helen, 
answering her romanticized question, “But was the dawn wonderful?” with “an 
unforgettable sincerity,” replying simply, “No” (100). The effect is profound: “Down 
toppled all that had seemed ignoble or literary in his talk, down toppled the tiresome 
R.L.S. and the ‘love of the earth’ and his silk top-hat. In the presence of these women 
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Leonard had arrived, and he spoke with a flow, an exultation, that he had seldom known” 
(100). Here, describing how miserable he felt while walking hungry, the wretchedness of 
living in a single room, he finally masters the self-assured tongue of his mentors. Just as 
the Schlegel sisters’ intellectual heritage informs and shapes their confident speech, 
Bast’s poverty shapes his and he cannot obtain fluency.  
Indeed, to illustrate the remaining chasm between the sisters and Bast, Forster 
immediately follows this with Bast’s return to his literature-speak, as he tries to continue 
his course of confidence by initiating a conversation about Jeffries, Borrow, and Thoreau. 
He quickly falls victim to “his cramped little mind,” and the sisters quickly dismiss this 
turn (100-1). Trying to mentor him, they end up reducing him to “the naïve and sweet-
tempered boy for whom Nature had intended him,” tritely encouraging him for having 
“pushed back the boundaries; I think it splendid of you” (101). The effect is rather 
patronizing, as they pat Bast on the back for talking about what comes easily to him, but 
discourage him from discussing the literature that he has not mastered. That literature, it 
turns out, is but a murky “swamp of books” that Bast has little hope of ever navigating: 
“No disrespect to these great names. The fault is ours, not theirs. They mean us to use 
them for sign-posts, and are not to blame if, in our weakness, we mistake the sign-post 
for the destination. And Leonard had reached the destination” (101). For Rickie Elliot, his 
journey away from Cambridge may be long, but he can turn to his heritage for guidance 
and hope; for Leonard Bast, he has no similar journey on which he can look back.  
Without heritage, Bast cannot fit what he reads into his own experience because 
his experiences, his habitus, do not allow for it. He has nowhere to go with his self-
improvement other than to Wickham Place for tea. He is passingly, almost laughingly, 
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referred to repeatedly as Helen’s “protégé,” but more because she is his advocate than 
because she is able to offer him any kind of meaningful advancement.40 And this is why 
the Schlegels’ mentorship is utterly futile: they are enthused by his efforts, vaguely 
encouraging and interested, but they cannot offer him a life in which literature and art are 
more than “sign posts.” He can speak to the Schlegels, he can speak to a Cambridge 
undergraduate on a train—“perhaps the keenest happiness he had ever known”—but their 
destinations are not the same. The Schlegels become mentors to Bast for reasons that are 
ultimately selfish: “To the Schlegels, as to the undergraduate, he was an interesting 
creature, of whom they wanted to see more.” Bast feels their mentorship is pointless 
because he can never advance to their place: “But they to him were the denizens of 
Romance, who must keep to the corner he had assigned them, pictures that must not walk 
out of their frames” (101-2). Forster is resigned to the fact that heritage and by extension 
the culture it promotes are not transportable; they cannot be reached by train, fueled by 
even the friendliest conversations between students and motivated clerks. Even if culture 
is parceled out in different ways, separated from institutions of heritage, it cannot ever 
really be fully transmissible.  
While Margaret and Helen have the noblest of intentions, they cannot deliver 
because heritage simply must be lived. Forster characterizes heritage as a combination of 
education, inheritance, and culture. Therefore, as class-bound as the institutions that 
house it, heritage will always elude Bast and others like him because there is no way to 
come to culture suddenly. The voice of Ruskin, the impetus behind the free concerts at 
the Queen’s Hall—the liberal encouragement toward “Effort and Self Sacrifice”—is, as 
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Bast sadly realizes, “the voice of one who has never been dirty or hungry, and had not 
guessed successfully what dirt and hunger are” (42). In considering class, Forster moves 
away from the ambivalence over heritage and class that plays out in The Longest 
Journey, and his commentary on the non-transmissibility of culture becomes much 
sharper. Howards End more forcefully criticizes those who turn a blind eye to the classist 
nature of heritage altogether. Hardly a reprimand of culture itself, Forster pointedly 
implicates those who fail to recognize the deep-seated and exclusionary nature of the 
production and preservation of cultural heritage.  Indeed, the Schlegel sisters’ efforts 
ultimately prove meddlesome, the direct cause of Bast’s further plunge into poverty and 
subsequent death; their efforts at transmitting culture are not simply misguided, but 
dangerous. Mentorship, hardly the equalizing impulse of the sovereign educator, is a kind 
of inconsequential noblesse oblige, an indulgence of the mentor’s feelings.   
 
V. Class-Bound Heritage and Forster’s Critique of Education Reform  
What Howards End works out is that heritage really is class based, ultimately 
coming from a place of privilege. Part of what keeps heritage class-bound is that, as 
Herbert Pembroke realizes, it is gained a priori, rather than post priori; heritage is not 
what you work toward, but where you come from. Bast, in my argument, is not cut off 
from access to the items of culture—“Literature and Art”— but finds that his class limits 
him from internalizing what he reads, or from assimilating it in ways that could allow 
him to shape the present and future.  
This general gesture toward class disparity is critically unsatisfying, though, 
because it does not account for why Bast’s character never quite comes across as 
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completely sympathetic, or even realistic. Even though he demonstrates well the non-
transmissibility of culture, Bast remains an odd choice for illustrating the chasm between 
classes in terms of culture given his discomfort among members of every class, including 
even his common-law wife. Barbara Rosencrance finds “Forster’s relation to Leonard 
Bast is at best uneasy, a mixture of compassion and condescension.”41 She accuses 
Forster of the same compassion and condescension exhibited by the Schlegels. 
Rosencrance’s accusation seems to me particularly misplaced given Forster’s own 
criticism of Goldie for not understanding how to teach students from the lower classes. 
Further, by the narrator’s own admission, Bast certainly is not even a wholly 
representative member of the lower classes, many of whom are explicitly excluded from 
the novel. The sixth chapter famously opens with, “We are not concerned with the very 
poor…They are unthinkable, and only to be approached by the statistician or the poet.”  
However Bast, while perhaps not “very poor,” is after all in bad enough circumstances to 
feel the disconnect between himself and a writer such as Ruskin. But the narrator 
continues, “This story deals with gentlefolk, or with those who are obliged to pretend that 
they are gentlefolk” (39). And here Forster reveals that Bast’s particular brand of poverty 
puts him in a position “at the extreme verge of gentility…He was not in the abyss, but he 
could see it, and at times people whom he knew had dropped in, and counted no more” 
(39). His vaguely lower-middle class affiliation is not defined in any monetary sense, but 
from its position on the fringe of other classes. Bast does not represent a class in and of 
itself, but others’ perceptions of his class; he represents what others think he can become, 
                                                
41 Barbara Rosencrance, Forster’s Narrative Vision (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982), 
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whether or not he will ultimately “count” and join the ranks of the genteel. He may not be 
studied by the “statisticians and poets,” but he is certainly an object of scrutiny. 
For Rosencrance, Bast becomes the object of specifically political scrutiny: “[t]he 
significance of Leonard Bast is in his origin, in his pivotal position as cause celebre for 
the liberal intellectuals and victim of the capitalists, and in his sentimental apotheosis into 
England’s future.”42 Bast, according to such readings, is a commentary on an entire 
movement geared toward pushing members of the lower and working classes closer 
toward the “verge of gentility,” efforts that mirror both Helen and Margaret’s mentorship, 
and especially Margaret’s endeavors at helping her husband, Henry Wilcox, turn toward 
the poor with greater empathy. “This liberal attitude is at the centre of the book,” claims 
Malcolm Bradbury, and his observation holds true as one of the novel’s most overt 
engagements with the liberal agenda occurs early on, as soon as Bast meets the Schlegels 
at the Queen’s Hall.43 It is an apt location, Zemgulys explains, “known for inexpensive 
musical performances aimed at ‘improving’ a broad public.”44 Zemgulys argues that 
because the incident at the Queen’s Hall sets into motion the plot that ultimately leads to 
Bast’s death, “it’s plausible that such broadly appealing institutions of cultural uplift are 
subtly disapproved.” For Zemgulys, this disapproval speaks to Forster’s perceived 
“futility of cross-class exercises in cultural exchange,” citing Margaret’s claim that such 
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exchange is termed ‘‘social intercourse’ or ‘mutual endeavor, when it’s mutual 
priggishness if it’s anything.”45  
Similarly, David Medalie argues in E.M. Forster’s Modernism that these cultural 
exchanges demonstrate the breakdown of late-Victorian progressivism into a display of 
pseudo-egalitarianism, as the novel “deal[s] with the failure to be inclusive and to carry 
out the Arnoldian injunction, with its Victorian ancestry and its liberal-humanistic 
cargo.”46 That “Arnoldian injunction,” which Medalie identifies as Arnold’s hope “that 
the cultured would see to ‘humanise [culture], to make it efficient outside the clique of 
the cultivated and learned’, thereby extending ‘sweetness and light’ to ‘the raw and 
unkindled masses of humanity,’” is the task of the sovereign educator, the task that the 
Schlegels sisters undertake to Bast’s detriment. For Medalie, Arnold and Ruskin are 
poignant figures, “for they both, in their different ways, represent a late-Victorian 
tendency to see culture in socially progressivist terms.” This progressivism was designed 
to bring culture to a newly literate middle class: when Bast reads The Stones of Venice, 
Medalie continues, he “deliberat[es] upon the viability of Ruskin’s project and upon the 
notion of cultural consumption—in particular, the extent to which the Victorian cultural 
legacy may be digested by the increasingly literate masses.” 47 So, when Bast fails, 
Medalie concludes that culture itself must be “profoundly inefficient,” as well as having 
“the effect of entrenching ‘the cultivated and learned’ in the seclusion of their 
Bloomsbury-like coterie.”48 As does Zemgulys, Medalie reads progressivism in the novel 
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as a failing project, one that only superficially accounts for the incompatibility of culture 
across classes, only he goes one step further and equates this progressivism with culture 
itself.  
I think, though, that Forster’s optimism about culture might be salvaged if this 
progressivism is understood more in context. These efforts at reading Bast as a more 
generalized symbol of an unproductive liberalism leave something out, namely the 
educational heritage Rickie Elliot and the Schlegel sisters enjoy. If, as I have claimed, 
Forster searches in Howards End for a means of transmitting culture without class-based 
heritage, then surely he has a stake in the institutions that were being created specifically 
to bring culture to the lower classes, such as the University Extension Programs and the 
Working Men’s College. Bast, I argue, certainly is a caricature of the supposed 
beneficiary to liberalism, but he is also more specifically a caricature of exactly the 
imagined beneficiary of certain specific liberal education programs. Only citing Forster’s 
ambivalence to cross-class cultural interaction overlooks his ever-present concern over 
what would happen to the Cambridge of his youth as he grapples with an educational 
system that increasingly ignores heritage as it re-packages culture in different ways and 
parcels it out among new and varied types of educational programs.  
In my previous chapter, I argued that Jude Fawley was destined for failure 
because of an educational system that brought into conflict culture and cultural capital. 
And like Jude, because Bast suffers as a result of mentorship gone awry, he acts as a 
harbinger of the disappointment of educational reform. But where Jude is an explicit 
commentary on the accessibility of Oxbridge itself, through Bast Forster casts a critical 
eye on those institutions designed to distribute individual elements of Oxbridge to the 
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lower and middle classes. These institutions, of course, grew out of the Arnold-Ruskin 
type conversations of the nineteenth century: “Even in the nineteenth century, after all, 
the mechanics’ institutes and adult schools, and the public libraries, had increased the 
working man’s access to knowledge and culture; such landmarks as the 1896 Act of 
Parliament providing for the Sunday opening of museums, and the founding in 1899 of 
Ruskin College, Oxford, specifically for working men, were signs of the times.” 49  
Norman Page finds that the time between Jude the Obscure and Howards End saw an 
increase in individual students finding success in such programs, and he concludes in turn 
that “[i]t may be objected then, that Forster, speaking from the limitations of his own 
experience and class, had an inadequate sense of the social and human realities and that 
he exaggerates the extent to which a truly civilised life is dependent upon an unearned 
income.”50 Page’s slightly patronizing reading cannot account for Bast’s failures other 
than to discredit Forster for failing to see the widespread benefits of such programs. 
While Page, of course, is right to credit the Working Men’s College and 
University Extension Programs for improving the lot of many, a closer look at the 
motivation behind the creation of these institutions may undercut his optimism and 
explain why Forster wanted to temper their successes, or at least analyze them in a more 
critical way. Importantly, I am not arguing in any way that Forster did not believe these 
programs were worthwhile—his longstanding involvement in both shows otherwise— or 
that he was exhibiting a snobbishness just as damning as Goldie Dickinson’s. Instead, I 
think that Forster only wanted to record the process of the loss of his version of heritage 
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even as he helped usher in its successor, and while these institutions were certainly not 
responsible for such loss, they do illustrate the particularities of the complications that 
arise around cultural transmission for all classes at the beginning of the period associated 
with modernism. As I conclude this chapter, I turn specifically to the Working Men’s 
College, the founder of which, F.D. Maurice, had hoped to instill in his students those 
same values of fellowship and intellectual discussion that Forster attributes to Cambridge. 
Established almost sixty years before Forster published Howards End, the 
Working Men’s College undertook with great seriousness the idea of an inclusive adult 
education. In an invaluable overview of the College’s origins published in honor of its 
centennial (1954), J.F.C. Harrison focuses on the college’s founder F.D. Maurice and his 
commitment to creating an institution that responded to gaping holes in education for the 
lower classes while also creating an environment that duplicated the fellowship of 
Oxbridge. The principal of the college at the time, Sir Wilfrid Eady, summarizes the 
College:  “Above all it is not just a place for evening classes; it is a College, with all the 
ordered corporate life and free companionship that is in the word.”51 Indeed, for Maurice, 
Harrison recalls, “The word symbolized…the spirit of a corporate life, of fellowship, of 
brotherhood in the deepest, Christian, sense.”52 This fellowship, according to his model, 
would come not only from the students interacting with one another, but with learned 
men—their teachers. The college was designed to bring classes together in “lessons 
rather than lectures,” with ample time for discussion in which all questions or opinions 
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would be welcomed.53 Maurice’s vision here seems like an ideal combination of Ansell 
and Tilliard’s cow discussion and the Schlegels’ tea with Bast: the college would 
facilitate free-flowing discussion in which members of all classes were valued 
participants. The workingman “was conceived to be ‘a person, not a thing, a citizen and 
not a slave or even a wage-earning animal.’”54As a result, literature was taught as part of 
a greater framework of history and ethics. Maurice “seems to have felt that the primary 
function of literature in the classroom was to illustrate other subjects, rather than to whet 
an appetite for reading for its own sake.”55  
At its time, the College was a revolutionary idea, miles apart from the Mechanics’ 
Institutes, “with their science for artisans, and Lord Brougham’s appeals to them to get 
knowledge that they might get on.”56  The Mechanics’ Institutes offered what Maurice 
found to be only superficial knowledge, with banal exhortations to “improve your mind 
that you may rise in the world.”57 The Working Men’s College offered an openly spiritual 
analysis of education, with a focus on brotherhood, fellowship, and mutual benefit. And 
arguably its most revolutionary tenet was that rather than continue the dully watered-
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down scientific lessons of the Mechanics’ Institutes, it would take up the humanist 
tradition of Oxford and Cambridge, a hitherto unheard of prospect in the field of 
education for working men.58 
Maurice wanted his college to evoke the Oxbridge tradition not only in spirit, but 
in practical execution. Under the leadership of George Tansley, the Working Men’s 
College modeled its hierarchy of examinations and honors on the Oxbridge system, and 
annual visits to these older universities were begun. Further, Tansley proposed a “resident 
tutor” at both Oxford and Cambridge who would act as a correspondent and serve as an 
“ex-officio member of the Council.”59 “When the Founders had talked of a college and of 
a liberal education for working men,” Harrison explains, “they had always had thoughts 
of Oxford and Cambridge in the back of their minds; but it was the general collegiate 
spirit rather than the specific scheme of studies that they had desired to emulate.”60 That 
spirit, spelled out by Maurice in his 1854 pamphlet, Scheme of a College for Working 
Men, would insist on establishing commonality between his university and Oxford and 
Cambridge in the service of elevating that most respected fellowship: “I do not mean that 
we shall ever have a Gothic chapel or hall, or endowments, or that we should wish for 
them. But I mean that, starting from a common maxim and a common object, there ought 
to be an understanding between us, even when the subjects which we teach are most 
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different… that is not found, so far as I know, among professors or tutors elsewhere.”61 
Maurice’s vision was an educational and cultural utopia, an institution in which “only 
connect” would have been realized in its fullest capacity nearly sixty years before Forster 
wrote Howards End. This vision linked together adult education for the working classes 
with Oxbridge tradition, a relationship later evoked by Bast and the Schlegels.  
The College, however, was not especially successful in its early years. In 1883 the 
total number of students for the year was 425; in 1889 it had risen to 875; until 1896 it 
remained steady at around 790; at its peak in the late 1800s it reached over 1000, but 
those numbers steadily declined soon after.62 In 1873, it considered changing into a 
center for the newly popular University Extension Movement that came out of 
Cambridge, which had gathered so much momentum that it saw the establishment of the 
Workers’ Educational Association in 1903, and, in the year before the publication of 
Howards End, the College offered its first University Tutorial Class. Richard Altick 
specifies one of the biggest obstacles to workingmen’s education: “The fact remained, 
however, that the working class was so completely unprepared for higher education that 
all but the most indomitable spirits soon lost hope.”63 Here Altick introduces a point that 
helps explain why Bast, who is a clerk and not a mechanic or workingman, is such an apt 
symbol of the adult education movement: these programs, while geared toward 
mechanics and workingmen in name, ultimately were better suited to skilled artisans 
rather than common laborers. “Business and professional families” took the mechanics’ 
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place and the Mechanics’ Institutes ultimately attracted students who were from the 
“higher branches of handicraft trades, or are clerks in offices, and, in many instances, 
young men connected with liberal professions.”64 The same happened at the Working 
Men’s College, as white-collar workers soon outnumbered actual workingmen by a large 
margin. Even the university extension program found this to be the case, eventually 
becoming mostly populated by women and business and professional men.65 Bast’s 
clerkship, his autodidactism, his position on the cusp of gentility make him the 
consummate beneficiary of any number of emergent adult education programs at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Those institutions had, however, only limited success 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, illustrating that Bast comes up against a 
tradition still in the process of inventing itself.  
The final push for such reinvention came in the years immediately preceding 
Forster’s writing Howards End, as the Education Act of 1902 abolished the old school 
boards and resulted in rapid educational expansion that took place at all levels, ushering 
in an era of significant growth in the sheer amount and diversity of universities, a 
phenomenon on which I comment in my final chapter.66 The moment, then, was ripe for 
Forster to reflect on where the university education of his own experience might go or 
how it might compare to those of the newer institutions. Forster picks up these main ideas 
from the recent history of adult education—fellowship and free discussion, how to 
educate working and middle classes, and the evolution of cross-class education from 
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vague platitudes of self-improvement to in-depth discussions of literature—and examines 
their relationship to his own version of culture and its associated heritage. Bast and his 
conversations with the Schlegels emphasize fellowship and meaningful understanding of 
art because that was the common thread Maurice wanted to share with Oxbridge; the 
relationship between the Schlegels and Bast mimics the kind of environment Maurice 
wanted on a national scale. And if the endeavor fails, with Bast never achieving any real 
benefit, it is less a commentary on the failure of the Working Men’s College mission as 
much as it is the realization that Maurice’s tie to the heritage at Oxford is, at last, out of 
date. 
With that in mind, we can look anew at the old questions of creating a national 
policy for culture, a seemingly tired debate that Helen and Margaret enter into when they 
attempt to mentor Bast.  The clerk unwittingly becomes the subject of vigorous 
discussion in response to the hypothetical question posed at a dinner party: “How ought I 
to dispose of my money?” (105). Should the financial gains of one generation be used to 
provide for the poor of the next? Matters of financial necessity overlap with questions of 
cultural gain as discussion ensues over “what right had ‘Mr. Bast’ to profit” from others’ 
hard-earned income, as well as what kinds of culture should be sufficient for him—must 
he have a free library? Free tennis courts? Should he be assigned a “Twin Star,” “some 
member of the leisured classes who would watch over him ceaselessly”? Should he be 
given “food but no clothes, clothes but no food” (105)? Margaret, assigned for the 
purposes of the debate the position of the “Society for the Preservation of Places of 
Historic Interest or Natural Beauty” argues that “Mr. Bast”—always in quotes now, who 
has come by this point to in the discussion to represent his entire class— should simply 
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receive cash: “Money’s educational. It’s far more educational than the things it 
buys…isn’t the most civilized thing going, the man who has learnt to wear his income 
properly? ...give Mr. Bast money, and don’t bother about his ideals. He’ll pick up those 
for himself” (106). It is a valid enough position, and argued for and against well by the 
other guests. Interestingly, though, another woman’s suggestion that “Mr. Bast” receive 
“personal supervision and mutual help,” in which “the effect…was to alter poor people 
until they became exactly like people who were not so poor,” is quickly dismissed by the 
Schlegel sisters (107). The mentorship the women offer Bast, it seems, is recognizably 
unviable, even though “personal supervision and mutual help” is exactly what Helen 
attempts with Bast on her own in the latter half of the novel. In her argument against 
mentorship, Margaret only affirms the import of class privilege, but she ignores that Bast 
cannot simply “pick up” the heritage she herself had been granted. 
The negative reaction to the idea of mentorship sticks out to me because it marks 
this debate as unique among conversations regarding education for the lower and middle 
classes; the inclusion of mentorship makes the debate not as typical of the kinds of social 
progressivism that critics such as Bradbury, Zemgulys, and Medalie read as being 
criticized in the novel. This dig at mentorship alludes to my earlier point regarding 
Forster’s recognition that mentorship is an ineffectual replacement for heritage, and asks 
the reader to consider specifically how the institutions in charge of such adult education 
respond to a more pervasive loss of heritage. As the sisters grapple with engaging both 
Leonard Bast, the individual to whom they try to share their heritage (even if they fail), as 
well as “Mr. Bast,” the nonspecific person who is at the heart of a debate over matters of 
educational policy, they get at a key issue at stake in the rise of universities and adult 
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education at the beginning of the twentieth century, which is the loss of the sovereign 
educator’s instinct that heritage could ever be taken across classes. To use Mrs. Wilcox’s 
phrase, Forster finds it is “an instinct which may be wrong” (55).  
Maurice’s instinct that a line could be traced directly from Oxford and Cambridge 
to his own College may not be a feasible one; the University Extension lectures may not 
be actual extensions of the Cambridge that creates them. The break does not come from 
the inability of the lower classes to access culture more generally—that kind of reading 
leads to the snobbishness Page and Rosencrance detect—but from this uncomfortable 
idea that culture can be mentored or passed down. There was a heritage that came with an 
Oxbridge education, one to which Forster felt greatly connected, and it seems his failed 
experiment with mentorship and Bast constitutes his acknowledgment that this particular 
experience cannot ever be duplicated or shared. Mrs. Wilcox directs the “an instinct 
which may be wrong” phrase at Helen and Paul’s incompatibility, but Margaret takes it to 
mean “they belong to types that can fall in love, but couldn’t live together. That’s 
dreadfully probable. I’m afraid that in nine cases out of ten Nature pulls one way and 
human nature another” (55). It seems apt, though, in Bast’s case as well. The instinct 
behind a place like the Working Men’s College or the University Extension Centers that 
opened all over England is, I think Forster would find, admirable in every way. But it is 
incompatible with the instinct of another sort, the heritage that he had come to enjoy at 
Cambridge. Educating Bast is hardly a worthless endeavor, but it will not take the place 
of heritage. Even the oldest institutions of education must now face a newly expansive 
view of defining and acquiring culture. 
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VI. Forster and Liberal Decline 
If any mentorship succeeds in Howards End, it is the mentorship of Margaret 
Schlegel by Ruth Wilcox, whose deeply personal ties to Howards End mark the novel’s 
most poignant connection to a heritage connected to history and tradition. For Mrs. 
Wilcox, the transmission of material goods, a topic I will explore in my next chapter, 
matters not a whit, even as her leaving the home to Margaret creates complications for 
her estate: “Mrs. Wilcox has left few clear indications behind her,” and only hastily 
scribbles her testament to leave to Margaret Howards End (55). She sought for Howards 
End “a spiritual heir,” and her own spirit “stayed in and out, ever a welcome ghost” (83, 
138). The two women form, over time, a close bond, and Margaret assumes Mrs. 
Wilcox’s position as Henry’s wife after her death. But while Margaret may have taken 
over Mrs. Wilcox’s physical place, Mrs. Wilcox seems to last even in death. Margaret 
says to Helen near the novel’s end:  
I feel that you and I and Henry are only fragments of that woman’s mind. She 
knows everything. She is everything. She is the house, and the tree that leans over 
it. People have their own deaths as well as their own lives, and even if there is 
nothing beyond death, we shall differ in our nothingness. I cannot believe that 
knowledge such as hers will perish with knowledge such as mine. (282) 
 
Through Mrs. Wilcox, Forster seems nostalgic for meaningful spiritual ties, even as he 
acknowledges those ties, as his old Cambridge ones, may no longer carry the same 
relevance or value. The value of such spiritual mentorship, or the tie to one’s heritage, 
has been usurped by inheritance, the importance of material goods or economic capital. 
While Margaret herself is the subject of Mrs. Wilcox’s spiritual bequest, Howards End 
will eventually go to Bast and Helen’s child, the object of material inheritance. While the 
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spirit of Mrs. Wilcox will always live in Margaret, even Margaret realizes that it does so 
incompletely, since with Mrs. Wilcox died her devotion to her ancestors.  
Forster’s wistfulness for Mrs. Wilcox is in line with what so many of the 
foundational arguments about the novel, from critics such as Rose Macaulay, Lionel 
Trilling, and F.R. Leavis, claim of Forster’s politics, in particular his struggle with being 
“on the fag-end of Victorian liberalism.”67 In such readings Mrs. Wilcox represents an 
earlier time: Forster’s nostalgia for Victorian liberalism in the face of modern disquiet. 
The compromises between the dichotomous Schlegels and the Wilcoxes, between culture 
and business, are demonstrative of Forster’s own political compromises. Indeed, Forster 
is often considered a not-quite-modernist, an author too-firmly rooted in both the literary 
tradition and political liberalism of an ageing Victorianism to be a convincing modernist. 
Malcolm Bradbury, in particular, has argued that while Forster is hardly an “old-
fashioned” writer, he is merely at the periphery of Bloomsbury, and hence of modernism, 
the era of liberal decline.68  
It follows, then, that in mourning Mrs. Wilcox, Forster is mourning the 
Cambridge of his youth, the heritage that helped shape him, and feels a bit of nostalgia as 
he sees slipping away the age in which he could so happily and unwarily engage in its 
culture. In his 1946 essay, “The Challenge of Our Time,” Forster reflects on that 
“admirable age”:  
                                                
67Forster, “The Challenge of our Time,” 56. 
 
68 Malcolm Bradbury, “Introduction,” in Forster: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Malcolm Bradbury 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1966), 1. 
Frederic Jameson goes so far as to call Forster “at best a closet modernist” in his The Modernist Papers 
(158). More complete accounts of Forster’s position on the cusp of modernism can be found in Malcolm 
Bradbury’s “Introduction” to Forster: A Collection of Critical Essays, and David Medalie’s E.M. Forster’s 
Modernism. 
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[it]…practised benevolence and philanthropy, was humane and intellectually 
curious, upheld free speech, had little colour-prejudice, believed that individuals 
are and should be different, and entertained a sincere faith in the progress of 
society. The world was to become better and better, chiefly through the spread of 
parliamentary institutions. The education I received in those far-off and fantastic 
days made me soft and I am very glad it did, for I have seen plenty of hardness 
since, and I know it does not even pay. But though the education was humane it 
was imperfect, inasmuch as we none of us realised our economic position…we 
did not realise that all the time we were exploiting the poor of our own country 
and the backward races abroad, and getting bigger profits from our investments 
than we should… All that has changed in the present century.69 
 
Grateful for his education and the outlook it gave him, Forster nonetheless realizes it has 
lost relevance in modern society, and thankfully so, in some ways. He turns, though, back 
to that “old morality…the doctrine of laisser-faire,” and asks that it be combined with the 
“new economy.” This is a confirmation of Forster’s dedication to liberty and the 
preservation of freedom of one’s mind. Though it is a commentary on much bigger 
political currents, Forster’s recollection of the education of his youth is his own reminder 
that heritage helped create his own art, and even if such heritage cannot be duplicated 
exactly, it still bears lasting relevance for anyone concerned with the freedom of the mind 
and the cultivation of the spirit. The Schlegel’s “personal relations” must live on, as 
surely as Mrs. Wilcox’s spirit would forever preside over Howards End. 
  During an interview granted to a young man at Cambridge after his novelistic 
career had ended, Forster was asked if the undergraduate’s generation “bewildered 
Forster.” He responded “no, he was fortunate to have always been around young people 
from having lived so much in Cambridge. He thought he understood them; it was their 
relation to the world they live in that he did not understand.”70 Forster felt he could no 
                                                
69Forster, “The Challenge of Our Time,” 56. 
 
70Recollection of Sandy Campbell, “Mr. Forster of King’s,” in E.M. Forster: Interviews and Recollections, 
ed. J.H. Stape (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc. 1993), 116.  
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longer write about “the old-fashioned world with its homes and its family life and its 
comparative peace,” the war having ruined the vestiges of his political liberalism and 
leaving him with fear over the country’s and democracy’s future.71 Looking to my next 
chapter on Virginia Woolf and how she sees mentorship and the university factoring into 
the Great War, it is important to note that the university always remained for Forster a 
place that should be separate from the ugliness of war. I turn once more to Forster’s 
biography of his friend, Goldie, to illuminate Forster’s own feelings on his beloved 
Cambridge. After the Great War, Forster writes, “Cambridge only increased his sadness. 
All that he had cared for and worked for had vanished, and a grim obscene power took its 
place.” Forster recalls an incident in which a group of soldiers burst out laughing at the 
site of an undergraduate in cap and gown, laughing at “the tradition I had been educated 
in, and that it should be laughed at in its own home appalled me…No one defended it or 
even seemed to regret it, it had become a wraith which the next puff of gas would drive 
away.”72 Woolf, of course, will challenge Forster’s vision of a perfect pre-war 
Cambridge, but for him it remained, till the last, the symbol of the very best kind of life, 
where students would learn to always be “the light of truth burning in a storm.”73 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
71 “E.M. Forster on his Life and Books” (interview with David Jones, January 1959) in E.M. Forster: 
Interviews and Recollections, ed. J.H. Stape (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc. 1993), 39. 
 
72Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, 134. 
 
73Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, 135. 
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Chapter 3 
 
“The Procession of the Sons”: Gendered Mentorship in To the Lighthouse 
 
Almost the same daughters ask almost the same brothers for almost the same 
privileges. Almost the same gentlemen intone almost the same refusals for 
almost the same reasons. It seems as if there were no progress in the human 
race, but only repetition. We can almost hear them if we listen singing the 
same old song, ‘Here we go round the mulberry tree, the mulberry tree, the 
mulberry tree’ and if we add, ‘of property, of property, of property,’ we shall 
fill in the rhyme without doing violence to the facts.  
      -Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas  
 
 
 In 1916, Virginia Woolf wrote to women’s rights activist Margaret Llewelyn 
Davies that the Great War was a “preposterous masculine fiction” that made her “steadily 
more feminist.”1 Woolf continues this argument in A Room of One’s Own (1929), 
claiming that it was the war that “hardened women’s views about their male rulers.”2 In 
her pacifist polemic, Three Guineas, Woolf links outright the “tyranny of the patriarchal 
state” to the “tyranny of the Fascist State.”3 Published in 1938 on the cusp of World War 
II and its very real threat of a Nazi invasion, Woolf’s critical version of British social 
history portrays the educated middle class as participating in a self-renewing cycle of 
patriarchy that is reflected in the gendered nature of daily activities. A society that 
perpetuates male dominance in turn perpetuates war; the violence of war, Woolf claims, 
                                                
1Mark Hussey, preface to Three Guineas, by Virginia Woolf (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2006), xiv.  
Also in Hermione Lee, Virginia Woolf (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1998), 339. 
 
2Hermione Lee, Virginia Woolf  (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 339. 
 
3Lee, Virginia Woolf, 669. 
See also Jane Marcus’s introduction to Three Guineas, in which she links issues of gender to the “buildup 
to war and the power of Fascism to rule the state” (xviii). 
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is a uniquely “man’s habit.”4 The country, then, becomes vulnerable to Fascism because 
it accepts “tyranny” as a matter of course.  
The validity of the causal relationship that Woolf posits between patriarchy and 
war has met resistance from the day Three Guineas was published. The book was 
criticized harshly by Woolf’s contemporary John Maynard Keynes; her own husband, 
Leonard Woolf; and even her nephew, Quentin Bell, who claimed her argument was 
“wholly inadequate,” taking particular issue with “a discussion of women’s rights” being 
joined “with the far more agonizing and immediate question of what we were to do in 
order to meet the ever-growing menace of Fascism and war.”5 Critically, these concerns 
persist today, as Three Guineas is often regarded as Woolf’s least successful work, 
replete with rhetorical oddities, unresolved arguments, and, given its focus on women of 
her own class, narrow scope.6 This, coupled with Woolf’s own tendency to “[present] 
herself as an unworldly, even mystical private person with no desire for contact with 
political life,” long devalued Woolf as a wartime critic, encouraging critics as different as 
F.R. Leavis, Paul Fussell, and Elaine Showalter to read Woolf only in the context of her 
narrative innovations characteristic of modernism.7 
                                                
4 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas, ed. Mark Hussey (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2006), 9. Hereafter cited 
parenthetically.  
 
5 Virginia Woolf qtd. in Lee, Virginia Woolf, 680. 
 
6 Hermione Lee explains Three Guineas’ unusual structure: “With a great boiling-up, it splashed over 
everything that affected her: not just the patriarchal home and ‘infantilism’ of male society, not just the 
education and employment of women, but the establishment, the media, the church, psychiatry, science, 
dress. Her cultural conspiracy theory encompassed them all…Just as she worked herself almost to death 
turning The Years into a ‘deliberate failure,’ a novel whose form would reflect its politics, so in Three 
Guineas she devised a deliberately fluid structure to undermine the rigid insistence of propaganda and 
polemic” (669-70). 
 
7 Lee, Virginia Woolf, 671. 
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 Renewed attention to Three Guineas, however, has helped recast Woolf as a 
prominent social commentator with particularly strong pacifist views that permeate both 
her fiction and non-fiction. Alex Zwerdling and Mark Hussey have revolutionized Woolf 
studies through their emphasis on her as a war critic, effectively removing her from the 
ivory tower on which she had been perched throughout the fifties and sixties.8 In Virginia 
Woolf and War, Hussey argues for Woolf’s position as “a serious political and ethical 
thinker,” and reads all of her work as “deeply concerned with war… it helps redefine our 
understanding of the nature of war.”9 Hussey, though, generalizes the main argument of 
Three Guineas to reflect what he sees as Woolf’s views on war as a whole:   
…from her earliest to her final work she sought to explore and make clear the 
connections between private and public violence, between the domestic and the 
civic effects of patriarchal society, between male supremacy and the absence of 
peace…Woolf shares with many historical women’s campaigns for peace a 
sense of the interconnectedness of violence and male dominance.10  
 
Emphasizing the war content of Three Guineas helps Hussey to get around some of the 
gaps and stretches in the book’s argument and rhetoric; focusing on the text’s anti-war 
stance and connecting it to Woolf’s larger corpus of fiction subjugates the tenuousness of 
that connection between wartime violence and male dominance, assimilating it into a 
greater contemporary conversation about women’s views on war. This critical 
                                                
8 In her introduction to Three Guineas, Jane Marcus helps connect this to the charges of “elitism” often 
leveled against Woolf: “In the same way one might argue that Three Guineas did not survive because its 
pacifism could not be separated from its feminism and neither –ism could be separated from Woolf’s own 
brand of communism, a view so often misread and reversed and called ‘elitism.’ She says ‘Let us try to 
translate the kitchenmaid’s cry into the language of educated people’. Woolf never assumed she could 
speak for the workingwomen or workingmen’” (li). 
 
9 Mark Hussey, “Living in a War Zone: An Introduction to Virginia Woolf as a War Novelist,” in Virginia 
Woolf and War: Fiction, Reality, and Myth, ed. Mark Hussey (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 1991), 3. 
 
10 Hussey, “Living in a War Zone,” 3-4.  
See also Patricia Laurence’s “The Facts and Fugue of War: From Three Guineas to Between the Acts” in 
Virginia Woolf and War: Fiction, Reality, and Myth. 
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conversation on Woolf and war has, importantly, helped to historicize and politicize 
Woolf, but it also potentially encourages a somewhat myopic reading of Three Guineas 
that overlooks the particularities of Woolf’s social critique by reading the book too 
exclusively in the context of war.  
 In a claim that helpfully builds on Hussey’s reading, Daniel Pick remarks in a 
passing footnote to War Machine that any analysis of Three Guineas must also recognize 
the blame Woolf places on the system of education for upholding the gender roles that, 
she argues, lead to war.11 While his obvious imperative is to read Woolf—as does 
Hussey— as a wartime critic, Pick strikes me here as being exactly right in wanting to 
put more emphasis on the nature of Woolf’s argument against educational institutions. 
Building on this point, I argue in this chapter for a more nuanced reading of Three 
Guineas that moves beyond the text’s war content and examines more fully the way that 
education upholds the “given [gender] roles and mystifying identifications” that Pick 
mentions. In contextualizing Woolf’s “manifesto” within her wider interest in education, 
I link her specific argument about the militaristic patriarchy that leads to war back to the 
chief establishment that Woolf argues perpetuates it: the university, which she criticizes 
as a profoundly classist and gendered institution. Further, I propose that attending to 
Woolf’s stance against the exclusionary tactics of higher education, as she lays it out in 
Three Guineas, illuminates a greater concern present in her fiction regarding the exact 
mechanisms through which institutions of higher education perpetuate tyranny. Woolf’s 
                                                
11The full footnote reads: “It is possible to read Woolf, at least at certain points of the essay, as endorsing a 
stark psychological and biological, as well as historical dichotomy between men and women, in their 
respective relations to war and Fascism. On the other hand, any adequate analysis of Three Guineas would 
need to stress, alongside the bi-polar gendered terms of guilt and innocence, implication and immunity the 
text offers, its powerful insistence that the current system of social and economic relations, above all for 
Woolf the system of education, upholds for both sexes given roles and mystifying identifications” (pg. 3 
footnote 2). 
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criticism of higher education is twofold, as she interprets the unequal access to 
universities as a sign of “tyranny,” and also sees this tyranny in the very process by 
which universities transmit social values. This process connects education to cultural 
transmission, and so is defined by Woolf in terms of mentorship.     
 My argument is primarily concerned with Woolf’s “daughters of educated men,” 
those shut out of the system of education that she claims perpetuates patriarchy. Alluded 
to in A Room of One’s Own but the subject of sustained discussion in Three Guineas, 
these women, “the weakest of all the classes in the state,” exert the least direct influence 
on society, having been instructed only in the areas of “poverty, chastity, derision, and,— 
what word covers ‘lack of rights and privileges?’” (16; 78). The repeated refrain, 
“daughters of educated men,” reveals rhetorically the dependency these women endure 
due to their lack of education, while simultaneously underscoring the discrepancy 
between their paltry education and that which their fathers received.12 Educated at either 
Oxford or Cambridge, the father is specifically implicated for not passing on to his 
daughters the education which, Woolf goes on to say, he always passes on to his sons. 
The education so central to the text is cast as a particular model, that of transmission, and 
the way that Woolf phrases the term for these victims of sociopolitical atrophy—“the 
daughters of educated men”— leads me to conclude that Woolf’s problems with 
education are inextricable from her problems with how that knowledge is transmitted: it 
is a problem of mentorship.  
                                                
12 The “Daughters of Educated Men” are hindered on two fronts: many receive no education at all, and the 
few who do remain powerless as a result of the educational system that perpetuates exclusionary tactics. 
These women keenly feel the disparity between themselves and their fathers and brothers, who have access 
to the knowledge, degrees, and appointments denied to them. 
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The inconsistencies and shortcomings she cites are put in terms of mentorship, as 
educated men are here faulted for not acting as mentors to their daughters. These 
“daughters of educated men” reveal Woolf’s concern with not just who is being educated, 
but who is passing knowledge on to whom.13 To return to this chapter’s epigraph from 
Three Guineas, Woolf takes a vituperative stance against tired rationales for male 
exclusivity and private property. The “mulberry tree” and “property” are not only 
indicators of the literal transmission of property and inheritance along male lines; they 
also symbolize the cultural values transmitted to the sons of educated men, relics of what 
I contend Woolf claims is an outmoded mentorship. The “same old song” is the 
institutionalized duplication and transmission of these values. In the plight of the 
“daughters of educated men,” the particularities of Woolf’s critique converge: she points 
to a reproduced, patriarchal, and exclusionary male discourse as it is intertwined with the 
Oxbridge tradition and she points to the absence of a viable, transmissible entity— a 
culture worth passing on.  
 In contextualizing Three Guineas within Woolf’s wider interest in education and 
the passing on of knowledge, I hope to extend the recent arguments of both Melba 
Cuddy-Keane and Lois Cucullu, who have both sensed Woolf’s concern with cultural 
transmission. Cuddy-Keane’s interests are explicitly pedagogical: she locates Woolf “in 
an environment rife with controversy about the dissemination and transmission of 
intellectual culture,” and traces her participation in “an on-going pedagogical debate” that 
                                                
13 Woolf herself was the “daughter of an educated man”; her father, Leslie Stephen, was a Cambridge 
intellectual. In her essay “A Sketch of the Past” Woolf describes the “communicative, literate, letter 
writing” into which she was born (62). Stephen believed women should be as well educated as men and 
encouraged Woolf’s reading. In his preface to Three Guineas, Hussey explains, “Such homeschooling was 
a source of some bitterness later in her life, as she recognized the advantages that derived from the 
expensive educations her brothers and half brothers received at private schools and university” (xi). 
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goes beyond institutional boundaries.14 Cucullu, in Expert Modernists, Matricide, and 
Modern Culture, argues for Woolf’s concern with the reproduction of social roles, as she 
sees Woolf transgressing the “social authority of the household…and mak[ing] the 
modernist intellectual a key player among the experts now responsible for reproducing 
the social order.”15 Both Cuddy-Keane and Cucullu imply that Woolf advocates forms of 
propagation that build on rather than reproduce intellectual institutions, but neither 
addresses exactly what it is that intellectual institutions reproduce, or the nature of the 
mechanisms of social reproduction.  Mentorship, in my argument, brings together 
Cucullu’s social reproduction with Cuddy-Keane’s pedagogical transmission; the two are 
linked as Woolf attacks the university for reproducing through mentorship the masculine 
“social order” she seeks to delegitimize. Further, I build on Cucullu and Cuddy-Keane’s 
work by claiming that Woolf additionally seeks an alternative mentorship, one actively 
involving the “daughters of educated men,” that could in turn help constitute a new 
“social order.”16  
This chapter explores how the mentorship implied by the “daughters of educated 
men” surfaces in To the Lighthouse (1927), a novel full of educated men and their 
daughters.  Since the importance of war to this novel has already been well-demonstrated, 
I read the novel’s commentary on war not as a critical ending point but as part of Woolf’s 
                                                
14 Melba Cuddy-Keane, Virginia Woolf, the Intellectual, and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2003), 8 (emphasis mine). 
 
15 Lois Cucullu, Expert Modernists, Matricide, and Modern Culture (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2004), 59 (emphasis mine). 
 
16 This refers back to the explanation of the classical version of mentorship described in my introduction 
and chapter on Hardy: Thomas Simmons’s claim about mentorship as an “invocation,” but not duplication, 
of the father. Woolf responds here to both mentorship as duplication and invocation.  
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larger commentary on the cultural transmission associated with university education.17 
Where my earlier chapters considered the class implications of cultural transmission, I 
examine here the ways in which that transmission was also affected by gender. I argue 
that Woolf establishes mentorship in the novel as a masculine tradition, and that she uses 
mentorship to characterize the patriarchal relationship between education (Oxbridge) and 
war identified in Three Guineas. Woolf’s earlier Jacob’s Room (1922) and even The 
Voyage Out (1915) also criticize the exclusivity and militarism of male mentorship and I 
believe To the Lighthouse raises this masculine mentorship only to resist it altogether. In 
a more drastic claim than either Hardy or Forster would make, Woolf argues here that the 
content being transmitted is ultimately as non-viable as the processes of transmission. In 
a move more powerful than any piece of education legislation, the war called for a radical 
end to cultural transmission, a transmission Woolf faults for leading to war in the first 
place. She proposes a uniquely female mentorship to take over from this traditional 
mentorship, a proposition explored primarily in the relationship between Mrs. Ramsay, a 
traditional domestic woman who has a particularly keen sense of perception, and Lily 
Briscoe, the artist who adores her. The novel, I claim, is an attempt by the daughters of 
educated men to construct both their own narrative perspective and their own model of a 
transmissible culture. The success of this attempt, though, Woolf herself comes to 
question, as Three Guineas ultimately calls for a “culture of outsiders,” signaling an end 
to mentorship as a viable system for cultural transmission at all, and wondering what, if 
anything, could take its place. 
 
                                                
17 See Hermione Lee’s biography of Woolf already cited in this chapter, and also Tammy Clewell’s 
Mourning, Modernism, and Postmodernism (2009), and Karen Levenback’s Virginia Woolf and the Great 
War (1999). 
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I.  Mentorship as a Masculine Institution 
 
 To the Lighthouse sets up a pattern of male mentorship through Mr. Ramsay, 
James Ramsay, Andrew Ramsay, and Charles Tansley, and argues that this pattern is 
passed down through institutions of higher education. The novel begins by establishing 
the presence and persistence of a distinctly male tradition, one that is handed down from 
generation to generation. On the first page, we are introduced to James Ramsay, the 
young son of Mr. Ramsay, an academic who “feed[s] eight children on philosophy!”18 
Symbolizing the next generation, young James is situated among terms of futurity: 
“tomorrow,” “to which he had looked forward for years and years,” and “future 
prospects” (3). While the boy hopes that his immediate future includes a family 
expedition to the lighthouse, his father bluntly dashes such hopes, insisting that the 
weather certainly “won’t be fine.”   
 The future that Mr. Ramsay envisions has less to do with weather or family 
outings and more to do with indoctrinating James with the same values to which he 
adheres. From the comfort of his mother’s lap, James sees his father in a pitch of 
excitement, declaring “Boldly we rode and well!” as he nearly collides with Lily 
Briscoe’s easel. Fortunately, the painting is spared, as “he turned sharp, and rode off, to 
die gloriously…upon the heights of Balaclava” (8). What nearly knocks into Lily’s art is 
not simply a too-boisterous walk in the garden, but a Tennyson poem. “Boldly we rode 
and well,” from “The Charge of the Light Brigade,” places Mr. Ramsay firmly in a 
masculine tradition of the past. The poem was written in 1854 during the Crimean War as 
                                                
18 VirginiaWoolf, To the Lighthouse (San Diego, New York, & London: Harcourt, Inc, 1981), 3; 22. 
Hereafter cited parenthetically.  
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a celebration of valor and courage even in the face of defeat.19  This past is made present, 
though, by Mr. Ramsay’s substituting the pronoun “we” for the “they” original to 
Tennyson’s poem. That small “we” has considerable weight: in Three Guineas, Woolf 
defines the term as encompassing “a whole made up of body, brain and spirit, influenced 
by memory and tradition” (22). With his son looking on, Mr. Ramsay makes it clear that 
he believes in that same male tradition of patriotism and valor championed by 
Tennyson’s poem.    
James, it would seem, is meant to learn and pass on this tradition, as well. The 
values on display in “The Charge of the Light Brigade” go hand in hand with Mr. 
Ramsay’s personal philosophy on child-rearing: “He was incapable of untruth; never 
tampered with a fact; never altered a disagreeable word to suit the pleasure or 
convenience of any mortal being, least of all of his own children, who, sprung from his 
loins, should be aware from childhood that life is difficult” (4). Although harsh, Mr. 
Ramsay’s outlook, like the one in Tennyson’s poem, encourages fortitude. Mr. Ramsay 
wants his children to learn to accept obstacles as inevitable, to learn that one needs, 
“…above all, courage, truth, and the power to endure” (4). In fathering eight children, 
Mr. Ramsay has endured—not only do his many children represent his literal 
propagation, but, if he teaches them as he plans, he will have transmitted those values 
                                                
19 The subject of Tennyson’s poem is the ill-advised and disastrous charge of the British cavalry in the 
Battle of Balaclava on October 25, 1854. Mr. Ramsay is the portrait of not only masculinity, but of a 
dangerous masculinity, the same one that Woolf would claim rationalized the violence of the Great War. 
The presence of the poem at such an early point in the novel signals the valorization of wartime disaster, 
and implicates this narrative in the many deaths of the Great War.        
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that, because he so vociferously sets them against his wife’s habits, are characterized in 
the novel as distinctly male.20  
As Mr. Ramsay’s progeny, James embodies physical continuity, straightforward 
reproduction, and the duplication of a tradition of valorous manhood.21  But if James, 
who ends up just like his father, represents the presence and continuity of a particular 
type of tradition, it is Mr. Ramsay’s protégé, Charles Tansley, who represents how that 
tradition of masculine virtues is consciously reproduced and passed on through a male 
mentor. One of the many young men who “parodied” Mr. Ramsay, Tansley is completing 
his dissertation (as Mr. Ramsay assumes Andrew will one day) under the supervision of 
Mr. Ramsay, and, with his repeated echoes of the impending bad weather, seems to have 
adopted his mentor’s attitude, as well.22  Indeed, while not Ramsay’s biological child, 
Tansley is every bit the son of an educated man by virtue of the allowances of 
mentorship. While he may have a working-class background, Tansley is granted the 
possibility of moving outside his class as the novel’s version of Cambridge indoctrinates 
him with its values.  
                                                
20 The Ramsays, of course, have a brood of both boys and girls. Mr. Ramsay’s interactions, though, are 
geared more towards his sons, whereas Mrs. Ramsay is the one, as I explain in my third section, to take into 
account what her daughters should learn.  
Additionally, many of the men in the novel echo Mr. Ramsay’s coldness. Charles Tansley, especially, is 
quick to chime in that the weather will not hold, and to resist moments of emotional vulnerability during his 
walk with Mrs. Ramsay. Augustus Carmichael and William Bankes, also, are aligned more closely with 
Mr. Ramsay. 
 
21 Hermione Lee provides a biographical reading of James’s character: “It is too simple to describe the 
Right Honourable James Stephen as a deep-dyed Victorian patriarchal imperialist. A man powered by a 
social conscience and a rigid sense of justice, ‘one of the great colonial administrators of the age,’ he seems 
also to have been a casualty of the system into which he was built and which he helped to build. Leslie 
thought of his father as ‘two persons in one.’ That double nature—the rigid will and the thin skin—would 
emerge again in the next generation, particularly in Thoby. The family type is invoked at the beginning of 
To the Lighthouse, where Mrs. Ramsay is looking at her son James, who has been give the Stephen family 
name as well as the Stephen face and destiny” (61). 
 
22 “‘There’ll be no landing at the Lighthouse tomorrow,’ said Charles Tansley, clapping his hands together 
as he stood at the window with her husband” (7). 
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The values to which Cambridge grants Tansley access are more clearly delineated 
in one of Woolf’s earliest novels, 1922’s Jacob’s Room. As Tansley envisions himself 
“for ever walking up and down, up and down, with Mr. Ramsay,” we hear the echoes of 
Jacob Flanders’ footsteps (7). It is a cool night at Cambridge as Jacob buttons his jacket 
and takes leave of the pleasurable company of his friends: “Back from the Chapel, back 
from the Hall, back from the Library, came the sound of his footsteps, as if the old stone 
echoed with magisterial authority: ‘The young man—the young man—the young man—
back to his rooms.’”23 Given that the novel narrates its protagonist’s life from the 
perspective of those who will mourn his death in the Great War on the book’s final page, 
such regression and repetition of Jacob’s footsteps and youth seem a fitting 
foreshadowing to the impending lament, which famously takes place over a pair of 
Jacob’s old shoes. Jacob’s Room is also a historical commentary: Woolf sees the culture 
that produced the intimate academic gathering of Jacob and his friends as subsequently 
calling them to war, to the endless deaths of so many young men. In this passage, Woolf 
emphasizes not the end result—death in war—but how Jacob ends up there as a result of 
that which Cambridge taught him. 
I will discuss the import of the war in the next section, but first, I would like to 
establish that there is precedent for reading in Woolf characterizations of the university as 
engendering mentorship-type relationships. Vincent Sherry extrapolates from Jacob’s 
footsteps a useful summary of Woolf’s critique: “The cadence to which his steps conform 
only confirms the ratios of an authority established, passed on: rational, male.”24 It is not 
                                                
23Virginia Woolf, Jacob’s Room (San Diego, New York, & London: Harcourt Inc., 1960), 46. Hereafter 
cited parenthetically. 
  
24Vincent Sherry, The Great War and the Language of Modernism (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), 279.  
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the subject of Sherry’s line—“rational, male”— that explains how this repetition comes 
about; it is his verb, “passed on,” which implies that this repetition occurs as a result of a 
conscious act of transmission. In matriculating at Cambridge, Jacob, as Sherry rightly 
asserts, inserts himself into the tradition of patriarchy criticized so overtly by Woolf in 
Three Guineas. In Jacob’s Room, Cambridge only continues an educational system 
already in place, one begun by Jacob’s tutor, Mr. Floyd. “‘Oh bother Mr. Floyd!’ said 
Jacob, switching off a thistle’s head, for he knew already that Mr. Floyd was going to 
teach them Latin, as…Mr. Floyd, like his father before him, visited cottages miles away 
on the moors, and, like old Mr. Floyd, was a great scholar” (20). Knowledge in the novel 
is, from the outset, cast in terms of “passing down.” Mr. Floyd himself went to either 
Oxford or Cambridge (Betty Flanders cannot remember which, as they are equal in her 
mind), and he prepares Jacob to do the same. Once there, Professor Plumer, whose name 
implies his embodiment of scholarly tradition, resumes the role of mentor and Jacob is 
left to take his repetitious footsteps.25   
Indeed, all the Cambridge men are cast in language that situates them as part of a 
great tradition of mentorship: “Look, as they pass into service, how airily the gowns blow 
out, as though nothing dense and corporeal were within. What sculptured faces, what 
certainty, authority controlled by piety, although great boots march under the gowns. In 
what orderly procession they advance” (32). Jacob’s footsteps down the dormitory hall, 
the boots marching under the pluming gowns, and the shoes that are Jacob’s only remains 
                                                                                                                                            
In accordance with my argument about the institutionalization mentorship of the values that lead to war, 
Sherry continues, “This masculine order of a rationalistic language extends its empowerment to Jacob 
through the university that institutionalizes these values” (279). 
 
25 In yet another passing critical reference to mentorship, Sherry refers to Professor Plumer as Jacob’s 
“mentor.”   
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symbolize his active participation in a transmitted tradition. Mentorship in the novel 
began as a kind, deliberate gesture of education for a lonely widow’s son, yet it quickly 
becomes an equally deliberate act of transmitting particular knowledge and cultural 
values. Given the novel’s tragic end it is obvious that that these values culminate in war, 
so I would like to emphasize here the way in which the novel relies on the language of 
transmission before Jacob ever even goes to war. Mentorship in this construction goes 
beyond exposing a social problem as it had for Hardy and Forster; mentorship according 
to Woolf actually is the source of the problem itself. The language describing his 
education is put in terms of mentorship, showing how Woolf came to think of it as a 
defining model for understanding the ways that the “male rationales” mentioned by 
Sherry are carried on.    
While Jacob Flanders and James Ramsay may initially resist their mentors, 
neither successfully dodges their influence: James, at the novel’s end, is as gruff and 
unfeeling as his father, and Jacob dies to protect the lifestyle afforded to him by 
Cambridge. 26 Both sons of educated men, they are the grateful recipients of Woolf’s 
famed “Arthur’s Education Fund,” recipients of male exclusivity, private property, and 
male rationales. But while both are the beneficiaries (or victims) of mentorship, it is 
Charles Tansley, the son of an uneducated man, who emphasizes the social implications 
of mentorship. Privy to the same educational opportunities as Jacob Flanders and James 
Ramsay, Charles Tansley underscores that mentorship inculcates more than just basic 
                                                
26 As a young child, James finds his father overbearing (tyrannous, even), especially in contrast to his 
mother: “But his son hated him. He hated him for coming up to them, for stopping and looking down on 
them; he hated him for interrupting them; he hated him for the exaltation and sublimity of his gestured; for 
the magnificence of his head; for his exactingness and egotism (for there he stood, commanding them to 
attend to him); but most of all he hated the twang and twitter of his father’s emotion which, vibrating round 
them, disturbed the perfect simplicity and good sense of his relations with his mother” (36-7). 
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knowledge: mentorship is both the transmission of values and the creation of a system 
that allows those values to be transmitted beyond biological lines and become an 
institutional norm. Tansley, while from a family as “poor as church mice,” is seen as 
“exceptionally able” by Mr. Ramsay (6). The son of a chemist, Tansley has “paid his own 
way since he was thirteen” (12). As a male, however, he is granted access to institutional 
mentorship (with Mr. Ramsay) through the university, and so is able to join in a 
particular tradition of passed-down values that grant authority and power to men. He 
may, as Mrs. Ramsay points out to Lily, be tutoring his sister at home, but he cannot 
admit her to the same university privileges he enjoys (197). An unpalatable version of 
Leonard Bast, he is still more successful than either Bast or the fated Jude Fawley, as 
Tansley accomplishes precisely what Jude cannot do: through hard work and the proper 
training, he gains access to an institution typically outside of his class.27  
The idea that Tansley could overcome his lower-middle class origins and attain a 
Cambridge-type degree, while inspiring, is hardly a naïve assumption on the part of 
Woolf that simple hard work could yield positive results. Rather, Tansley’s ability to 
transcend class boundaries links education to the class and gender struggles so important 
to Woolf. As Hermione Lee points out, Woolf’s “essays and fiction of the 1930s present 
a disfigured society with a hypocritical culture and an unbridgeable class gap. They 
diagnose rigidly constructed gender identities, which exclude or oppress the misfits of 
                                                
27 In a nod to the unfortunate scholar, Leonard Bast, the elderly attendant to the Ramsay’s beach house, 
shares his name: the old (and “creaky”) Mrs. Bast helps Mrs. McNab rescue the Waverley novels, a tea set, 
and other forgotten goods from impending decay (135). Like her namesake, Mrs. Bast seems doomed to 
fail, as the relics from the house are as sure to be as forgotten as Leonard Bast is by the end of Howards 
End.  
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either.”28 To the Lighthouse, in allowing Tansley to bridge this gap by virtue of his 
gender and the allowances of mentorship by other men, demonstrates the profound 
possibilities of institutionalized mentorship. Firstly, institutional forms of mentorship 
promote gendered educational access and transmission (i.e. the Tennyson poem and the 
“rational, male cadence” of Jacob’s footsteps). Secondly, this mentorship points to 
possibilities for upward class mobility and, correspondingly, the possible acquisition of 
upper-class cultural capital—a degree. While his humble origins prevent him from even 
being considered as a possible match for Prue (Mr. Ramsay says he would disinherit her 
should they marry) he can still write the same dissertation expected of Andrew (66). 
Mentorship creates Tansley’s one possibility for upward class movement. In Charles 
Tansley, especially, Woolf makes the argument that mentorship is a masculine institution 
housed in the halls of higher education while granting only men social mobility and 
power. Woolf’s deprecatory portrait of Tansley’s character as an unfeeling atheist who 
makes the Ramsay women shudder also foreshadows her impending critique of 
mentorship, resonating with the doom that permeates Tennyson’s, “All in the valley of 
Death.”29  
 
 
                                                
28 Lee, Virginia Woolf, 338. 
 
29 Tansley seems to be inspired by Woolf’s older brother, Thoby, who had, according to Sherry, a real 
passion for the Age of Reason, “a sensibility given to strong opinions and convinced in particular of the 
irrelevance now of Christianity, fiercely moral but committed to logic rather than faith as the basis of 
correct action, his rational atheism stemmed identifiably from Leslie’s root” (238).  While Toby’s “rational 
atheism” is echoed in Tansley, though, Thoby’s intellectual privileges were very much a matter of more 
literal inheritance. Woolf was shut out on both counts because of her gender—she could not directly access 
Cambridge through either being self-taught or born into it. She may have had access to the knowledge, but 
could not, like Tansley, be granted access. 
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II. The Failure of Male Mentorship  
 Turning to the Great War’s looming presence in the novel, I argue that the 
patriarchy Woolf famously implicates is actually part of a greater system of the 
exclusions and shortcomings of mentorship and the particular relationship it posits 
between gender, social policy, and education. In “The Parable of the Young Man and the 
Old,” Great War poet Wilfred Owen casts the seminal patriarch Abram (Abraham) as a 
murderer, who kills both his son and “half the seed of Europe.”30 Owen’s feeling that 
fathers have quite literally killed their sons as one generation sends the next to war is part 
of a more generalized narrative of the Great War that came about shortly after the war’s 
conclusion. Samuel Hynes explains this “Myth of War” as a “collective narrative of 
significance,” a way for the nation to explain and come to terms with what it had 
endured. Hynes argues that this narrative began with “a generation of innocent young 
men, their heads full of high abstractions like Honour, Glory, and England, [who] went 
off to war to make the world safe for democracy.” Not only were these men “slaughtered 
in stupid battles planned by stupid generals,” but, as Owen suggests, they blamed the 
previous generation: “They rejected the values of the society that had sent them to war, 
and in doing so separated their own generation from the past and from their actual 
cultural inheritance… [the story] can be reduced to two terse propositions: the old betray 
                                                
30Wilfred Owen, “The Parable of the Young Man and the Old” in The Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen 
(New York: New Directions Publishing, 1965), 42.     
It is interesting to note that Owen refers to Abraham as “Abram.” Abram’s name is amended in Genesis 
17:5—well before the potential sacrifice of his son— to include the additional letters as a reference to God. 
By using this earlier version of Abraham’s name, Owen effectively omits God from the poem, referring to 
the perceived Godlessness of a brutal war. At the same time, God’s absence from the poem signals the 
same “Age of Reason” that is associated with the political progressivism of Liberalism, and that which also 
ushered in World War I.  
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the young; the past is remote and useless.”31 Together, Owen and Hynes capture the 
narrative of Jacob Flanders and Andrew Ramsay: armed with the “Tennysonian” 
(Victorian) values of male valor and courage received from their fathers, they die in war. 
Hynes’s “tyrannous Old Men,” an entire generation of murderous patriarchs, point to the 
“patriarchy” that Woolf criticizes in Three Guineas as fascist and tyrannical, imposing 
their justifications for war with deadly consequence.32  
 For Nancy Topping Bazin and Jane Hamovit Lauter, this patriarchy is embodied 
by Mr. Ramsay, whose attachment to Tennyson’s poem provides an easy link, in their 
argument, between the “husband-hero” and “soldier-hero,” the patriarch who feels 
superior to and protective of women, and the patriarch who wants to protect his country. 
The war imagery surrounding Andrew (and Jacob, by implication) stems, then, from a 
patriarchy that is both domestic and political.33  But as criticisms of Three Guineas 
illustrate, the presence of two types of patriarchy (domestic and political) does not 
necessarily imply a causal relationship between them. So, instead of taking the militarism 
of To the Lighthouse immediately back to the novel’s domestic engagements, I take it 
                                                
31Samuel Hynes, A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture (New York: Atheneum, 
1991), xii. 
George Orwell, in The Road to Wigan Pier, poses a similar narrative: “Essentially… it was a revolt of 
youth against age, resulting directly from the war. In the war, the young had been sacrificed and the old had 
behaved in a way which, even at this distance of time, is horrible to contemplate; they had been sternly 
patriotic in safe places while their sons went down like swathes of hay before the German machine guns. 
Moreover, the war had been conducted mainly by old men and had been conducted with supreme 
incompetence” (qtd. In Hynes xii).   
 
32Hynes identifies  To the Lighthouse as taking its form directly the “Myth of the War”: “a first part set in 
the world before the war, a third part in the changed world after the war, and separating those parts ‘Time 
passes’, in which the war occurs as a parenthetical example of time’s destruction” (458). 
 
33 Nancy Topping Bazin and Jane Hamovit Lauter, “Virginia Woolf’s Keen Sensitivity to War” in Virginia 
Woolf and War: Fiction, Reality, and Myth, ed. Mark Hussey (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University 
Press), 19. 
 Bazin and Lauter follow this relationship into A Room of One’s Own, arguing that “Woolf clarifies how 
sexism and its concomitant behavior can provide a foundation for either heroism (which can be admirable) 
or fascism (which is deplorable).” 
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back to the novel’s educational framework in order to flesh out this connection more 
fully. If, as I have argued, institutions of higher education instill the patriarchal values of 
the previous generation, then it follows that the values these institutional mentors 
transmit are related to the militaristic ones that Owen attacks. In this “Myth of War,” the 
violence is the end-product, what Hynes calls “cultural inheritance.” For Woolf, however, 
this inheritance itself is culturally inculcated; because it is actively mentored, it is part of 
a greater system of education and class represented by Tansley. The wartime violence in 
To the Lighthouse, after all, is limited to a simple bracketed statement, buried in the 
book’s center: “[A shell exploded. Twenty or thirty young men were blown up in France, 
among them Andrew Ramsay, whose death, mercifully, was instantaneous.]” (133). This 
compression does not diminish the impact of war; it enlarges it and makes the war part of 
a more systemic social failure outlined in the passage’s surrounding pages, a failure in a 
system characterized by mentorship. Not only does patriarchy make excuses for violence, 
but that patriarchy has been mentored. Patriarchy has been institutionalized, passed down 
from generation to generation. If universities operate by a system of mentorship and men 
continue to advance socially by the allowances of mentorship, they will continue to 
transmit the same patriarchy, which would lead to the same violence, and the same war 
that these institutions permitted in 1914. For this reason, Woolf scrutinizes male 
mentorship, first connecting it explicitly to war and then wondering what, if any, 
possibilities it holds for the future. 
 Woolf relates mentorship to both the university and the violence that she believes 
follows from it. While Cambridge may have been the seat of early Bloomsbury 
intellectualism, it was also the site of Liberal politics that reached a terminal crisis in the 
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Great War. Sherry makes a forceful case for reading Woolf in relation to the political 
Liberalism that led to the Great War, a formative event for literary modernism. Here, 
Sherry offers a very close reading of both Woolf’s language and the language he shows 
her to be appropriating and ultimately arguing against—those “authoritative male 
rationales” I mentioned above. These rationales are the “rational intercourse” or 
“language of reason” of Liberal politics, and rationalized a war that was not actually 
reasonable at all.34 Sherry links this language of rationality to the politics implicated in 
the war, analyzing the language of reason present in Three Guineas as Woolf argues 
against war. Sherry explains:  
Closely argued, densely and empirically reasoned, this antiwar treatise is 
massively and even wearisomely buttressed with its apparatus of scholarly 
citation and case-making, syllogism and proof. Its passionate rationality stands as 
strikingly at odds with the cooler and sauver manner of her accomplished style, 
moreover, as it reveals the underlying, abiding strength of that intellectual faith. If 
those protocols of documentary logic appear overprepared, their excesses preserve 
a memory of what they attempt to correct: the errors of insufficiency to which an 
overconfidence amounted in 1914.35  
 
The “overconfidence” to which this rationalism leads is precisely what guides Jacob 
Flanders to war. The language of mentorship or “passing down” in Jacob’s Room further 
relates the education associated with the Latin tutoring and the classic Cambridge 
education to a Liberal political agenda.  
 Like this male rationalist discourse, mentorship is blamed for propagating 
rationales for war. Having received the appropriate education from Mr. Floyd, Jacob goes 
up to Cambridge in October 1906, a particularly poignant date just after the sweeping 
                                                
34 Sherry, The Great War and the Language of Modernism, 234-5.  
 
35 Sherry, The Great War and the Language of Modernism, 237.  
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Liberal election victory.36 Jacob’s graduation in 1914 sees another key moment in Liberal 
political history: the outbreak of the Great War. Woolf’s description of war’s outbreak 
incorporates the language of transmission and casts it as a distinctly masculine mode. As 
“Five strokes of Big Ben intoned,” Timothy Durrant, a classmate of Jacob’s who is now a 
Whitehall clerk, records that war has been declared. The note is typed, the “burden of 
knowledge” carried across the street, onto “the sixteen gentlemen, lifting their pens or 
turning perhaps rather wearily in their chairs, decreed that the course of history should 
shape itself this way or that way, being manfully determined… to control the course of 
events.” This “manful determination” is that of Liberal politicians:  
Pitt and Chatham, Burke and Gladstone looked from side to side with fixed 
marble eyes and an air of immortal quiescence which perhaps the living may have 
envied, the air being fill of whistling and concussions, as the procession with its 
banners passed down Whitehall….altogether they looked too red, fat, pale or lean, 
to be dealing, as the marble heads had dealt, with the course of history. (171-2)  
      
This passage is put in terms of transmission, depicting the physical projection of the 
voice dictating the call to war, carrying the burden of knowledge, the transmission of this 
knowledge from the voice to the sixteen men to their colleagues, to the procession at 
Whitehall. This language establishes that the course of history, the march to war, truly is 
“manfully” determined as it is passed down, as mentorship is a uniquely male institution 
for Woolf.37 The war is the natural conclusion to the “mechanical (male) rationality” that 
Sherry finds in the character of Mr. Dalloway in The Voyage Out: linguistic reason is 
“powerful. It is male. It is the engine of advance.”38   
                                                
36 A subject Sherry discusses at length. See pages 275-7. 
 
37 Hermione Lee explains the Freudian basis of Three Guineas, showing how Woolf interprets Freud’s 
essential aggression as male (712). The slipperiness between masculinity and violence is characteristic of 
the entire text.  
 
38 Sherry, The Great War and the Language of Modernism, 278. 
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Jacob’s Room shows that such language “advances” only violence. But it is, 
crucially, the university that is implicated in this connection. Indeed, Woolf’s criticisms 
of Cambridge were many. Hermione Lee observes:  
In all her writings about Cambridge, there is the same tone—whether it’s in her 
unpublished caricatures of Saxon, ‘one of the great men of our time,’ who in the 
end never did anything except crossword puzzles, or her fictional version of 
privileged Cambridge life in Jacob’s Room, or her encounter with the closed 
doors of the ‘Oxbridge’ library in A Room of One’s Own. She criticised the closed 
world of Cambridge Socialites all her life for ‘rousing jealousies and vanities.’ 
And she would never forget how the young men irked her.39  
 
Albeit for somewhat different reasons, Woolf shared with D.H. Lawrence a distaste for 
Cambridge’s exclusions, a disdain that comes from, in part, the way that these exclusions 
are perpetuated. The presence of Durrant in the passage above relates this narrative of 
“the course of history” back to Cambridge, an institution represented in the text as the 
seat of male rationality. Mr. Floyd, Professor Plumer, Jacob Flanders, Timothy Durrant 
are the transmitters and receivers of the culture Woolf deems patriarchal and authoritarian 
in Three Guineas, and all are equally implicated in this procession that excuses a call to 
war.  And if the masculine mentorship transmitted through Cambridge leads to war, it 
cannot, to use the term Woolf associates with Mr. Ramsay, “endure.” When Woolf asks 
in Three Guineas, “where in short is leading us, the procession of the sons of educated 
men,” she looks back at Jacob’s heavy footsteps down the Cambridge corridor, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Hermione Lee echoes the mechanical nature of the language surrounding war in Jacob’s Room: “… the 
emergence of a young life is obliterated by the war, which is seen as a grotesque mechanical force 
superimposed on to terrifying chaos” (336). 
 
39 Lee, Virginia Woolf, 209. 
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banners passed down at Whitehall, and questions where this mentored, masculine 
liberalism can possibly go next.40 
 Jacob’s Room does not answer that question. As Hynes suggests, “War is not the 
subject of the novel, but it is the termination of it, the event after which no story remains 
to tell…at the end of the book there is only a vacancy, which represents both the dead 
Jacob and his dead world, the ‘civilization’ of Edwardian England.” 41 While Jacob’s 
Room shows how male rationales are linked to patriarchy and demonstrates that the 
university perpetuates these rationales through mentorship, the novel does not move 
beyond the emptiness of war and widespread loss of mass male youth, that which male 
rationales attempted to justify. But what lies beyond? Sherry looks to the forcefully 
shaped arguments of Three Guineas to gauge Woolf’s reaction to rational, male language 
as also an act of “desperation.” “The extremity of current circumstances repeats,” he 
continues, “the inefficiency of reason’s appeal to history.”42 Turning again to my 
epigraph from Three Guineas, Woolf’s stance against tired rationales for male exclusivity 
reads with a familiar pattern: “It seems as if there were no progress in the human race, but 
only repetition” (80-1). As property is passed down male lines, war is “the monotonously 
recurring product of patriarchal order.”43 Woolf, in the thirties, cannot see any possibility 
                                                
40 The question appears in Mrs. Dalloway, as well, as Peter Walsh watches a procession of young boys 
place wreaths at the Cenotaph. 
 
41 Hynes, A War Imagined, 344. 
 
42 Sherry, The Great War and the Language of Modernism, 237 (emphasis mine). 
Sherry continues: “In the late 1930s, she is revisiting—or awaiting—the disappointment that her father’s 
failed example first instanced. His failure to realize his intellectual ideals will provide a model and form for 
her understanding of subsequent events, especially those superintended in 1914 by the (somewhat) younger 
men of his own aging generation of liberals” (237-8). What Sherry reads as happening in the thirties I 
actually locate a bit earlier in To the Lighthouse. 
 
43 Hussey, “Living in a War Zone,” 8. 
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beyond a repeat of violence, as the male authority housed in Cambridge offers only an 
exclusionary history that merely recycles ineffective male rationales.  
 So when repetition characterizes the majority of male relationships in To the 
Lighthouse, it signals Woolf’s sense that mentorship has reached its end. Speculating as 
to why his friendship with Mr. Ramsay has faded, William Bankes thinks: “Whose fault 
it was he could not say, only, after a time, repetition had taken the place of newness. It 
was to repeat that they met…and their paths lying different ways, there had been, 
certainly for no one’s fault, some tendency, when they met, to repeat” (21). Even Mr. 
Ramsay’s own work is characterized by its inability to innovate: “He had made a definite 
contribution to philosophy in one little book when he was only five and twenty; what 
came after was more or less amplification, repetition” and “He had not genius; he laid no 
claim to that: but he had, or might have had, the power to repeat every letter of the 
alphabet from A to Z accurately in order” (23; 34-5).44 Mentorship, however, cannot 
survive on this repetition. As Mentor encourages Telemakhos to take his own path, the 
mentee must preserve the tradition he inherits while also individualizing it, understanding 
it in the context of his present-day society. Mr. Ramsay’s work represents masculine 
thought’s inability to move forward, signaling in the novel that the future of mentorship 
is not clear. 
In Jacob’s Room, Cambridge mentorship is offered as a kind of breeding ground 
for male discourse, a discourse which ultimately leads right to war. Jacob Flanders and 
later Andrew Ramsay demonstrate Woolf’s belief that mentorship’s repetition has 
                                                
44 Consider also Mr. Pauncefort, the artist, “watched by ten little boys,” who paints the same scene over and 
over again: “all the pictures were like that…green and grey, with lemon-coloured sailing-boats, and pink 
women on the beach” (13). It is especially important to note that Lily, the novel’s female artist, is the one 
who sees the repetitiousness of men’s art, as she later reacts to it with her own more personal art. 
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become dangerous, since it leads only to war. Jacob’s and Andrew’s fate is similar to that 
of Septimus Smith in Mrs. Dalloway: like Charles Tansley, Smith has the opportunity to 
become solidly middle class, but the war’s violence leaves him unable to advance, and 
like Rachel Vinrace of the Voyage Out, there is no other narrative possibility other than 
for him to die. With war as its endpoint, mentorship is no longer viable; repetition has 
become self-destructive.  
In To the Lighthouse, though, Woolf examines whether mentorship can lead to 
additional possibilities other than death. Woolf does not distinguish these possibilities as 
necessarily fruitful, since they still lead only to repetition. In To the Lighthouse, male 
mentorship is itself under scrutiny as a system that itself transmits values; if authoritative, 
male rationales can lead only to war, what of a system that privileges and relies on male 
authority and rationality? The repetition associated with Mr. Ramsay, the book’s primary 
male mentor, signals that Woolf’s continued analysis and attack uncovers problems of 
mentorship that persist even after the war, or may even lead to another one. James, Mr. 
Ramsay’s heir to intellectualism, is left with no way out of mentorship’s bind: he and 
Cam vow to “fight tyranny [Mr. Ramsay] to the death” on their eventual voyage to the 
lighthouse, but Cam realizes that James has simply slipped into Mr. Ramsay’s role, and 
she wonders to which one she should “yield” (168). The tyranny the Ramsay children 
must resist is twofold: war (which claims Andrew) and the male authority that Mr. 
Ramsay represents. If James cannot help but repeat the male authority of his father, he 
may not be able to resist the other either.  
 Woolf further questions where masculine mentorship can lead through the figure 
of the mentee who does not succumb to war’s violence, who seems immune to the 
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tyranny of war and the tyranny Mr. Ramsay represents to his children: Charles Tansley. 
Just as Cambridge harbors the discourse that led to war in Jacob’s Room, the university 
again produces a male, rationalist discourse in To the Lighthouse through Tansley. 
Tansley, as per Hynes’s “Myth of War,” feels he must speak out against the violence 
perpetuated by his elders. The novel’s final pages depict him as an anti-war speaker, 
“denouncing something: he was condemning somebody,” Lily thinks (197). But this is 
not the break with the old values that is seems. Instead, it is only an unwitting echo of 
Tansley’s dissertation, which was, as Mrs. Ramsay had thought, about “the influence of 
something upon somebody” (23). Tansley, the epitome of mentorship’s potential, is still 
very much a product of that mentorship even though the subject of his discourse has 
superficially changed. It is still that male, rationalist discourse of Jacob’s Room, even 
though Tansley didn’t have to die.  
But while he lives, Charles Tansley offers only false hope for mentorship. 
William Bankes sees him as the potential spokesman for the next generation: looking at 
him during a political discussion, Bankes thinks, “perhaps…here is the man. One was 
always waiting for the man…for Mr. Tansley seemed to be saying, You have wasted your 
lives. You are all of you wrong. Poor old fogies, you’re hopelessly behind the times…he 
had courage; he had ability; he was extremely well up in the facts” (94). But Tansley, 
because of the very allowances of mentorship, seems to promise only repetition of the 
same old rationales. Bankes’s “courage” and “ability” echo Tennyson; his praise of 
Tansley’s being “well up in the facts” only underscores the persistence of old male 
rationales. Tansley is Mr. Ramsay’s brightest protégé, the one who imagines himself 
“gowned and hooded, walking in a procession” of young men led by Mr. Ramsay, and he 
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ends up with a lifestyle very similar to his mentor’s, having received a fellowship, gotten 
married, living in Golder’s Green, and making Lily Briscoe shudder every time she sees 
him (196). Resistance to tyranny—both patriarchal and political—is done emptily; its 
transmission is continued through an institutionalized mentorship. Mr. Ramsay has 
indeed lived according to his dictum that one needs “the power to endure,” since he lives 
on just as much through Charles Tansley as he does through his biological children. 
Mentorship privileges that which endures, but Woolf believes it does so at a time when 
history’s events do not merit endurance. As Tansley represents the potential successes for 
men under the auspices of mentorship, he also represents their failure, since he cannot 
move beyond that tired “power to endure,” leaving mentorship floundering in endless 
repetition. 
 
III. Male Mentorship in Decline 
 I have argued that To the Lighthouse presents mentorship as a masculine 
institution, one that transmits traditional male values through the university structure. In 
light of the Great War, the novel associates this male mentorship with a justification of 
violence that precipitated a war Woolf considered unjust. As a result, mentorship in To 
the Lighthouse is thrown into question: it produces institutionalized repetition of these 
values, leaving Woolf wondering what can possibly remain as a viable subject of cultural 
transmission. No such possibilities exist in Jacobs Room, since the novel ends with the 
very absence of any transmission. All of Jacob’s knowledge acquired at Cambridge leads 
to what it is not there—Jacob, whose profound vacancy fills the room. But in To the 
Lighthouse, this knowledge is transmuted into physical terms, tangible proof of its 
 173 
 
existence; Woolf assigns to male knowledge a very literal “power to endure.” 45 In To the 
Lighthouse, material goods are more than the luxury commodities enjoyed by the refined 
men at Oxford and Cambridge mentioned in A Room of One’s Own or the haunting 
presence of Jacob’s shoes as a reminder of the steps he took at Cambridge. Cultural 
knowledge in To the Lighthouse itself can and does come to be measured in strictly 
material terms. Mr. Ramsay’s books are about “subject and object and the nature of 
reality” (23); James Ramsay is introduced as literally sitting in a pile of things; Tansley 
talks about his dissertation, as well as the possibility of a fellowship, professorship, 
readership, and a lectureship, tangible, noun-based markers of intellectual status or 
cultural capital.46 Male rationales and male knowledge are the subjects of mentorship as I 
have outlined it, and they come to be defined in the novel as too rational, too tangible, too 
similar to the “of property, of property, of property” passed down in Three Guineas. I 
believe that Woolf articulates through the association of male mentorship with 
“thingness” her particular problems with the male discourse that mentorship naturalizes. 
Only then can she finally allude to alternate possibilities for a less exclusionary 
mentorship. In opposition to men’s material needs, Woolf positions women and their 
rejection of this materialism in favor of feeling.   
                                                
45 In Jacob’s Room, this interest is more peripheral, as the most primary instance of physical acquisition 
occurs early on in the novel, upon Mr. Floyd’s departure. The scholar sends for the Flanders boys, “to say 
good-bye, he told them to choose whatever they liked in his study to remember him by. Archer chose a 
pen-knife…Jacob chose the works of Byron in one volume; John, who was still too young to make a proper 
choice, chose Mr. Floyd’s kitten…” (21-2). Aside from the academic, masculine tradition (Byron) present, 
the passage indicates the need for a physical souvenir of the learning the boys received.  
 
46 “James Ramsay, sitting on the floor cutting out pictures from the illustrated catalogue of the Army and 
Navy Stores, endowed the picture of a refrigerator, as his mother spoke, with heavenly bliss. It was fringed 
with joy. The wheelbarrow, the lawnmower, the sound of poplar trees, leaves whitening before rain, rooks 
cawing, brooms knocking, dresses rustling—all these were so coloured and distinguished in his mind…” 
(3-4). 
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 Whenever the artist, Lily Briscoe, tries to comprehend Mr. Ramsay’s work, “she 
always saw clearly before her a large kitchen table” (23).  Lily blames this mental image 
on Andrew: when she asks him what his father’s books were about, he replies, “Subject 
and object and the nature of reality.” Lily is, understandably, still confused: “And when 
she said Heavens, she had no notion what that meant. ‘Think of a kitchen table then,’ he 
told her, ‘when you’re not there’” (23). The passage evokes the reflective work of John 
Maynard Keynes, Woolf’s Bloomsbury friend. In “My Early Beliefs,” Keynes reflects on 
his intellectual life within his Cambridge milieu. Early Bloomsbury, Keynes shares, was 
indebted to G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, from which he and his friends learned that 
“Nothing mattered except states of mind, our own and other people’s of course, but 
chiefly our own.”47 Keynes recalls “the beauty of the literalness of Moore’s mind,” 
claiming, “But even when he was awake, he could not distinguish love and beauty and 
truth from the furniture. They took on the same definition of outline, the same stable, 
solid, objective qualities and common-sense reality.”48 Moore’s philosophy is, of course, 
infinitely more complicated than a passing reference to furniture, but the tradition Keynes 
describes here is in fundamental ways that same rationalist discourse I discussed above. 
Keynes, a Liberal himself, implicates this rationalism in creating a too-objective world 
view that undervalues human emotion, a view that began to wear thin even in the years 
leading up to the Great War, and completely collapsed afterwards.49 By literally 
objectifying the male transmission that came out of Cambridge, Woolf parodies this 
                                                
47 John Maynard Keynes, “My Early Beliefs,” in The Bloomsbury Group: A Collection of Memoirs and 
Commentary, ed. S.P. Rosenbaum (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 86. 
 
48 Keynes, “My Early Beliefs,” 92. 
 
49 Keynes, “My Early Beliefs,” 96. 
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outlook, taking aim at the entire system of a phony progressivism associated with 
Cambridge that did not turn out to be, in her argument, progressive at all.  
 Even upon realizing that “we completely misunderstood human nature,” Keynes 
reverts to an affirmation of mentorship:  
It did not occur to us to respect the extraordinary accomplishment of our 
predecessors in the ordering of life (as it now seems to me to have been) or the 
elaborate framework which they had devised to protect this order…we had lost 
something which our predecessors had without replacing it. I still suffer incurably 
from attributing an unreal rationality to other people’s feelings and behaviour.50  
 
Keynes, while he acknowledges that Moore “left out altogether some whole categories of 
human emotion,” reflects a bit too nostalgically on the traditions from which Bloomsbury 
grew. Keynes situates Moore’s philosophy into a greater tradition that echoes what I have 
called male mentorship:  
I have said that we were amongst the first to escape from Benthanism. But of 
another eighteenth-century heresy we were the unrepentant heirs and last 
upholders. We were among the last of the Utopians, or meliorists as they are 
sometimes called, who believe in a continuing moral progress by virtue of which 
the human race already consists of reliable, rational, decent people, influenced by 
truth and objective standards...51  
 
Keynes concedes that his philosophy is not sustainable in a post-1914 society; he even 
regrets the snobbishness and lack of “vulgar passions” suffered by early Bloomsbury and 
acknowledges that D.H. Lawrence might justly have felt some distaste for “intellectual 
chic.” However, he identifies the problem as belonging to a particular historical moment 
rather than a flawed institutionalized norm; he sees Moore’s rationalism as a misguided 
development of a longer held intellectual transmission, but never questions the validity or 
                                                
50 Keynes, “My Early Beliefs,” 95-6. 
 
51 “Plato said in his Laws that one of the best of a set of good laws would be a law forbidding any young 
man to enquire which of them are right or wrong, though an old man remarking any defect in the laws 
might communicate this observation to a ruler or to an equal in years when no young man was present” 
(Keynes 95). 
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fruitfulness of this transmission’s history.52 By emphasizing material goods as markers of 
a languishing male mentorship, Woolf is not claiming that physical things are not worth 
having (that would, of course, undermine the foundation of A Room of One’s Own), but 
that the intellectual tradition that shuts women out of such transmission is lacking in a 
more full and vibrant understanding of humanity that could offer a sustainable outlook in 
a postwar society. She characterizes male mentorship by placing it firmly at odds with 
that which it overlooks: the intangible, the irrational, the lack of authority. 
 Woolf underscores the frailty of male mentorship by making it reliant on women, 
the very people it rejects. Women have a distinctly non-Rationalist agenda in the novel. 
Male mentorship is indeed in need of sustenance, and it turns to women to provide it. 
Mrs. Ramsay, with her son in her lap, demonstrates to James that “into this delicious 
fecundity, this fountain and spray of life, the fatal sterility of the male plunged itself, like 
a beak of brass, barren and bare” (37). Without Mrs. Ramsay to birth his children and 
support his authority, Mr. Ramsay cannot pass on anything. As Cucullu explains, the 
Ramsays each acknowledge their “complicity in and responsibility for reproducing social 
order.”53 While Mrs. Ramsay lacks power in the social order, she recognizes that she 
facilitates that male authority: “Indeed, she had the whole of the other sex under her 
protection; for reasons she could not explain, for their chivalry and valorous, for the fact 
that they negotiated treaties, ruled India, controlled finance…” Because of women, men 
are able to build up those authoritative rationales that justify their increasing power. But 
                                                
52 Keynes, “My Early Beliefs,” 97. 
 
53 Cucullu, Expert Modernists, Matricide, and Modern Culture, 81. 
Cucullu argues the this complicity pleases Mr. Ramsay, who “fairly glows with the prospect of his family’s 
future.” Mrs. Ramsay, however, “privately broods over the trials her family will undergo and her sense of 
duty in spite of misgivings (81). 
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this power that men exercise as a result of the allowances that mentorship permits them is 
not stable or self-sustaining. Indeed, one of the book’s main harbingers of male authority, 
Tennyson’s poem, comes to foreshadow the decline of male mentorship, as Mrs. Ramsay 
appropriates the poem for her own understanding of male weakness:  
  But what had happened? 
  Some one had blundered. 
 
Starting from her musing she gave meaning to words which she had held 
in her mind for a long stretch of time. ‘Some one had blundered’ Fixing 
her short-sighted eyes upon her husband, who was now bearing down 
upon her, she gazed steadily until his closeness revealed to her…that 
something had happened, some one had blundered. But she could not for 
the life of her think what.  
He shivered; he quivered. All his vanity, all his satisfaction in his own 
splendour, riding fell as a thunderbolt, fierce as a hawk at the head of his 
men through the valley of death, had been shattered, destroyed. (30)  
 
With an emphasis on the poem’s “blunder,” Mrs. Ramsay realizes the feebleness of the 
language of truth, courage, and endurance that are the source of her husband’s strength. 
While she cannot articulate exactly why, she knows that the steadfastness of Mr. 
Ramsay’s power is waning, unable to progress beyond the blunder. Seeing that he is 
“outraged and anguished,” she wants to soothe him, but does so by retreating to the 
mentorship he has come to rely upon, and instead comforts their son: “She stroked 
James’s head; she transferred to him what she felt for her husband…” Here, Mrs. Ramsay 
is equally implicated in male mentorship—it depends on women’s participation, on Mrs. 
Ramsay teaching her daughters to emulate her role as a supporter to her husband; Cam, 
by the novel’s end, embodies exactly such mentorship as she tries to bring comfort to Mr. 
Ramsay.54 Mrs. Ramsay takes on the role of Coventry Patmore’s famed “Angel of the 
                                                
54 Mrs. Ramsay’s daughters, “in their girlish hearts,” admire their mother, “honour her strange severity, her 
extreme courtesy, like a Queen’s raising from the mud to was a beggar’s dirty foot” (7). They may dream 
of “a wilder life; not always taking care of some man or other,” but they recognize that this tradition of 
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House,” made ironic in Woolf’s essay “Professions for Women.” According to Cucullu, 
this Angel of the House is keenly interested in reproduction, but in biological and social 
forms rather than cultural. The social reproduction undertaken by the Angel is the 
marriage and moral piety that Mrs. Ramsay herself propagates. The biological and social 
reproduction for which women are responsible—marriage, children, and harmony in the 
home—are separate from male cultural procession, but are charged with sustaining it. If 
male cultural procession leads to war’s devastation, Mrs. Ramsay’s emotion and 
sympathy are aimed at soothing and healing over that devastation.55  
As Bazin and Lauter claim, women’s subordination to men while inflating their 
egos has direct impact on society: “When such actions are done to further civilization or 
knowledge, all is well. Sometimes, however, a man’s inflated ego makes him overtly 
self-confident, pompous, and dictatorial: his behavior then becomes fascistic. He imposes 
his will on others, by force if necessary.”56 While Bazin and Lauter assume a bit too easy 
a link between patriarchy and violence, they are right to point out that women play a role 
in enabling this patriarchy. For Bazin and Lauter, women’s subordination is proof of 
patriarchy’s tyranny. I suggest though that Woolf is actually commenting on the 
unsustainability of a male system that relies so thoroughly on female support. The 
university plays a key role in the ways Mrs. Ramsay chooses to mollify her husband. She 
sees herself as infinitely inferior to Mr. Ramsay, in part because of the prestige granted to 
him by universities; she holds his position up as a kind of lighthouse in itself, a place she 
                                                                                                                                            
female mentorship into which they have been raised has been hitherto used as a supplement to male 
mentorship. 
 
55 See also Claire Tylee’s reading of the “Angel of the House” in The Great War and Women's 
Consciousness : images of militarism and womanhood in women's writings, 1914-64 (1990). 
 
56 Bazin and Lauter , “Virginia Woolf’s Keen Sensitivity to War,”19-20. 
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admires but never can achieve.57 She chooses to revive Mr. Ramsay by turning to the 
institution that is the seat of male mentorship’s strength, the university, and offers up 
Charles Tansley—not her sons—as proof of her husband’s virility, as a way of allaying 
Mr. Ramsay’s concern that he is a “failure.” Mr. Ramsay’s response asks Mrs. Ramsay to 
also use her gift of feeling to restore him, to remind him of his intellectual talents: “But 
he must have more than that. It was sympathy he wanted, to be assured of his genius, first 
of all, and then to be taken within the circle of life, warmed and soothed, to have his 
senses restored to him, his barrenness made fertile, and all the rooms of the house made 
full of life” (37). Mrs. Ramsay’s emotion works in harmony with male institutional 
transmission: reminded of his mentee’s devotion and his own intellectual rigor, then 
finally bolstered his wife’s sympathy, Mr. Ramsay is comforted.  
In further proof of male mentorship’s need for female sustenance, Mrs. Ramsay 
extends her sympathy to Tansley himself, reviving him by “insinuating…the greatness of 
man’s intellect, even in its decay, the subjection of all wives” (10-11). Mr. Ramsay can 
give to Tansley access to male mentorship, but it is Mrs. Ramsay who grooms the young 
man as to how to sustain it through wifely subjection. She gives Tansley a model of what 
to want or expect. Mrs. Ramsay soothes her son’s sadness, her husband’s feared 
“sterility,” and now soothes this mentee, too. As a result, “for the first time in his life 
Charles Tansley felt an extraordinary pride; a man digging in a drain stopped digging and 
looked at her, let his arm fall down and looked at her; for the first time in his life Charles 
                                                
57Mrs. Ramsay sees her husband’s academic work as far superior to anything she could accomplish:  
“…she did not like, even for a second, to feel finer than her husband; and further, could not bear not being 
entirely sure, when she spoke to him, of the truth of what she said. Universities and people wanting him, 
lectures and books and their being of the highest importance—all that she did not doubt for a moment; but 
it was their relation, and his coming to her like that, openly, so that any one could see, that discomposed 
her; for then people said he depended on her, when they must know that of the two he was infinitely the 
more important, and what she gave the world, in comparison with what he gave, negligible” (39). 
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Tansley felt an extraordinary pride; felt the wind and the cyclamen and the violets for he 
was walking with a beautiful woman. He had hold of her bag” (14).58 Armed with a 
physical souvenir of Mrs. Ramsay, he is rejuvenated, repeating his own praise. This is 
Mrs. Ramsay’s gift; her social and biological reproduction ensures reproduction of men’s 
culture. It must, because this male culture, with its overemphasis on the tangibles of 
academic rank and material acquisition, is not self-sustaining.  
 
IV. Women’s Mentorship 
 Mrs. Ramsay’s attempts at reviving a decaying male mentorship, though, result 
only in ensuring its monotonous repetition since, as I have claimed, it no longer has 
anything to offer other than now-hollow rationales. In response, Woolf proposes in the 
novel a model of mentorship that entails a specifically female form of cultural 
transmission, a transmission that does not have the goal of sustaining male social order. 
Denied access to Cambridge herself, Woolf wants a radically different mentorship, one 
that does not rely on the university. When Woolf shuts women out of Cambridge in To 
the Lighthouse, she does so not necessarily because they cannot grasp the subject matter 
taught, but because they cannot see the university as a framework through which to study 
and reproduce social order in the way that men do. Women in To the Lighthouse prove 
themselves equally capable as men in terms of thinking about social problems, but they 
do not have the same resources. Mrs. Ramsay, while she considers herself an 
“investigator, elucidating the social problem,” can think about the problems of “rich and 
poor… employment and unemployment,” but she is powerless to do anything about 
                                                
58 Mrs. Ramsay extends her ameliorative powers to Paul Rayley, making him “believe that he could do 
whatever he wanted…as if she were saying, “Yes, you can do it. I believe in you. I expect it of you” (78).  
Here, she is promoting also the institution of marriage, encouraging Paul’s relationship with Minta.  
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them—“insoluble questions they were, it seemed to her” (9). Mr. Ramsay, though, 
reserves his thinking “for the young men at Cardiff next month.” Men have the 
university’s sponsorship for isolating social problems; women do not.  
 To some extent, this turn is anticipated as early as Woolf’s The Voyage Out. 
Rachel Vinrace enters the novel as a kind of clean slate, raised isolated and without any 
substantial education. She is a typical “daughter of educated men” as her father, 
Willoughby, committed “nameless atrocities with regard to his daughter” that leave 
Rachel uneducated in terms of more basic knowledge, such as “the shape of the earth, the 
history of the world, how trains worked, or money was invested.” 59 Completely devoid 
of any mentored skill, Rachel also lacks the knowledge of how to read other people’s 
emotions. Rachel’s Aunt Helen attempts to mentor Rachel at least in the art of emotion, 
but ultimately all she can offer Rachel is the same type of mentorship that Woolf would 
later criticize—one centering on men. In this case, that man is Terence, who is very much 
the son of an educated man. Woolf puts Rachel in a bind where the terms of mentorship 
cancel each other out: as with Philip Wakem and Maggie Tulliver, Terence can transmit 
his Oxbridge knowledge to Rachel, but the only institution to which he can grant her 
access is marriage. Rachel has not received male or female mentorship, and when she is 
suddenly offered both—by Terence and by Helen—there is no way for her to bring the 
two together in any workable way. Rachel and Helen, in trying to use the structures of 
masculine mentorship, cannot succeed. Rachel’s death at the end of the novel signals the 
impossibility of a women’s mentorship that simply plugs women into a male equation.   
 If Tansley himself were to offer an explanation for Mrs. Ramsay’s inability to 
wrap her head around her husband’s work, for example, it would be because women do 
                                                
59 VirginiaWoolf, The Voyage Out (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2004), 19; 28. 
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not engage in activity that produces physical transmission.“Yes, it was pretty well true, 
[Tansley] thought. They never got anything worth having from one year’s end to another. 
They did nothing but talk, talk, talk, eat, eat, eat. It was the women’s fault. Women made 
civilization impossible with all their ‘charm,’ all their silliness” (85). Women are here 
accused of being antithetical to the “civilized”; the graspable information indicative of a 
mentored male culture directly conflicts with what women know and have. Woolf herself 
concedes this point in “Women and Fiction”: “Often nothing tangible remains of a 
woman’s day. The food that has been cooked is eaten; the children that have been nursed 
have gone out into the world.”60 In a way, then, Tansley is correct. If women were to 
apply the mentorship model to the physical objects to which they are granted access, 
women’s culture would be sorry indeed. For all that women have to pass down in terms 
of tangible transmission are recipes, such as Mrs. Ramsay’s grandmother’s recipe for 
Boeuf en Daube, and jewelry, like the lost brooch of Minta Doyle’s grandmother. The 
acquisition of these physical goods means nothing to Mrs. Ramsay: “it was all one 
stream, and chairs, tables, maps, were hers, were theirs, it did not matter whose, and Paul 
and Minta would carry it on when she was dead” (113-4). For women, physical objects 
are just that—objects. They are neither the markers of cultural transmission nor the 
markers of endurance required by men.  
 Woolf identifies women as upholding the value of emotion, which is precisely 
intangible, in stark contrast to the tangible items that have come to characterize the futile 
remains of male mentorship. After the gastronomical triumph that is her perfectly cooked 
French beef, she reflects on her feelings of peace and rest, “Of such moments, she 
                                                
60Virginia Woolf, “Women and Fiction,” in Selected Essays by Virginia Woolf , ed. David Bradshaw 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 137. 
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thought, the thing is made that endures” (105). Her concern with endurance indicates her 
attempts to appropriate Mr. Ramsay’s “power to endure” for women. As such, Woolf 
proposes a radical shift in the way feelings are used. In the holograph manuscript of the 
novel appears a glimpse of what Woolf was trying to accomplish with her negation of 
male mentorship. The sketch for the “Time Passes” section looks like this: 
  “Hopeless gulfs of misery. 
  Cruelty. 
  The War.  
  Change. Oblivion.” 
  And then, “human vitality”61  
This “human vitality” is Mrs. Ramsay’s true gift; it survives her and it fills a real gap felt 
in a postwar society. Reading the scene in A Room of One’s Own where Woolf reflects on 
a Cambridge dinner party, Hermione Lee claims that Woolf believed that romance was 
the missing presence. “Romance is something that one finds in the poetry of Tennyson 
and Christina Rossetti,” Woolf said, “something that ‘celebrates some feeling that one 
used to have’, back then, before the war.”62 Tennyson can be refigured, moved toward 
“human vitality” rather than “shock and shell.”63 Lee finds that many of Woolf’s 
characters—Betty Flanders, Mrs. Dalloway, Mrs. Ramsay—feel it; and so do her men, 
such as Mr. Ramsay, Septimus Smith, and Peter Walsh. “In their minds,” Lee claims, 
“memories hover of an earlier time before the war, a time that seemed to hold more 
promise, and a sad sense that time is gone.”64 Woolf proposes in To the Lighthouse, then, 
a radically different subject as the object of transmission, shunning altogether the 
                                                
61 Lee, Virginia Woolf, 227. 
 
62 Qtd. In Lee, Virginia Woolf, 227. 
 
63 Mr. Ramsay stops quoting Tennyson after the war; he turns to William Cowper, an early Romantic poet. 
 
64 Lee, Virginia Woolf, 227. 
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intellectual rationalism that is the subject of male mentorship’s now-futile transmission. 
She turns to the power she grants Mrs. Ramsay, the other kind of knowledge that Rachel 
Vinrace lacks: that of sympathy and feeling, the power of human vitality.  
 Woolf establishes here a new form of knowledge to be passed on, an argument 
consistent with Cuddy-Keane’s claim that Woolf “developed an alternative pedagogy 
outside the educational institutions.”65 Much like Arnold’s vision of culture, this 
alternative pedagogy promotes a classless, democratic, but intellectual readership. While 
she evokes in some ways Arnold’s sense of culture as a far-reaching intellectualism, 
however, Woolf is eager to remove culture from the institution-based mentorship Arnold 
advocated. Woolf’s alternative pedagogy for women is based on intimacy and the 
ephemeral and is intended to extend mentorship beyond its exclusionary past, the 
exclusions Hardy and Forster felt so keenly. Once Woolf hurls that famous inkpot at the 
Angel of the House, Mrs. Ramsay has the power to become not the propagator of a life to 
suit men’s own needs, but the subject of women’s mentorship. Perhaps anticipating her 
later claim in A Room of One’s Own that women think back through their mothers, Woolf 
seeks to transform those feelings of unity and sympathy into a cultural transmission that 
moves beyond biological or social reproduction. While Mrs. Plumer can only ponder her 
role as support to her husband and pass that vague ideal to her daughters, Mrs. Ramsay 
concerns herself with actively transmitting something that is really worth having. 
Although she supports male mentorship, she simultaneously begins to shape a uniquely 
female mentorship that is independent of male need. The ephemeral quality of Rose’s 
fruit bowl arrangements, meant to be eaten; of Mrs. Ramsay’s harmonious dinner parties; 
of her sympathy for the lighthouse boy with the tubercular hip; these become the objects 
                                                
65 Cuddy- Keane, Virginia Woolf, the Intellectual, and the Public Sphere, 3. 
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of transmission. According to this women’s mentorship model, culture becomes 
associated with precisely what is not meant for keeping, but for feeling. So when Cucullu 
claims that the expulsion of the Angel of the House “makes space for a revised social 
calculus and new cultural formations,” we can see Woolf appropriating the male 
mentorship model, a cultural formation, for the feelings of unity and harmony that 
women see as what should endure.  
 Just as Tansley, who is not Ramsay’s son, shows that masculine mentorship is 
more than biological and social reproduction, I suggest that Lily Briscoe is the 
experimental subject for women’s mentorship, arguing for women’s “cultural 
reproduction,” as Cucullu would call it. Lily, whose rejection of marriage signifies her 
rejection of the institutionality associated with male mentorship, learns at Mrs. Ramsay’s 
knee the art of feeling. Lily aims to transmit the art of feeling to future generations not in 
the traditional role of marriage that Mrs. Ramsay envisions for her daughters, but by 
capturing it in her painting. Mrs. Ramsay’s love, she believes, “was meant to be spread 
over the world and become part of the human gain.” “Could loving,” she asks, “make her 
and Mrs. Ramsay one? For it was not knowledge but unity she desired, not inscriptions 
on tablets, nothing that could be written in any language known to men, but intimacy 
itself, which is knowledge, she had thought” (47; 51). Lily returns to the Ramsay house 
after the war, at the close of the “Time Passes” section. Where the remains of war are 
strewn about, with the house fallen into disrepair, Lily enters, and “Then indeed peace 
had come” (142). She seems primed to duplicate Mrs. Ramsay: she sees all the old 
characters (or at least those who have survived), feels the same fear of Mr. Ramsay, and 
finds him still begging for sympathy. However, she enters with the promise of a radically 
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different, postwar mentorship of peace. Lily strives to make something enduring of the 
unity characteristic of her mentor, capturing Mrs. Ramsay’s adage, “Life stand still here.” 
Lily builds on Mrs. Ramsay’s efforts at making feeling a lasting, transmissible entity: 
“Mrs. Ramsay making of the moment something permanent (as in another sphere Lily 
herself tried to make of the moment something permanent)—this was the nature of a 
revelation.” Struck by a “moment of stability,” Lily thinks she has found a way to be the 
subject of Mrs. Ramsay’s mentorship if only she can use her art to the capture 
permanence of feeling (161).  
 
V. Rejecting Women’s Mentorship 
It is difficult to argue, though, for the success of Mrs. Ramsay’s mentoring Lily. 
How would such transmission be measured? The problem is spelled out at the end of the 
novel’s first section, “The Window,” when Mrs. Ramsay, reflecting on her bliss, thinks to 
herself, “Nothing on earth can equal this happiness” (124). It is not that the happiness as 
an emotion is unparalleled, but that it cannot be duplicated in experience; how can one 
replicate the precise emotions association with a particular moment? The qualifier, “this 
happiness,” points to the specificity of circumstance on which every behavior depends. 
Harmony, peace, love, and intimacy can be modeled, but not ultimately transmitted. Lily 
can admire Mrs. Ramsay and even strive to capture her likeness in a painting, but the 
female mentorship she seeks is as unsustainable as the masculine mentorship she resists. 
Mrs. Ramsay’s refrain, “Life stand still here,” is simply an impossible achievement.   
And so I conclude that mentorship of all types fails as the Great War enters in the 
novel’s interlude, “Time Passes.” Here, masculine mentorship finally is rendered hollow, 
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as the Ramsay family furniture sits unused and Mr. Ramsay’s prized Waverley novels 
mildew on their shelves.66 The physical markers of cultural transmission eventually rot 
from disuse. The inheritors of these empty objects are lost, as well, as Andrew and Prue 
Ramsay, the son and daughter of an educated man, both die. Andrew is slain instantly by 
the “shot and shell” glorified by Tennyson, and Prue dies in childbirth in a failed 
expression of the biological reproduction that was women’s domain. And, most 
profoundly, Mrs. Ramsay, the family’s unifying force, the wellspring of her husband’s 
virility, dies quietly in her sleep. Mentorship and transmission are cut off radically at all 
levels. There is nothing left to endure. Lily’s redemptive end comes not from her being 
successfully mentored, but from her recognizing the futility of mentorship as a model of 
cultural transmission. “[Mrs. Ramsay] was dead,” Lily reflects. “The step where she used 
to sit was empty. She was dead. But why repeat this over and over again? Why be always 
trying to bring up some feeling she had not got? There was a kind of blasphemy in it. It 
was all dry: all withered: all spent” (150). Mentorship and its associated repetitions, both 
masculine and feminine, have died. Woolf, having identified all the problems with male 
mentorship, cannot find a viable solution for women either except the final, regretful 
rejection of the mentor.  
That Lily ultimately completes a painting speaks to her realizing this very 
rejection. She sees Mr. Ramsay and “His immense self-pity, his demand for sympathy 
poured and spread itself in pools at her feet, and all she did, miserable sinner that she 
was, was to draw her skirts a little closer round her ankles, lest she should get wet” (152). 
Lily is overwhelmed: “All Lily wished was that this enormous flood of grief, this 
                                                
66 “Waverley” is also the street on which Professor Plumer of Jacob’s Room lives: “‘Waverley,’ the villa on 
the road to Girton was called…” (33). 
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insatiable hunger for sympathy, this demand that she should surrender herself up to him 
entirely, and even so he had sorrows enough to keep her supplied for ever, should leave 
her, should be diverted…before it swept her down into its flow” (151). Lily is given the 
opportunity to use the gift of sympathy she learned from Mrs. Ramsay, but she resists. 
Ultimately, that sympathy would once again only revive men; women’s mentorship 
cannot get around patriarchy. A procession of Ramsays marches before her, and finally, 
“the hope of sympathy and the desire for praise, had entered some other region, was 
drawn on, as if by curiosity, in dumb colloquy, whether with himself or another, at the 
head of that little procession out of one’s range… The gate banged” (156). Only at that 
moment of radical rupture is Lily ready to resume her painting—“Where to begin?”— to 
use her power of feeling for her own expression, for the first time (157). 
Lily experiences a moment of courageous failure: she knows, per Mrs. Ramsay’s 
mentoring, that she should praise and pity the patriarch but is, thankfully, unable to do it. 
“She had felt,” she claims, “now she could stand up to Mrs. Ramsay—a tribute to the 
astonishing power that Mrs. Ramsay had over one” (176). And as she picks up her 
paintbrush, she leaves behind her desire to somehow capture the essence of Mrs. 
Ramsay’s feelings in symbolic terms. Instead, she “tunnels” through the past, 
illuminating its darkness with her own collected impressions. She is no longer concerned 
with painting as a transmissible form. Instead, she accepts that the painting will be “hung 
in attics…it would be destroyed” (208). Lily’s success is in realizing that, in her own 
words, “what did that matter?” 
 If the novel is, as Alex Zwerdling insists, “concerned with [Woolf’s] sense of 
institutional and ideological change and continuity,” and simultaneously interested in 
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Cuddy-Keane’s claim that Woolf pursues the pedagogical outside institutional 
boundaries, then my claims regarding mentorship signal an ideological change.67 Cultural 
continuity cannot happen in the borders of any institution, be it Cambridge or the country 
house. And it is in this way that the failure of mentorship in To the Lighthouse lays the 
groundwork for Woolf’s denunciation of mentorship in Three Guineas. There, she calls 
for “finding new words and creating new methods …by remaining outside your 
society…” (219). This culture of outsiders, is the legacy of Lily Briscoe. An outsider to 
the Ramsay family and the institutions the family represents, only she is granted an 
illuminated perspective.  
The language of exteriority Woolf uses is the same as Sue Bridehead’s—the only 
woman mentor in Jude the Obscure. For Sue and for Woolf, the cultural capital being 
offered is simply not worth having. In this sense, the very real Woolf can denounce 
mentorship in ways Sue Bridehead could not. Sue regrets not being better able to lie to 
Little Father Time about the society that shuns him, but Woolf refuses to acquiesce to the 
tyranny of mentorship. When the outsider says in Three Guineas, “in fact, as a woman, I 
have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole 
world,” we can see Lily, on the novel’s final page, rejecting the institutions that have 
stifled her for too long: “It was done; it was finished” (209).  The ending of the novel, 
Lee claims, “is poised between arriving and returning, getting somewhere…and being 
finished.”68  Lily arrives at the realization that mentorship has ended; cultural 
transmission must come from somewhere else. Her strength comes in finally refusing to 
                                                
67 Alex Zwerdling, Virginia Woolf and the Real World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 
181. 
 
68 Lee, Virginia Woolf, 476. 
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support it any longer. Refuting male mentorship’s authority and women’s support of it 
entirely, Woolf assumes her radical position of outsidership in Three Guineas, where, as 
a woman refusing the limitations of her “country,” she strongly denies tyranny on all 
fronts.   
 While she may abandon mentorship, though, Woolf cannot abandon education. 
To understand how the “daughters of educated men” are to morph into a “society of 
outsiders” is to understand, according to my argument, Woolf’s particular criticism of 
mentorship as an exclusionary model of cultural transmission. Woolf does not, however, 
deny the value of a university education. The “daughters of educated men” are 
mentorship’s victims, while the projected, idealized “society of outsiders” is to have 
somehow done away with it.  In a way, she falls into the same trap as did Arnold. As she 
makes clear in A Room of One’s Own, Woolf happily associates culture with a vaunted 
tradition of classical learning, and she wants it to be freely accessible regardless of class 
or gender. She cannot, however, propose a viable model for this. She cannot construct 
either a brand new type of mentorship that is bereft of patriarchal overtones, or a whole 
new way of transmitting knowledge that is not mentorship at all. As were Arnold’s 
sovereign educators, her “outsiders” are intended to assist with cultural transmission, but 
even though Woolf rejects mentorship, she cannot propose a viable alternative.  
Where a culture of outsiders will suffer is that education provides the “daughters 
of educated men” with training, and hence self-earned income, which emancipates these 
daughters from their fathers and brothers: “Since it is beyond the power of her family to 
punish her financially she can express her own opinions. In place of the admirations and 
antipathies which were often unconsciously dictated by the need of money she can 
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declare her genuine likes and dislikes. In short, she need not acquiesce; she can criticize” 
(21). So, if the daughters of educated men want to stop war, then they must continue to 
educate themselves in whatever capacity they can, since “[i]f there were no means of 
training them to earn their livings, there would be an end of that influence.” This 
influence requires using their meager income to support peace, and is the sole social 
influence available to the daughters of educated men. Only through economic capital can 
they gain any social capital, but this economic capital can only come from engaging with 
institutions of education. Daughters of educated men are victimized by mentorship, but 
still somehow must rely on it; they can never really be “outside.” Lily’s rejection of 
mentorship proposes a system of outsidership that may not be viable in the face of social 
and political upheaval in the face of a looming war. 
 The paralysis Woolf feels shapes her final novel, Between the Acts, which is 
fundamentally pessimistic in that the failure of mentorship present in the novel points to 
political inequities that cannot be overcome. Miss La Trobe exemplifies the “culture of 
outsiders” for which Woolf argues in Three Guineas, but all La Trobe can produce is a 
pageant play that reproduces an insular culture. This insularity is the problem Jed Esty 
outlines in A Shrinking Island, where he argues that English intellectuals try to integrate 
social and aesthetic power in a resurgence of national culture: “For Woolf, as for Powys, 
Eliot, and Forster, pageantry was a dramatic genre that could allow the emergence of a 
choral voice, giving form to communal values rather than to individual impressions or 
divisive ideologies. The desirability of a collective or impersonal voice had become an 
urgent political as well as aesthetic matter in the period.”69 In the face of the Fascist 
                                                
69 Jed Esty, A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton UP, 2004), 87. 
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threat, Woolf is inclined to reach out to a more inclusive view of “national tradition,” 
seeking to redefine it ways that reflect her “troubled half-love for England.”70 If women’s 
mentorship in To the Lighthouse probes possibilities for a radical break from English 
tradition, Between the Acts, according to Esty’s reading, only comes back to the 
uncertainty of what comes next. But in light of her concern with mentorship, Woolf’s 
pessimism for her artists stands out amid Esty’s sympathetic reading. Lily Briscoe and 
Miss La Trobe are drawn into portraying a culture that does not accommodate them. 
Woolf in To the Lighthouse and Three Guineas rejects mentorship, but does not know 
how to stop its influence. Further, she cannot assign lasting and meaningful significance 
to the culture of outsiders that offers any promise for the future. As Woolf wonders in 
“Women and Fiction,” how can a woman combine the “emotional,” “intellectual,” and 
“political”? This may be the real tragedy of Between the Acts: as the mirror is turned on 
the audience, they too are mired in mere repetition. 
 Woolf rejects empty indicators of cultural capital and she considers the 
limitations of a culture of feeling or emotion, but she never questions whether an 
education associated with culture is worthwhile. Turning to the literature of the thirties at 
the beginning of my next chapter, however, I take Woolf’s argument to a further 
conclusion. If, as she claims, cultural transmission is inherently political and must be 
radically cut off in order to stop the perpetuation of tyranny, then what should become of 
culture itself? Culture is not immune from the political threat, and that threat increased 
exponentially in the face of World War II. Culture by that point most definitely is no 
longer the straightforward process of virtue and study that Arnold wanted, since Arnold’s 
                                                                                                                                            
 
70 Esty, A Shrinking Island, 93. 
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prescription of culture as a cure for political strife is patently inadequate in the face of the 
Fascist threat Woolf feared. With the close of World War II, Woolf’s radical claim that 
mentorship must end proves to not be radical enough.  
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Chapter 4 
 
“Culture Cannot Compensate”: Parodic Mentorship and the Rise of the Welfare State 
 
“Ridicule is the only honorable weapon we have left.” 
—Muriel Spark, “The Desegregation of Art” 
 
In my earlier chapters, I demonstrated that mentorship’s failures in the novels of 
Hardy, Forster, and Woolf point to the modernist-era assertion that Oxbridge culture 
could no longer be passed down effectively. In this chapter, I argue that as the modernist 
era drew to a close, writers who doubted the transmissibility of culture also called into 
question culture’s fundamental worth. “It is a commonplace to-day that culture is at a 
crisis,” F.R. Leavis writes in his Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture (1930).1 Even 
though Leavis’s call for an English curriculum as the response to this crisis may have 
been controversial (Paul Fussell calls his work “vigorously self-righteous, moralistic, 
[and] badly written”), he was not the only one to note the correlation between education 
and a culture in crisis.2 His growing apprehension over the relationship between 
education and cultural preservation was also felt by other writers of the period, including 
Kingsley Amis and Evelyn Waugh. The thirties saw a widespread recognition of the 
problem of cultural transmission that Hardy and Forster identified, but these writers did 
not share Leavis’s optimism that the culture transmitted by the university was worth 
salvaging. In my final examination of the mentor, I argue that mentorship has been made 
parodic, a comic symbol of the absurdity of continuing to pass on a culture finally seen as 
anachronistic and irrelevant.   
                                                
1F.R. Leavis, Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture (Cambridge: The Minority Press, 1930), 5. 
 
2 Paul Fussell, The Anti-Egotist (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 57.  
Fussell provides additional background on the feud between Amis and Leavis. Amis at one point claimed 
“[Leavis] seems to me to have done more harm than good to literature, never mind the study of literature.” 
Leavis had said, allegedly, of Amis’s appointment to Cambridge that that Peterhouse could no longer be 
taken seriously, having “given a fellowship to a pornographer” (57).  
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If mentorship, as I will argue, ceased to transmit meaningful or significant values, 
it was because education was felt to be of little use or consequence. Amis famously takes 
such a position on education in Lucky Jim (1954), but the origins of that novel’s argument 
are in Amis’s own experience of education: “I went up to Oxford in the spring of 1941,” 
writes Amis in his Memoirs (1991), “in impeccably proletarian style, being driven over 
from my parents’ house in Berkhamsted by the family butcher in his battered Morris, and 
approaching the wrong way up Plough Lane.”3 In keeping with his awkward entrance, 
Amis finds his university years increasingly discomfiting, hardly the “magic years” of 
academic rigor and personal growth described nostalgically by E.M. Forster. The 
intellectual debate foregrounded in The Longest Journey has been replaced by banal 
banter from “worthy dullards” over the vulgarity of kid gloves.4 The gloves become a 
fitting image—surely they, too, are “proletarian”— as Amis’s description of Oxford puts 
academics aside and focuses instead on the Oxford lifestyle, simultaneously mocking and 
mourning the leisure culture so long associated with the university. Unlike his harshly 
aimed criticism of nineteen-sixties Cambridge (which he associated exclusively with 
tiresome dinner parties and frippery), Amis’s take on nineteen-forties Oxford is 
                                                
3Kingsley Amis, Memoirs (New York: Summit Books, 1991), 36. 
 
4Amis’s complete account of the incident reveals his contempt for his Oxford peers, as he characterizes 
them as snobs who are out of touch with pressing sociopolitical matters: 
“ I was fool enough to join the Oxford Union Society, for one term only…I attended some debates, but 
decided their style was not for me on witnessing the following exchange:  
 Worthy dullard: ‘This situation is too grave to be handled with kid gloves.’  
 The Secretary, ringing his bell and interrupting, as the rules permitted: ‘On a point of information, 
kid gloves are very vulgar,’ this causing the loudest laughter I ever heard in the chamber where future 
prime ministers were alleged to have made their first flights” (Memoirs 37). 
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somewhat more ambivalent as his trademark wit is undercut by a strong sense of loss: he 
characterizes Oxford by what it no longer is, couching it in terms of a steady decline.5  
Taking Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited (1945) as counterpoint, Amis 
depicts Oxford as languishing. The homosocial camaraderie Waugh celebrates in Charles 
Ryder and Sebastian Flyte comes to be replaced by isolation and drudgery. Though 
greeted warmly by a sherry party hosted by friends, 
[t]his initial blaze of glory did not last, was untypical. After a year and a half of 
war smart Oxford, anything like the Oxford to be seen in Brideshead Revisited, 
was shut for the duration, much of it never to reopen…Oxford had been changing, 
certainly since 1939, perhaps longer, a change accelerated but not, I think, caused 
by the war. Elegance (foppery) was losing ground to purposefulness 
(philistinism). In Brideshead Revisited, the novel par excellence of pre-war 
Oxford, though written in retrospect and not published until 1945, nobody ever 
seems to go near an exam even in thought, let alone deed—simply being there at 
the university was the point of going to it. In 1946-48 it was sometimes as if 
exams filled the world.6  
 
In this nostalgic look back at Brideshead Revisited, Amis suggests that Flyte’s “foppery” 
is a youthful indiscretion, part of the carefree lifestyle afforded by Oxford. Waugh’s 
young men are a positive version of Amis’s own fellow undergraduates, who he 
characterizes as “not working, getting drunk, and pursuing young women.”7  The 
Brideshead characters do not need to participate in academic studies because "culture" is 
something they already have and have had long before attending Oxford by virtue of their 
upper-class upbringing. Flyte can leave Oxford without a degree and not stir up much 
                                                
5Amis felt the sting of this decline long past his years at Oxford. Paul Fussell notes that after leaving 
Swansea, Amis became Director of English studies at Peterhouse of Cambridge from 1961-3. “He now 
realizes that what caused him to accept this offer was a romantic hope that Cambridge would be like 
Oxford when he was young. ‘I should have known better, not being a young man any more.’ What he 
found—was he more critical now?—was snobbery, provincialism, and shop—rather than literary talk. It 
was perhaps the chic academic dinner parties at Cambridge that finally wore him down, together with 
atmosphere and attitudes he recalls without pleasure more than thirty years later” (Fussell 36). 
 
6 Amis, Memoirs, 36-7; 46. 
 
7Amis, Memoirs, 41. 
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disappointment since the university is merely an add-on, another experience of leisure. 
Amid this cultured oasis, Waugh grants his characters refined aesthetic taste and social 
insight, namely Flyte’s luxuriously hedonistic lifestyle and Anthony Blanche’s wry yet 
perceptive wit, outside of any academic context. Presenting another version of Forster’s 
Cambridge dormitory debate about a cow and philosophy, Waugh makes Oxford a 
gathering place for discussion that is not necessarily dependent upon classroom learning.  
For Amis, however, this cultured camaraderie was on the decline. When he pits 
the exams that “filled the world” against the ease and joy of “simply being there,” he 
points to the loss of the social and intellectual heritage outlined by Forster, hinting that it 
has been replaced by a concern for performance and stark utility that may come at the 
expense of an appreciation for the arts. Evoking Matthew Arnold, Amis alludes to this 
culture of exams as “philistinism.” The “philistines,” Arnold believed, “do not pursue 
sweetness and light, but… prefer to them that sort of machinery of business, chapels, tea-
meetings.”8 By the forties, according to Amis, the dreaded philistinism had infiltrated 
even the institutions of higher learning that Arnold had thought were immune. Amis 
celebrates Waugh’s characters as the vestiges of an Arnoldian ideal society where Oxford 
had remained impermeable to philistinism.9 For Charles Ryder, Oxford is hallowed 
                                                
8 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Ian Gregor (Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1971), 84. 
Raymond Williams, who had himself benefited from the increased educational opportunities advocated by 
the utilitarians Arnold resisted, provides in Culture and Society a useful definition of philistinism that 
clarifies Arnold’s contempt: “The middle classes (Philistines) were also useless, because of their 
attachment to an external civilization. Their faith in ‘machinery’ (Wealth, Industry, Production, Progress) 
and in individual success denied, respectively, the ‘harmonious’ and the ‘general’ pursuit of perfection” 
(120).  
 
9 In the 1955 issue of Encounter, Evelyn Waugh responds to the 1944 Butler Act by predicting that it will 
spur “a new wave of philistinism.” “Grim young people” would emerge from “the assembly lines in their 
hundreds every year and finding employment as critics, even as poets and novelists.” Waugh is reacting to 
Amis’s mocking of high culture, calling Amis a product of “L’Ecole du Butler” even though Amis 
graduated before the Act’s passage (qtd. in Zachary Leader’s The Life of Kingsley Amis, p.356).  
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because it gives him the opportunity to gain “sweetness and light,” beauty and intellect, 
and he can gain them from his friendships rather than academic learning. For Amis, 
however, Oxford creeps toward philistinism because its exams do not measure beauty 
and intellect, but the dry classroom learning that Waugh rarely even mentions. By 
emphasizing the credentializing function of the universities, Amis argues that in the post-
war period utilitarianism has finally been assimilated into the universities; the fellowship 
and conversation treasured by Forster have disappeared; and Woolf’s prediction that 
Oxbridge culture was unsustainable has come true.  
 In the aftermath of the Great War, Woolf forecasted the end of Oxbridge cultural 
transmission on the grounds that it passed on only the values of war. Likewise, for 
Waugh writing in the forties, the source of Oxford’s decline is also intertwined expressly 
with war: as the army takes over the Marchmain chapel, the country house and its 
aristocratic family disappear, the war leaving its indelible mark on the British physical 
and cultural landscapes. Brideshead Revisited captures those last moments of Waugh’s 
beloved Oxford, a farewell to the university as he had idealized it in its prewar state. 
Reflecting on his university days in his Memoirs (1991), however, Amis also identifies 
the impact of peace on the forties: “I reached Oxford [for his second year] just nicely in 
time for the start of the autumn term, more than ready to throw myself into the tasks of 
peace.”10 These tasks of peace, while never defined precisely, seem key to Amis’s 
                                                
10 Amis, Memoirs, 41. 
Liberal politician and President of the Board of Education under Lloyd George, H.A.L. Fisher, refers to the 
“arts of peace” in his illustration of the growing impulse for more complete education reform even after the 
Great War: “The country was in a spending mood and eager to compensate the wastage of war by some real 
contribution to the arts of peace… the educational world was in a state of ferment. For the first time in our 
national history education was a popular subject and discussed in an atmosphere cleared of religious 
acrimony” (qtd. in Dent 84). 
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experience at post-war Oxford. They are, I claim, a possible indicator of how precisely 
Oxford became for Amis and his contemporaries the subject of ridicule rather than praise.   
To help explain how the tasks of peace could have contributed to Amis’s eventual 
distaste for Oxford, I turn to Virginia Woolf’s landmark essay of the forties, “The 
Leaning Tower,” in which she explains how a writer’s experience of his education is 
colored by the political climate in which he lives. Woolf groups together Leftist writers 
from Waugh’s generation and examines the increasingly complex authorial 
responsibilities that have come to be associated with an Oxbridge education in the face of 
national upheaval. Beginning with an overview of nineteenth-century writers, Woolf 
determines that their writing was not affected by the physically distant wars of the 
century, from which those writers were completely disconnected. When she asks, 
however, “Were the nineteenth-century writers affected by the settled, the peaceful and 
prosperous state of England?” the answer is a firm yes.11  Peace grants these writers 
“leisure” and “security”: “life was not going to change; they themselves were not going 
to change. They could look; and look away” (110). These writers are, to use Woolf’s 
metaphor, perched high on a steady tower, a place of privilege and unmoving perspective 
that reflects the writers’ own limited experience.  
For these early writers, stability had been a benefit of class position and, relatedly, 
the education such a position affords. The nineteenth-century writers, Woolf summarizes, 
“were all of them fairly well-to-do middle class people. Most had been educated either at 
Oxford or at Cambridge” (108). The result of this illustrious education is the “tower” of 
Woolf’s title, “[h]e sits…raised above the rest of us; a tower built first on his parents’ 
                                                
11Virginia Woolf, “The Leaning Tower,” in The Moment and Other Essays, by Virginia Woolf (London: 
The Hogarth Press, 1947), 8. Hereafter cited parenthetically.  
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station, then on his parents’ gold. It is a tower of the utmost importance; it decides his 
angle of vision; it affects his power of communication” (112).12 Class privilege allows for 
education, which in turns allows for both the acquisition of writing skill and a stable 
perspective or vision that this writing will reflect. This helps to explain, to return to my 
argument, the lingering veneration of Oxford and Cambridge found in novels such as 
Jude the Obscure and Howards End: university education in these times and for these 
authors was wrapped up with a public acknowledgment of having learned a particular art, 
as these institutions are the recognized transmitters of a specific cultural capital, or 
certain type of recognized knowledge. While acknowledging disparities of class that 
make this acquisition frustratingly impossible, these novels reflect back on a historical 
moment when institutionalized education was associated readily with stability and 
privilege. Even in critique, writers such as Hardy and Forster celebrate the possibility of 
institutional education because, for them, this education still makes possible the 
preservation and transmission of knowledge and art.  
This privileged and stable perspective, however, could not well last much past the 
declaration of war in 1914. While the writers of 1914 came to their writing with the same 
education and advantage as their predecessors, Woolf suggests, they became increasingly 
aware of a growing instability in their own position. The peace following the Great War 
was of a different kind than that of the nineteenth century, since the war preceding it had 
such lasting and profound effects on both class and politics. In turn, writers could no 
longer assume an unaffected position; they must take into account sweeping changes on 
                                                
12 “To breed the kind of butterfly a writer is you must let him sun himself for three or four years at Oxford 
or Cambridge—so it seems” (“The Leaning Tower” 112). 
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their own home front and an increasing awareness of happenings abroad.13 Moving to the 
group of writers that she situates as beginning to write around 1925 (the “Auden 
Generation” 14), Woolf relates a writer’s education to emergent political turmoil:  
at first sight there seems little difference, in station, in education [from their 
predecessors] …They are tower dwellers like their predecessors, the sons of well-
to-do parents, who could afford to send them to public schools and universities. 
But what a difference in the tower itself, in what they saw from the tower! When 
they looked at human life what did they see? Everywhere change; everywhere 
revolution. (113-4) 
 
While there may have been “neither war nor revolution in England itself… The books 
were written under the influence of change, under the threat of war” (113). With the rise 
of communism and fascism, along with increasing political upheaval and uncertainty, 
“the tower of middle-class birth and expensive education” begins to lean (113).  
Thirties writers become acutely aware of their middle-class birth and privileged 
education in ways that make them uncomfortable, creating a conflicted sense of self that 
echoes Jude’s disjointed habitus. These writers sense the precariousness of their own 
position and first feel “discomfort”; then “self-pity for that discomfort”; finally, this pity 
“soon turns to anger—to anger against the builder, against society, for making us 
uncomfortable” (114). Awkwardly turned against the society that granted them privilege 
in the first place, Woolf argues, they turn to scapegoating and excuse finding, “all very 
natural tendencies” (114). Unable to “throw away their capital” as they become 
                                                
13  “In Germany, in Russia, in Italy, in Spain, all the old hedges were being rotted up; all the old towers 
were being thrown to the ground. Other hedges were being planted; other towers were being raised. There 
was communism in one country; in another fascism. The whole of civilisation, of society, was changing” 
(“The Leaning Tower” 113). 
 
14Samuel Hynes defines “The Auden Generation” as “one generation of writers, the men and women born 
in England between 1900 and the First World War, who came of age in the ‘twenties and lived through 
their early maturity during the Depression” (The Auden Generation 9). These writers (notably W.H. Auden, 
Christopher Isherwood, and Stephen Spender) are typically Oxbridge educated, middle-class poets. 
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increasingly aware of the global effects of tyranny and injustice (suffered by those unable 
to gain any kind of meaningful capital), they create work “full of discord and bitterness, 
full of confusion and compromise” (115). These men had been brought up to appreciate 
their privileged education, but now turn against the social and political disparity that 
allowed them such privilege. While choked by their anger at the same society that 
granted them privilege, this generation of writers could find clarity and stability in their 
personal experiences, and, in turn, become “great egotists,” writing so well about 
essentially themselves (120).15  
Woolf’s summary of the thirties explains Oxbridge’s continued presence in the 
writing of that era, as these writers’ expensive educations remained part of their 
upbringing and training while eventually becoming a persistent source of guilt and 
uneasiness. Where such education was previously a matter of pride or a hallmark of 
cultural capital, it has now become also a kind of albatross. Privileged education 
continues to inform authorial perspective, but in an increasingly problematic way since 
the benefits of that education are limited; education cannot reduce the global threats of 
fascism and communism, nor can it account for more local class disparities that have 
become increasingly scrutinized. In this context, the “tasks of peace” that Amis believed 
took place at Oxford in the early forties are hardly as inconsequential as they may seem 
in his passing remark; they refer to the important relationship Oxbridge tries to forge with 
a rapidly altering political landscape. By engaging in the “tasks of peace,” Amis 
acknowledges that Oxbridge can no longer reasonably be the isolated oasis of the writers 
of the nineteenth century. To be relevant, the university must become part of a greater 
                                                
15 Woolf explains that this egotism comes from a need for stability: “When everything is rocking round 
one, the only person who remains comparatively stable is oneself. When all faces are changing and 
obscured, the only face one can see clearly is one’s own” (The Leaning Tower 120). 
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system of political reform, nationalism, and resistance to the “tyranny” abroad. When 
university education cannot do those things, when it attempts to carry on as before, it is 
ineffective and foolish. Yet, Amis implies, efforts to mirror national reform movements 
must be equally unsuccessful if exams, empty indicators of rote knowledge, are the new 
markers of Oxbridge achievement.  
Education in the novels of the period becomes the subject of a much broader 
scope of critique, as the nature of an Oxbridge education fluctuated while the universities 
struggled to find an identity among calls for new political relevance. In attacking their 
own education—or, perhaps, exploring its limitations— mid-century authors 
acknowledged, as Woolf does in To the Lighthouse, that the leisure culture of Oxbridge 
no longer pointed to a refined heritage or the acquisition of meaningful knowledge as it 
had for Waugh. This culture had now become incomplete, unable to prepare its students 
to participate in political matters that seem increasingly more pressing. Woolf’s “great 
egotists” look back at the entirety of their own educational experience from public school 
to university with renewed criticism not necessarily of the quality of their education, but 
of its ultimate purpose. If the university had now become charged with the daunting 
“tasks of peace,” then it surely had to change to reflect its newfound responsibilities for 
the future, an especially problematic task for an institution that was, as I have shown, 
based so much on the preservation and transmission of the past. 
What we are left with in mid-century fiction is a series of autobiographical or 
semi-autobiographical novels, memoirs, and essays that reflect on an entire educational 
system in ways that vacillate between nostalgia for the author’s carefree youth and his 
contempt for the inability of that experience to be carried forth in any meaningful way: 
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Henry Green’s Pack My Bag (1940), Anthony Powell’s A Question of Upbringing 
(1951), Graham Greene’s A Sort of Life (1971), and George Orwell’s posthumously 
published “Such, Such Were the Joys” (1952) all look back at the authors’ own varied 
educational experiences, all of which are privileged and all of which are described in 
increasingly critical terms. Their work represents institutionalized education in a variety 
of forms. Orwell describes St. Cyprian’s as a brutal prep school “crammer” intended to 
prepare him for admissions exams, while Powell and Green, who were together at Eton 
and Oxford, argue that their education was more about networking. Reflecting on their 
own lives as students in the thirties and forties, these authors share what publisher 
Geoffrey Faber calls “signs of exhaustion.” As the nation “suddenly exchanged riches for 
poverty, and power for insecurity,” authors, too, had to adjust and consider whether or 
not their education could at all prepare them for the daunting nature of the tasks of 
peace.16 It is perhaps their contemporary Cyril Connolly who best summarizes the 
persistent pessimism that accompanies the seeming lightheartedness in many of these 
works: “Nothing dreadful is ever done with, no bad thing gets any better; you can’t be too 
serious. This is the message of the Forties from which, alas, there seems no escape.”17  
With this as a conclusion, these authors’ negative or ambivalent view of 
institutional education must come from their belief that this education could no longer be 
taken seriously. Institutional education was vitally serious to Arnold because it was 
responsible for cultural preservation, but if education’s success is now to be measured in 
                                                
16 Faber’s conclusion is somewhat more alarmist than I’m willing to consider: “Until we have realistically 
and courageously adjusted ourselves to it [post-war flux], we are not likely to produce very much 
worthwhile literature” (qtd. in Fussell 319). 
 
17 Cyril Connolly, qtd. in Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain, 1945-1951 (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1993), 319. 
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pragmatic terms by exams and political relevance, then it lacks the inherent value it had 
enjoyed in the past. Unlike the nineteenth-century writers whose education was tasked, 
per Woolf, with teaching them their art, post-war writers must now confront national 
turmoil with an education that was ill-equipped to fulfill such a role. If modernist-era 
writers, as I have suggested, were concerned as to whether or not Oxbridge could (or 
should) preserve and transmit the version of liberal-humane culture that had long been 
associated with the universities, then the generation that followed envisioned an even 
more radical break in which the relationship between education and culture was 
questioned at the most fundamental level. In its time of “crisis,” culture became 
increasingly difficult to define and seemed to lose its value as it was separated out from 
its long-held association with education.      
 
I. A Comic Crisis of Culture  
The rise of the campus novel in the fifties only extends the thirties-era critique of 
educational institutions as protectors of culture. These novels undercut Herbert 
Pembroke’s notion of school as “the world in miniature,” often arguing that campus life 
is overly isolated with little relevance to the world outside. Poking fun at the institution of 
teaching itself and often mocking the very subjects which are taught, professors in 
campus novels are typically either old-fashioned and obscure or flippant and 
irresponsible. One of the most notable examples of the genre, Amis’s Lucky Jim (1954) is 
among the most cutting satires of the period. Paul Fussell interprets Amis’s novel as 
“specifically a satire on the sort of thought and behavior not just found at but apparently 
encouraged at a university: laziness, vanity, cultural and intellectual affectation, self-
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absorption, and sycophancy.”18 According to this argument, the Oxbridge lifestyle is no 
longer a carefree intellectualism but an “affectation” of culture coupled with mere 
frivolity. The culture preserved and transmitted by the university has lost its connotations 
of tradition and enlightenment. 
Impediments to institutional forms of cultural transmission had become not only a 
matter of access, which had been— as my previous chapters demonstrate—at the heart of 
discussions of education for decades. Lucky Jim and its mid-century ilk advance Woolf’s 
argument that the culture transmitted at the university is not worth having. Even in their 
critical examinations of cultural transmission, Hardy and Forster still look to Oxbridge as 
the seat of a definable culture; Woolf questions the institutionalization of culture, but not 
the learning that defines it. But by the fifties, culture had become so separated from 
learning that it could take the form of the antiquated and stodgy Professor Welch of 
Amis’s Lucky Jim. “No other professor in Great Britain,” the newly appointed Jim Dixon 
reflects on Professor Welch, “set such store by being called Professor.”19 But Welch’s 
accomplishments as a professor are minimal: “How had he [Welch] become Professor of 
History, even at a place like this? By published work? No. By extra good teaching? No in 
italics” (8).20 Professor Welch thinks he has prestige just because of his title, even though 
                                                
18 Fussell, The Anti-Egotist, 53. 
 
19 Kingsley Amis, Lucky Jim (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 7. Hereafter cited parenthetically. 
 
20 Dixon and Welch do not teach at Oxford or Cambridge, but at a “redbrick” university. The term 
“redbrick” refers to one of six universities founded in England’s major industrial cities before World War I 
(see Dent’s Century of Growth in English Education, pages 76-79). They had originally been founded as 
civic science or engineering schools. Gilbert Phelps argues that “one of the purposes in putting Jim Dixon 
in a new redbrick university is to show that what might have been a fresh start was already infiltrated by the 
old Oxbridge values and assumptions so notably embodied in Professor Welch” (qtd. in Fussell 53). Dixon 
realizes figures such as Welch are everywhere: “He and Welch might well be talking about history, and in 
the way history might be talked about in Oxford and Cambridge quadrangles. At moments like this Dixon 
came near to wishing that they really were” (8). Fussell explains that Amis, “had taught at four universities, 
and his experience at each seems to have augmented his disillusion with that scene” (53).  
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he has not demonstrated any of the actual talent a professor is expected to have. As a 
university professor, he represents a literal preserver of culture, but his culture is, like his 
academic specialty, “medieval” or outdated. The culture Welch offers is as irrelevant and 
meaningless as his title of “professor”; it has lost its connotation of status and 
achievement. Dixon is enlightened precisely because he realizes that the traditions to 
which Welch clings are increasingly irrelevant. When he describes his upcoming lecture 
“Medieval Life and Culture” to an overeager graduate student, Dixon silently 
acknowledges how vague and outdated the university tradition is: “I thought I might start 
with a discussion of the university, for instance, in its social role,” he says to the student, 
but then “[h]e comforted himself for having said this by the thought that at least he knew 
it didn’t mean anything” (28).  
 If culture has lost its ready association with a specific tradition of learning, then 
the act of cultural preservation at the university becomes a kind of comic pantomime. 
When Dixon stands in front of a lavatory mirror, trying to put on his best “Evelyn Waugh 
face,” he is trying to act as if culture still matters the way it did to Waugh (220). 
University professors, as Amis argues in Lucky Jim, are “pretenders to high culture” 
rather than keepers of it.21 In his review of the novel, Somerset Maugham attacks people 
like Jim who go to the university to get a job and not a cultural education:  
It is the white collar proletariat…They do not go to the university to acquire 
culture, but to get a job, and when they have got one, scamp it. They have no 
manners, and are woefully unable to deal with any social predicament…They are 
mean, malicious and envious…Charity, kindliness, generosity are qualities they 
hold in contempt. They are scum. Some will doubtless sink back, perhaps with 
relief, into the modest class from which they emerged; some will take to drink, 
some to crime and go to prison. Others will become schoolmasters and form the 
young, or journalists and mould public opinion. A few will go into parliament, 
                                                
21 Fussell, The Anti-Egotist, 7. 
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become cabinet ministers and rule the country.22  
 
Maugham’s tone is ominous, arguing that post-war academic standards have greatly 
devalued an education’s cultural worth. Because education has now been redirected 
towards “the tasks of peace,” those tasks associated with political policy and social 
change, Amis argues the university is no longer is tasked with transmitting culture; to 
carry on as if education still propagates culture must surely be an act. As Leavis 
indicates, university education had indeed reached a crisis in the fifties as it struggled to 
find its identity amid accusations of pretended high culture and uselessness.  
 In this context, it would be difficult to construct an argument regarding 
mentorship because it is not clear what content would be transmitted. Christine 
Callaghan, for example, the mentor in Lucky Jim, offers Jim Dixon mentorship in the 
form of monetary patronage and sexual desire as a means out of a dreary university 
career. She is obviously not related to the types of cultural preservation that I have argued 
are intertwined with mentorship earlier in the century, as those mentors depended on a 
socially agreed upon sense of the value of the university culture (then Oxbridge) that 
simply does not exist by the mid century. It is natural, then, for this concluding chapter 
also to move away from Oxbridge and the university altogether, away from the 
institutions that so plainly have ceased to offer meaningful mentorship. Instead, I will 
show that even though mentorship at the university level is no longer a tangible ideal, the 
figure of the mentor can still be used to depict concerns over the transmission of culture. 
This transmission is now put into the greater context of education at all levels as state-
mandated national attention to the content and structure of education grows. 
Contemporary and friend of Waugh, Amis, and Greene, Muriel Spark turns to a 
                                                
22 Somerset Maugham, qtd. in Ted Morgan, Maugham (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), 87-8. 
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mentorship that takes place at a far younger age and is far more fraught with 
complication and ambivalence than any I have previously examined as she articulates 
persistent concerns about the impact of post-war social policy—the “tasks of peace”— on 
the preservation of culture, a term she finds increasingly difficult to define as it loses its 
ready association with university education. In the novel, Spark uses mentorship to 
articulate that the distance between culture and education is, finally, decisive and 
permanent. The mentorship she depicts is ultimately parodic, a comic re-imagination of 
the cultural preservation that had long been considered part of an esteemed educational 
tradition.   
 Born in Edinburgh in 1918, Muriel Spark lived and wrote through some of the 
most profound policy changes in the United Kingdom until her recent death in 2006.  
Educated in Scotland, she lived in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), and worked for British 
intelligence during World War II.  Critic Alan Bold summarizes nicely her career’s 
reputation and scope: “Dealing with a period ranging from the 1930s to the present, 
Spark is one of the most lucid and alert of contemporary writers.”23 Spark’s economic 
prose and sharp wit are the hallmarks of her fiction, but the most frequent subject of 
critical work is her theology, for, like Greene and Waugh, she was a convert to 
Catholicism. The disproportionate emphasis on Spark’s religion has resulted in a gross 
underrepresentation of her engagement in historical matters, despite the frequent attention 
to current events in many of her novels.24 Consequently, descriptions of her relationship 
                                                
23 Alan Bold, “Poet and Dreamer,” in Critical Essays on Muriel Spark, ed. Joseph Hynes (New York: G.K. 
Hall & Co., 1992), 86. 
 
24 Although she is often criticized as being an ahistorical writer, Bold explains that her novels do not ignore 
matters of political importance: “Even when her characters slip into solipsism her books do not ignore 
world events such as the rise of Fascism (The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie), the Second World War and its 
aftermath (The Girls of Slender Means), the Eichmann trial and the Middle East Conflict (The Mandelbaum 
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to Greene and Waugh are often limited to their shared religion, Greene’s financial 
support of Spark during the writing of her first novel, and an occasional anecdote 
regarding Waugh’s praise of Spark’s work.25  I believe that Spark’s relationship to these 
authors, however, extends beyond the theological and the familiar, and that she, too, 
offers social commentary at least as insightful as theirs.  
 A notable exception to the critical trend of overemphasizing Spark’s Catholicism, 
Marina MacKay’s “Muriel Spark and the Meaning of Treason” argues for more attention 
to be paid instead to Spark’s “historical inquiries” as she studies treason in several of 
Spark’s novels.26 Like MacKay, I turn to the The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1961) and 
offer a reading that emphasizes the novel’s historical engagement. But where MacKay’s 
reading focuses on the novel’s play with fascism, I turn instead to its take on what I 
contend is the novel’s subject and background of education reform. Spark, I argue, 
elucidates the motivation behind the critiques her contemporaries leveled against 
Oxbridge as she offers the necessary connection between education reform at the national 
level and the cultural preservation that, as I have been suggesting, had been the task of 
the university. If education had at one point been linked to an individual’s cultural 
acquisition, it now, having been legislated at every level, refers to a social imperative that 
has little to do with culture at all. In The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie, mentorship proves 
                                                                                                                                            
Gate), the Watergate scandal (The Abbess of Crewe, 1974), the crisis of capitalism (The Takeover, 1976) 
and political terrorism (Territorial Rights, 1979)” (86-7). 
 
25 In Martin Stannard’s 2009 biography of Muriel Spark, he relays a brief anecdote regarding Waugh’s 
praise of Spark’s work. The two enjoyed a friendly relationship and Spark had invited Waugh to a 
publication party he could not attend, “ but he had sent in his stead a copy of his last novel, Unconditional 
Surrender, just out, dedicated ‘For Muriel Spark in her prime from Evelyn Waugh in his decline’” (254).  
 
26 Marina MacKay, “Muriel Spark and the Meaning of Treason,” Modern Fiction Studies 54.3 (2008): 505. 
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more successful than it has in any other novel in this dissertation, only the version of 
culture the mentor transmits is not worth preserving.  
 Set in Edinburgh in the nineteen thirties, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie follows a 
group of schoolgirls during their time at the Junior Division of the Marcia Blaine School. 
Monica Douglas, Rose Stanley, Eunice Gardiner, Sandy Stranger, Jenny Gray, and Mary 
Macgregor comprise the “Brodie Set,” led by their teacher, the memorable and eccentric 
Miss Jean Brodie. Miss Brodie, who is proudly “in her prime,” declares herself the ten-
year-old girls’ mentor and tasks herself with cultivating their appreciation for a culture 
that is limited and defined by Miss Brodie’s own tastes. During their two years with her, 
the girls are mesmerized by Miss Brodie’s sexual escapades and thrilled by her elitism 
and passion. After encouraging a student—Joyce Emily Hammond—to run off and fight 
for Franco, Miss Brodie is eventually “betrayed” by Sandy to the school’s headmistress 
and is dismissed on the grounds of fascist sympathies in 1939, wondering until her death 
in 1946 which of her students turned her in. Sandy becomes a Roman Catholic nun and 
acts as a mentor of sorts herself after publishing her treatise on “The Configuration of the 
Commonplace.”  
 In this last chapter, I argue that Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie is, in part, 
a response to the sweeping educational reform policies of the forties that very clearly set 
out to make education a national “task of peace.” Although socially and geographically 
far removed from Oxbridge, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie is still very much concerned 
with matters of cultural acquisition, especially as governmental policy comes to dictate 
more fully who and what is taught. Miss Brodie herself is a parody of traditional 
humanist values as I have presented them, as she clings to the preservation of high 
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culture, flagrantly refutes any sense of social prudence while partaking in her own 
version of a leisure culture, and, in a comic nod to Matthew Arnold’s “sovereign 
educators,” takes on only a small group of elite students that she seeks to indoctrinate 
with her own values. Brodie’s version of culture has little to do with the pragmatic 
Marcia Blaine version of education and this growing disconnect between useful 
education and traditional high culture makes it clear for Spark that no institution is fit to 
take on cultural transmission. In turn, mentorship itself is now possible only in parody, a 
comic reflection on a system of cultural preservation that, as I have shown, never could 
quite live up to its promises or expectations.  
 
II. Miss Brodie’s Mentorship and the Sovereign Educator 
Miss Brodie is one of Spark’s most famous and enigmatic characters, a reputation 
she has earned in part due to her sheer audacity. “Attend to me, girls,” Miss Brodie 
demands, insisting her students model their behavior and tastes on her own.27 A self-
proclaimed mentor, Miss Brodie believes she embodies what culture should be and that 
she is uniquely capable of transmitting it to her “set.” I will elaborate on the specifics of 
Miss Brodie’s unusual definition of culture in the next section, but here I emphasize first 
that Miss Brodie’s mentorship shares some of the same principles as Matthew Arnold’s 
sovereign educator, and second that Miss Brodie, for all her eccentricities, is an effective 
mentor. In the previous novels I have examined, mentorship fails in a move that marks 
the modernist-era attempt at a break with the traditions of institutional cultural 
                                                
27Muriel Spark, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999), 8. Hereafter cited 
parenthetically. 
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transmission, but Miss Brodie’s mentorship succeeds in a re-imagination and 
reexamination of select parts of those traditions.  
Both Miss Brodie and Arnold’s sovereign educators intend to preserve and 
transmit to new generations the appreciation of art characteristic of high culture. “Art and 
religion,” Miss Brodie teaches, come first, “then philosophy; lastly science. That is the 
order of the great subjects of life, that’s their order of importance” (24-5). With that 
mantra, she teaches the girls about famous artists and regales them with stories about her 
exotic travels. “Full of culture,” as one of her students reflects, Miss Brodie is an 
Edinburgh graduate well-versed in the “art and religion” she privileges (26). When Miss 
Brodie proclaims to her students that she is “putting old heads on your young shoulders,” 
she means that she intends to bring them up in a way influenced by older tradition, 
replicating the liberal-humane learning that had been the backbone of Arnold’s sovereign 
educator (5). The sovereign educator, stripped away from its institutional affiliations and 
all the problems Hardy identifies, has the grand but straightforward mission of inspiring 
one’s pupils to be motivated by the same culture that has inspired oneself—and Miss 
Brodie considers this her mission, too. 
Both Miss Brodie and Arnold’s sovereign educator consider this duplication or 
passing on what one has learned to be of paramount value. This transmission takes place 
through the cultivation of a “best self,” who in turn inspires others toward their own “best 
selves.” Proudly in her “prime,” Miss Brodie is at a moment in which she believes she 
can act as a “best self,” or the greatest possible mentor. As Arnold envisioned his ideal 
mentors would do, Miss Brodie prides herself on her own knowledge and experience and 
fully intends to transmit to her students those same values. With her curt and forceful 
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calls for allegiance—“Follow me”; “Attend to me”— Miss Brodie demands her girls take 
in the knowledge she offers so that they can become “best selves”: “If only you small 
girls would listen to me I would make of you the crème de la crème” (7; 8; 11). Miss 
Brodie’s superlative language, one of the hallmarks of her mentorship, commands 
unwavering allegiance. Miss Brodie holds herself to a certain standard and demands it of 
her young pupils since she is intent on transmitting what she knows, that which she 
believes truly to be the very best. Although each girl is “famous” for her own individual 
characteristics and Miss Brodie recognizes and fosters those differences, she remains 
certain that she can duplicate what matters, what is essentially “Brodie” and therefore the 
“best,” by attuning the girls to her own history, likes, and dislikes.  
Even if, as I will argue, the novel comes to question the stuff of Miss Brodie’s 
version of culture, the process through which she transmits her values is undoubtedly 
effective. In terms of transmission, Miss Brodie enjoys far more tangible success than 
Arnold’s imagined sovereign educators.  Echoing a Jesuit maxim, Miss Brodie exclaims: 
“Give me a girl at an impressionable age, and she is mine for life” (6). A bold statement, 
to be sure, but Miss Brodie can support it. The novel opens in 1936, four years after her 
term of instruction for these girls has ended, and they are still, the narrator claims, 
“unmistakably Brodie” as they complete the senior school, and they continue to reflect on 
their time with Miss Brodie into their adulthood as well (2). Even in her new identity as 
Sister Helena, Sandy Stranger remembers that her “biggest influence” was not “political, 
personal,” or “Calvinism,” but “a Miss Jean Brodie in her prime” (35). David Lodge 
interprets the novel’s flash-forward technique —the entire narrative moves quickly 
among various points in time ranging from 1930 to well past Miss Brodie’s death in 
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1946—as an affirmation of Miss Brodie’s continued influence. The technique is designed 
to “present the extension of Miss Brodie’s influence on the girls in their adult life 
simultaneously with their relationship as teacher and pupils.”28 Miss Brodie demands 
long-term influence on the girls’ lives and implores her girls to “all grow up to be 
dedicated women as I have dedicated myself to you” (66). She believes the girls’ future 
will reflect the success of her own teaching efforts. After finding out that Sandy has 
joined a convent, Miss Brodie laments, “What a waste. That is not the sort of dedication I 
meant. Do you think she has done this to annoy me?” (66). Juxtaposing Miss Brodie’s 
call for loyalty with a glimpse at future betrayal, Spark makes it clear that Miss Brodie’s 
mentorship is intended to shape the girls’ future, for she has a vested interest in their lives 
that extends far beyond their years at Marcia Blaine.  
Miss Brodie’s work as a schoolteacher is inseparable from the long-term values 
she wishes to instill. Elaborating on Miss Brodie’s role as an influential teacher, one of 
the most traditional of literary figures, Lodge suggests: “Miss Brodie’s ‘beneficent and 
enlarging effects’ are mainly educational. Though she is a memorably individual 
character, she is not an unfamiliar type: the charismatic teacher who leaves an indelible 
mark on her pupils.”29 A simple schoolteacher, like Jude Fawley’s Mr. Phillotson had 
been at first to his young student, the untraditional Miss Brodie still fills a traditional role 
that requires real dedication to the individual student while cultivating knowledge and 
eventual independence. It matters a great deal to Spark that the mentor in her novel be 
recognizable as a schoolteacher, and she intertwines mentoring and teaching to a greater 
                                                
28David Lodge, “The Uses and Abuses of Omniscience: Method and Meaning in Muriel Spark’s The Prime 
of Miss Jean Brodie,” in Critical Essays on Muriel Spark, ed. Joseph Hynes (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 
1992), 161. 
 
29 Lodge, “The Uses and Abuses of Omniscience,” 160. 
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degree than they have been in any of the novels I have examined previously. If Miss 
Brodie is both a successful mentor and a successful teacher, I suggest that her mentorship 
harks back to Arnold’s claim that the sovereign educator facilitated an institutional 
education that could itself be instilled by a mentor.  
A mentor who is a schoolteacher, specifically, implies a tangible connection 
between a culture that is passed along and the knowledge that is schooled; such a mentor 
is the closest to the sovereign educator, who uses his own vast education (gained at 
Oxbridge, per Arnold) to acculturate his pupils. Indeed, Brodie’s mentorship stems 
neither from philanthropy nor sympathy, as had that of the Schlegel sisters or Mr. 
Phillotson, all of whom only exposed a heritage that could not be transmitted even when 
the knowledge itself could. Her mentorship is not that of Mrs. Ramsay, who permits for 
the possibility of a mentorship separate from institutional affiliation. Instead, Miss 
Brodie’s mentorship is motivated by an impulse similar to the sovereign educator’s: she 
seeks to make culture the privilege of the few so that it may benefit the many, and she 
believes that institutional education provides her the best possible forum for doing so. 
And where teachers in this project have hitherto been fairly vilified—Mr. Phillotson 
becomes a competitive rival; the stodgy Professor Plumer and the overbearing Mr. 
Ramsay have a proclivity for a material transmission lacking sustainability— Miss 
Brodie succeeds as a teacher and mentor, generally leaving a lasting and positive memory 
for each member of her elect.30 In making Miss Brodie a successful mentor and teacher, a 
“best self,” and a champion of the arts, Spark has brought together some of the longest-
held assumptions about the best that education can offer.   
                                                
30 The notable exceptions would be Mary MacGregor and Joyce Emily Hammond. Mary’s death in a fire, 
however, has little to do with Brodie’s influence, and Joyce Emily is not a member of the actual Brodie set. 
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By placing institutional education and mentorship at cross-purposes, the novels I 
studied in earlier chapters confirmed the sovereign educator as a utopian impossibility at 
best, and a short-sighted and elitist abstraction at worst. So when Spark evokes a 
successful sovereign educator-type mentor with her efficacious mentorship, emphasis on 
best-selfhood, and demand that her students remain engaged in noble pursuit of art as a 
way to inform and shape their everyday life-decisions, it may seem that she sees new 
opportunities for mentorship’s impact outside the narrow confines of Arnold’s Oxbridge. 
She seems to affirm the possibility of institutionalized mentorship, rather than argue for 
its demise. Spark’s novel might thus be understood as a radical refutation of the 
modernist skepticism about the transmissibility of culture in institutions of education; 
perhaps she would be sympathetic to Leavis’s optimism for the university and reject the 
arguments of Amis and other postwar writers that institutionalized education had become 
mechanical and irrelevant.  
But in her reflections on Christina Kay, her own personal Miss Brodie from her 
days at the James Gillespie School for Girls, Spark begins to resist the idea that 
mentorship and education could have the widespread impact Arnold wanted, or could 
protect the institutional forms of culture to which Leavis clung. Miss Brodie’s successful 
mentorship may evoke an ideal combination of education and culture, yet that success 
also becomes increasingly irreproducible. Remembering Miss Kay, Spark recalls a note 
from John Steinbeck’s tribute to teachers: “I have come to believe that a great teacher is a 
great artist and that there are as few as there are any other great artists. Teaching might 
even be the greatest of the arts since the medium is the human mind and spirit.”31 
                                                
31 Muriel Spark, Curriculum Vitae (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), 67. 
218 
 
Steinbeck tempers his celebration of teaching by his admitting just how rare good 
teaching actually is, a fact Spark herself confesses when she says one of the reasons she 
did not attend university was that “[t]he chance of finding another inspiring teacher like 
my later ‘Miss Jean Brodie’ in the form of Christina Kay was very slight.”32 Spark’s look 
back on her school days shares some of the wistfulness present in Waugh’s nostalgia for 
a disappearing Oxford culture; she and Waugh both celebrate an exceptional experience 
of education knowing how difficult it will be to ever duplicate it.33 
By casting herself as the “leaven in the lump,” Miss Brodie makes it clear that she 
thinks she is the lone teacher at Marcia Blaine who can guide her students toward 
meaningful education (6). Her solitariness becomes a problem in and of itself, for the 
very small Brodie set proves simply incapable of furthering Miss Brodie’s vision in any 
extensive way beyond treasuring a pleasant memory of an eccentric teacher.  Eunice 
Gardner, for example, tells her husband she wants to visit Miss Brodie’s grave, but can 
provide him with only a fumbling answer when he asks who Miss Brodie was: “She used 
to give us teas at her flat and tell us about her prime…She fell for an Egyptian courier 
once, on her travels, and came back and told us all about it. She had a few favourites. I 
                                                                                                                                            
Miss Brodie fits Woolf’s implied definition of a teacher as well, since Woolf maintains that writers learn 
their craft from their education and Miss Brodie certainly tends to the creation of the artist. Sandy, who 
becomes an artist herself through the publication of her The Transformation of the Commonplace, is a 
ready indicator of Miss Brodie’s abilities. As Mackay explains, “what the treacherous Sandy learns from 
the treacherous Miss Brodie is that it is possible to reshape the world according to her own needs and 
desires…Miss Brodie turns her girls into artists by showing them that the world in which they live is 
intractably multiple and endlessly rewritable” (MacKay 513). 
 
32 Spark, Curriculum Vitae, 101-2. 
 
33 Spark enjoyed her years at Joseph Gillespie and in Curriculum Vitae she looks back fondly on all her 
teachers: “It was sixty years ago. The average age of those high-spirited and intelligent men and women 
who taught us was about forty; they were in their prime. I cannot believe they are nearly all gone, past and 
over, gone to their graves, so vivid are they in my memory, one and all” (76). Spark, like Forster, may have 
mourned the loss of a particular educational tradition while remaining optimistic that education could still 
offer meaningful learning that would, in perhaps a new way, lead to cultural appreciation even as that 
culture is continuously reimagined and redefined. 
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was one of them. I did the splits and made her laugh, you know” (26). While Miss Brodie 
may represent a venerated tradition of mentorship and education, that tradition also seems 
disjointed and random. Eunice’s husband gives her a telling, deadpan response: “I always 
knew your upbringing was a bit peculiar.” His confusion over his wife’s upbringing 
points to the difficulty of assessing clearly the value of Miss Brodie’s mentorship. This 
complicates the long-term potential of Miss Brodie’s culture, for once she is let go from 
Marcia Blaine, no one can take her place and recreate her “peculiar” brand of culture. 
While Miss Brodie represents successful mentorship and a steadfast commitment to 
culture, the Arnoldian image of cultured education she presents cannot help but fade.   
 
III. Miss Brodie’s Culture and the Modern Philistines 
Miss Brodie, I suggested above, is a successful mentor when considered as an 
individual teacher leading her own small group of a chosen elect. Even if her mentorship 
is rare, she successfully evokes the older, Arnoldian ideal of the sovereign educator. I 
argue here, however, that the subject transmitted through her mentorship is a version of 
culture that nonetheless betrays its limitations. When examined in the context of the 
novel’s larger engagement with education, Miss Brodie’s “peculiar” culture seems self-
indulgent and frustratingly difficult to define. If the act of her mentorship represents the 
best possible version of culture, the subject of her mentorship represents emergent 
accusations against high culture as lacking a clear purpose in contemporary society. Miss 
Brodie criticizes the Marcia Blaine School as an “education factory,” but her proposed 
curriculum is equally restricted and extreme since the culture she wants to transmit is 
ultimately defined by and meaningful to only her (6). Miss Brodie holds her culture in 
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counterpoint to the stark practicality of the Marcia Blaine curriculum, yet she fails to 
make any convincing argument for the benefits of her cultured approach beyond its 
perpetuation of her own ideals. Even though she evokes the sovereign educator and a 
culture premised on an “inward operation,” Miss Brodie’s culture is not predicated on 
Arnold’s “reading, observing, and thinking in order to come to reason,” but an undefined 
predisposition that constantly reinforces its own specialness.34 As a result, her mentorship 
proves just as unsustainable as that of the mentors I have examined previously, since the 
culture she perpetuates lacks any clear or lasting value. 
The culture Miss Brodie attempts to pass on is never plainly explained; she is 
certain she will pass on to her girls what she believes matters, but she cannot articulate a 
coherent system behind her criteria for determining something as “culture.” The girls of 
the Brodie set learn from their mentor a most unusual and diverse body of “cultural” 
information:  
These girls were discovered to have heard of the Buchmanites and Mussolini, the 
Italian Renaissance painters, the advantages to the skin of cleansing cream and 
witch-hazel over honest soap and water, and the word ‘menarche’; the interior 
decoration of the London house of the author of Winnie the Pooh had been 
described to them, as had the love lives of Charlotte Bronte and of Miss Brodie 
herself. They were aware of the existence of Einstein and the arguments of those 
who considered the Bible to be untrue. They knew the rudiments of astrology but 
not the date of the battle of Flodden or the capital of Finland. All of the Brodie 
set, save one, counted on its fingers, as had Miss Brodie, with accurate results 
more or less. (2) 
 
The list is a bizarre amalgamation of random bits of art, history, literature, and hygiene; it 
does not identify with any cohesiveness what would constitute being “cultured” or 
“educated.” Further, the compatibility between education and culture once implied by 
Miss Brodie’s depiction as a successful mentor and schoolteacher begins to erode as Miss 
                                                
34 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 5. 
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Brodie refuses to teach even the basic standards of a primary school curriculum. She tells 
her students to “Hold up your books” and pretend they are studying “our history 
lesson…our poetry…English grammar,” when in fact she plans to tell them “about care 
of the skin, and of the hands…about the Frenchman I met in the train to Biarritz” (7). 
Miss Brodie rejects any prescribed curriculum and replaces it with personal anecdote and 
opinion. Ultimately, the only criterion she uses to determine cultural and educational 
worth is whether or not she finds a particular cultural artifact or historical narrative to be 
personally interesting. The correct answer to her question, “Who is the greatest Italian 
painter?” is Giotto, simply because “he is my favourite” (7-8). Miss Brodie’s culture is 
purely self-referential in that it is affirmed by no one else and presented as a matter of 
nothing more than her personal taste.  
In Miss Brodie’s mind, though, her eclectic culture is no less important than 
Oxbridge culture had been to Arnold, and her insights on “care of the skin, and of the 
hands” are on par with the primacy of truth and beauty. Even though Miss Brodie’s 
culture appears to be a random assortment of insights and artifacts, she passionately 
defends its validity and seriousness. Like Arnold and Amis, she fears the threat of 
“philistinism” to her culture, which still evokes a venerated tradition of art and 
intellectual inquiry. Although the particularities of her tradition differentiate hers from 
Arnoldian culture, she seems to think her culture faces the same type of threats and merits 
the same types of protection. Indeed, Miss Brodie levels the insult “Philistine” at her girls 
when they fail to remain poised during Mr. Lloyd’s art lesson: “It is obvious…that these 
girls are not of cultured homes and heritage. The Philistines are upon us, Mr. Lloyd” (51). 
The “Philistine” designation calls to mind Arnold’s utilitarian thinkers and Amis’s exam-
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advocates, but Miss Brodie’s “Philistines” are merely young girls giggling at the female 
form in a lesson on Italian paintings. To Miss Brodie, though, her girls are guilty of a 
more serious offense: that they do not take culture seriously enough.35 While she may 
later dismiss the exams for which the pragmatic Miss Mackay wants the students 
prepared, Miss Brodie implies here that the real threat to her culture is the fundamental 
inability to recognize its value.   
While the girls are eager to parrot Miss Brodie’s assertion that culture has value, 
their response to being labeled “Philistines” makes it apparent that they do not have any 
tangible sense of what culture’s actual significance is. Their understanding of Miss 
Brodie’s culture portrays it as seemingly as archaic as the term “philistine” itself. To 
show Miss Brodie that they really do take culture seriously, the girls anxiously attempt to 
make themselves appear “of cultured and sexless antecedents” (51). The addition here of 
“sexless” to a “cultured antecedent” makes those antecedents appear as lifeless as the 
figures the girls study in their trips to the museum. Miss Brodie would not notice the 
museum statues’ nudity, Sandy maintains, because “Miss Brodie’s above all that.” 
Similarly, when Sandy and Jenny write their version of Miss Brodie’s love story with the 
doomed Hugh Carruthers, they decide that surely Miss Brodie could never have “had 
sexual intercourse with Hugh” (18). Even though “Miss Brodie said they clung to each 
other with passionate abandon on his last leave,” Sandy is convinced her teacher remains 
                                                
35Miss Brodie still must navigate Arnold’s distinction between utilitarianism and traditional culture. Upon 
her insistence that Sandy and Jenny teach her Greek at the same time they learn it, Miss Brodie reaches to 
the values of past tradition: “There is an old tradition for this practice…whereupon that one scholar of the 
family imparted to the others in the evening what he had learned in the morning” (86). But this is 
juxtaposed with John Stuart Mill, the quintessential utilitarian: “John Stuart Mill used to rise at dawn to 
learn Greek at the age of five, and what John Stuart Mill could do as an infant at dawn, I too can do on a 
Saturday afternoon in my prime.” This comic nod to utilitarianism acknowledges the movement’s 
persistence but, in typical Brodie fashion, manages to turn it into a reflection of a culture that suits Miss 
Brodie’s own tastes and asserts her own superiority. 
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pure: “I don’t think they took their clothes off, though,” she tells Jenny (18). By 
removing sex from culture, the girls create an image of Miss Brodie that paints her as a 
historical relic of another time, idealized to the point of being completely detached from 
the vagaries of the modern world. She is elevated to the extent that she becomes an 
unrealistic abstraction. Jenny and Sandy can only depict a romanticized Miss Brodie in 
the story they write because their mentor has offered them a culture so “above all that” 
that it is cut off from everything else. If Miss Brodie sees herself as defending a culture 
so profoundly serious and pure it has been raised to the status of desexualized statues 
austerely displayed in museums, she must reproach the Philistines for laughing at sex 
because she fears they bring a mundane perspective to what she thinks is profoundly 
solemn. Being so elevated and idealized, Miss Brodie and the culture she represents 
become the subjects of merely a studious curiosity. Culture here is sterile, removed and 
protected from any engagement that might threaten its appearance of purity.  
Not coming from “cultured homes and heritage,” the girls do not readily 
appreciate culture’s value, which is precisely why Miss Brodie thinks she must keep 
culture cordoned off for a select few. To permit access to that culture, Miss Brodie 
believes, she must awaken an appreciation for it. Even if separate from class, culture 
remains exclusive and privileged in that it reflects a particular engagement enjoyed only 
by a small group. If one already has a spirit of culture, Miss Brodie believes she can help 
it emerge: 
“The word ‘education’ comes from the root e from ex, out, and duco, I lead. It 
means a leading out. To me education is a leading out of what is already there in 
the pupil’s soul. To Miss Mackay it is a putting in of something that is not there, 
and that is not what I call education, I call it intrusion, from the Latin root prefix 
in meaning in and the stem trudo, I thrust. Miss Mackay’s method is to thrust a lot 
of information into the pupil’s head; mine is a leading out of knowledge, and that 
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is true education as is proved by the root meaning. (36) 
 
If education is a matter of “soul” and Miss Brodie’s girls are her “elect,” then clearly 
culture belongs to but a predetermined few and cannot be transmitted to everyone. 
Instead, she can only “lead out” culture from where it already resides. Miss Brodie may 
bill her culture as the self-cultivation inherent to Bildung, but given the importance she 
grants herself in that process of cultivation it is clear that her culture is actually the 
development of taste more closely affiliated with habitus. Miss Brodie’s ex duco seems to 
rely on an already-present recognition of culture. Hugh Carruthers, for example, is a 
made up figure, a compilation of Keats, Wilfred Owen, and Burns. She presents her 
fictional love story as truth, immediately after reminding her girls that “we are civilized 
beings” (9). But even if the girls are civilized, they have no way of knowing the literary 
references constituting Miss Brodie’s dead lover; the adult “cultured” reader catches the 
references, but the girls cannot. Miss Brodie seems to want to lead out culture, but she 
has not yet put in the knowledge that constitutes the learning of that culture. 36 Her culture 
is drawn only further into isolation as it becomes increasingly clear that it belongs only to 
the select few who have somehow managed to understand it.  
In pointing out what she believes to be the shortcomings of Miss Mackay’s 
philosophy, Miss Brodie actually reveals the problem of her own: how can one pinpoint 
what constitutes culture if it comes from a place as abstract as the soul? Could culture 
ever reside in everyone? This is why Miss Brodie must teach such an eclectic mix of 
knowledge: she is not actually trying to teach a specific curriculum that transmits a 
specific version of culture, for culture has no specific referent that can be “thrust into” 
                                                
36 Indeed, Miss Brodie’s culture often appears to be in trudo in disguise. Because the girls lack the 
foundational knowledge to understand Miss Brodie’s culture, her attempts at ex duco seem instead to 
“thrust” knowledge onto the girls knowledge to make up for all that they do not know. 
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one’s mind. Instead, culture is a kind of awareness, the cultivated taste Miss Brodie 
herself enjoys. As Waugh depicts Oxford as a way of life rather than a program of 
learning, Spark gestures here toward an education that reflects a cultured outlook or 
attitude. But because Miss Brodie is a schoolteacher to those “not from cultured homes 
and heritage,” she must rely on classroom lessons to teach a culture that had hitherto been 
left out of the classroom. Her teaching philosophy, her “ex duco,” is an attempt to reclaim 
culture as a privileged perspective that emerges from self-cultivation, but this seems 
incompatible with the in trudo of her institutional milieu.  
The conflict between ex duco and in trudo is not far removed from the conflict 
between culture as a process and culture as a product that I outlined in my first chapter. 
Ex duco characterizes culture as a process of the awakening of an appreciation for the arts 
and intellect; in trudo looks for measurable indicators of specific knowledge having been 
transmitted and successfully acquired. Hardy, I argued, uses the figure of the sovereign 
educator to demonstrate that Jude can acquire culture as process, but not the social 
indicators of having gained culture (i.e. a Christminster degree).  In denying in trudo, 
Miss Brodie rejects the idea that culture should have a socially assigned value at all. Her 
culture can appear “peculiar” to those who do not care to embrace it, but its inherent 
value will remain clear to those who truly understand it. Miss Brodie’s culture is 
portrayed as antiquated and haphazard, but this has absolutely no bearing on her 
commitment to it. In fact, Miss Brodie goes so far as to encourage a view of culture that 
celebrates its distinction from social convention. And this is where she breaks from 
Arnold’s sovereign educator in a crucial way and illustrates a fundamental change in 
culture’s purpose: Miss Brodie’s culture is fully intended to remain inaccessible to those 
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who do not readily recognize its value. For Arnold, culture may begin as the exclusive 
perspective of the few, but the sovereign educator would work to develop a sensibility 
that could eventually be made available to all, whereas Miss Brodie delights in the 
specialness of her elect. Even if Jude Fawley and Leonard Bast prove the hollowness of 
Arnold’s claims about class transcendence, Arnold believed that culture promised a 
character refinement that would encourage individuals of all classes to work toward 
social harmony. In contrast, Miss Brodie attempts to develop a sensibility defined by 
social contrariness. Part of education’s “leading out” involves defining oneself as distinct, 
and maintaining that air of distinction.37 Arnold advocated classical texts as a means to 
cultivate “civilized” behavior among all of England; Miss Brodie advocates her personal 
tastes as a means to cultivate opposition to almost everyone else.   
It becomes clear even on the first page of the novel that Miss Brodie’s training 
prepares her girls to operate against norms, endlessly rewriting rules to suit their own 
tastes. The novel opens with a glimpse at how the Brodie set wear their school-mandated 
panama hats: “The girls could not take off their panama hats because this was not far 
from the school gates and hatlessness was an offence. Certain departures from the proper 
set of the hat on the head were overlooked in the case of fourth-form girls and upwards so 
long as nobody wore their hat at an angle” (1). The girls, however, resist: they manage to 
wear “their hats each with a definite difference,” denoting from the outset that what 
makes them “immediately recognisable as Miss Brodie’s pupils” is their subtle defiance 
of rules and their desire to differ from a prescribed standard (1). As the girls talk to a 
group of boys over a boundary of bicycle handlebars, Spark further emphasizes the nature 
                                                
37 “Distinction” is exactly what Bourdieu calls the cultivation of taste. For him, this taste reflects the 
sensibilities encouraged by one’s class. For Miss Brodie, this distinction is likewise a means of 
demonstrating an awareness of culture.  
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of the girls’ separatism: they are only united through Miss Brodie, and they are, with her 
guidance, against conformity. Indeed, that resistance to conformity may be one of the few 
unifying threads behind Miss Brodie’s culture. The girls “had no team spirit and very 
little in common with each other,” but their allegiance to Miss Brodie marks them as 
distinct (2). By encouraging her girls to resist other people’s rules, Miss Brodie ensures 
they will continue to elevate only her version of what really matters, while she also 
emphasizes that culture should remain the subject of difference and enjoyed only by the 
few.  
Miss Brodie teaches nonconformity not out of any sense of disrespect for rule-
following altogether—after all, she demands the girls follow her own rules expressly—
but as a means of resistance against what she calls “this education factory,” the Marcia 
Blaine School. This tension between culture as an idealized separateness and as a 
pointless distraction from useful knowledge reflects, I believe, what had become of the 
narrative of institutional cultural transmission at the mid-century. Spark’s novel argues 
that the structure of education under the legislation of the modern welfare state 
reproduced only a way of thinking in which culture was no longer a vaulted tradition that 
could inform an entire curriculum, but an increasingly isolated program of study.38 
Modernists such as Forster and Woolf depict contemporary embodiments of (failed) 
mentorship to illustrate that institutional forms of cultural transmission are no longer 
possible; Spark, however, turns to a radically traditional, Arnoldian mentor to 
                                                
38Born in Scotland, Spark received a Scottish—not English—education. Education in Scotland is certainly 
not exactly the same as in England: “Education in Scotland remained distinct, in its traditions, which were 
in some respects superior to those of the south, and in its practical organization, which was not now more 
impressive” (Calder 545). However, Scottish schools were organized in primary and secondary stages and, 
thanks to a further Act of 1945, had been “brought into line with the English on certain important points” 
(Calder 545). For Spark’s own account of her Scottish education, see Curriculum Vitae pages 49-76. 
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demonstrate how out of date is the fundamental assumption that culture as it once was 
even has a place in institutional education. As the writers of the thirties and forties had 
argued, schools could no longer foster a cultural sensibility that would put together 
classroom learning and intellectual dialogue into a meaningful and transmissible culture. 
Humanist culture struggles to remain relevant or to define itself as anything more than a 
vague resistance to the “uncultured,” and in turn it faces criticism as either a snobbish 
elitism or an irrelevant pursuit. Spark’s private girls’ school is a caricature of some of the 
generalities about modern education expressed at the beginning of this chapter, as Miss 
Brodie’s culture struggles to find validity in the face of education’s legislated emphasis 
on practicality, exams, and “hard knowledge.” 39 
 The Marcia Blaine School evokes the specific ways in which the final 
nationalization of education symbolized the complete break between institutional 
education and the transmissible version of culture. The 1944 Education Act was the 
culmination of a host of social reform movements undertaken around World War II, and 
addressed especially the issue of secondary education. 40 Following the recommendations 
of the 1942 Social Insurance and Allied Services (the “Beveridge Report”), the Act made 
secondary education free and compulsory for all and brought the maintenance of these 
                                                
39 C.P. Snow’s famous 1959 lecture “The Two Cultures” argues that the “hard knowledge” of science is not 
any less important than the “intellectual life” of the humanities, and that this dualistic perspective has a 
negative impact on British schools. Snow and Miss Brodie obviously have different priorities, but both 
indicate an increasing (and increasingly criticized) separation of forms of knowledge, which had a great 
deal of impact on education.  
 
40 “The educational institution which remained fullest of vigorous life throughout the period between the 
wars was, without any doubt, the maintained secondary school—the grammar school as it is called today. 
From the earliest postwar years it was almost everywhere bursting at the seams, yet having to reject 
annually thousands of eager and able youngsters, most of whom had qualified for entry by winning 
scholarships or free places” (Dent 93).  
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schools under the purview of public authorities.41 The educational reform measures of the 
forties saw a renewed commitment to universal education, providing especially increased 
opportunities for secondary and further education. Education was very much a matter of 
what Beveridge called “social insurance” because it provided a potentially solid 
foundation for both economic prosperity and equality.42 As school reform had been a 
particular interest of the utilitarian movement, the 1944 Education Act was motivated by 
the belief that school reform could enact social reform and economic growth.43  
 Social reform and economic growth are of little concern to Miss Brodie. Such 
mundane preoccupations are precisely what she resists in her insistence on staying at 
Marcia Blaine. “There needs must be a leaven in the lump,” she claims, as she is 
determined to elevate her group of young students above a school standard that she sees 
as misdirected when it guides students away from the version of culture she advocates 
(6). And while the Marcia Blaine School is not a state school, it is implied that it shares a 
similar curriculum when Miss Brodie contrasts Marcia Blaine to a progressive or 
experimental school. Rationalizing her refusal to ever leave Marcia Blaine, Miss Brodie 
                                                
41 The 1942 Beveridge report dealt with social insurance. The report states: “There was a widespread 
feeling that a revolutionary moment in the world’s history is a time for revolutions, not for patching.” As 
such, William Beveridge targeted what he called “Five Giants on the Road to Recovery,” which he 
identifies in bold, capital letters: “WANT, DISEASE, IGNORANCE, SQUALOR and IDLENESS.”  To 
defeat them, Peter Hennessey explains, “Beveridge designed a comprehensive welfare system (though, 
oddly, he never cared for the phrase ‘the welfare state’ preferring to call it ‘the social service state’) based 
on three ‘assumptions’—a free national health service, child allowances, full employment (which he 
defined as less than 8.5 per cent unemployment).”   
 
42 For additional information on what led to the 1944 Education Act and on its aftermath, see H.C. Dent’s 
1870-1970: Century of Growth in English Education (1970); Angus Calder’s The People’s War, Britain 
1939-1945 (1969); Peter Hennessy’s Never Again: Britain, 1945-1951 (1993); Ken Jones’s Education in 
Britain: 1944 to the Present (2003). 
 
43 Kenneth Richmond, Education in Britain Since 1944: A Personal Retrospect (London: Methuen & Co. 
Ltd., 1978), 14.  
Richmond argues, however, that “[o]n both counts this belief has been seriously undermined during the 
past decade.” 
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says with great disdain: “It has been suggested again that I should apply for a post at one 
of the progressive schools, where my methods would be more suited to the system than 
they are at Blaine. But I shall not apply for a post at a crank school” (6). Ironically, Miss 
Brodie associates herself in many ways with the oldest of educational traditions, yet her 
approach is now seen as more in line with a “progressive” school. 
 The progressive and the traditional meet up in a corridor at Marcia Blaine. 
Walking her students past a poster of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin with the words 
“Safety First” emblazoned across the bottom, Miss Brodie explains that the school’s 
headmistress, Miss Mackay, “retains him on the wall because she believes in the slogan 
‘Safety First.’” Miss Brodie, however, refutes such a claim. “But safety does not come 
first,” she admonishes her girls, “Goodness, Truth and Beauty come first” (7). In defense 
of such practical admonishments as “Safety First,” Miss Mackay tells the girls that 
“Culture cannot compensate for lack of hard knowledge,” encouraging them to work hard 
on all subjects (69). In her somewhat sarcastic “You will have to work hard at ordinary 
humble subjects for the qualifying examinations,” Miss Mackay ridicules the elevated 
perception of culture the girls have learned from Miss Brodie (69). She asks them about 
their own “cultural interests,” downplaying culture as a kind of extracurricular pursuit 
(68). To Miss Mackay, culture is a matter of interest or personal enjoyment, not the 
sustained pursuit of a particular type of knowledge. 
In Never Again (1993), Peter Hennessy looks back at the national fervor 
motivating the 1944 Education Act. The push for such major reform, he maintains, was 
part of a greater concern with what schools could pass on to future generations, which 
offers some explanation behind Miss Mackay’s viewpoint: “Education, as everybody 
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knew then and knows now, is crucial to the wider social and economic well-being of the 
country. There is a direct link between the quality of educational investment in one 
generation and the industrial output, balance of payments and strength of the currency in 
the next and the next-but-one.”44 Education is here figured as both Amis’s “tasks of 
peace” and as part of a greater narrative of transmission, but it has nothing to do with 
traditionally understood culture. In Culture and the Grammar School (1965), however, H. 
Davies argued that culture was still part of education’s purpose: “Traditionally education 
has been concerned with the task of cultural transmission and the culture in question has 
been that of a minority group. It has been the duty of the schools to preserve this 
culture—the best that has been thought and said—and to hand it on reverently to an elite 
class.”45 While arguing in support of culture’s position in education, Davies actually gets 
at its potential collapse. If education in the forties had been intended to improve the 
economic lot of the population in its entirety, then is there still a benefit to keeping 
culture as the privilege of the elite? The forties-era acknowledgment of the unequal 
distribution of knowledge among dominant groups left “egalitarian trends in sociological 
analysis” questioning what “counts as knowledge.”46 Culture could not be the preparation 
for the real world it had once been considered; it becomes only one possible curriculum 
out of many, and it is seen in opposition to other forms of equally valid knowledge. 
  Nowhere in the novel is this increasing split between “culture” and other types of 
study more apparent than in the girls’ decision to attend either the Classical or Modern 
School. This divide between classical and modern schools is an allusion to the “eleven-
                                                
44Peter Hennessy,  Never Again: Britain, 1945-1951 (York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 161. 
 
45H. Davies, qtd. in Richmond, Education in Britain since 1944, 89. 
 
46 Richmond, Education in Britain since 1944, 89. 
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plus.” This exam, created by the 1944 Butler Education Act, was designed to determine a 
student’s future career path, because the results of a student’s eleven plus exam would 
dictate his or her track in the tripartite secondary school system, which divided students 
among the grammar (academic) school, the modern school, or a technical school.47 The 
grammar school, or what Miss Brodie calls the “Classical” school, gave students the most 
traditional education with an emphasis on classic literary texts. As outlined in The 
Education of the Adolescent, the modern school would not focus on the traditional 
subjects of the school curriculum, but was based on a “child-centered approach” that had 
been “deemed appropriate for the mass of pupils who had neither the ability nor the 
aptitude for a full-length academic course.”48 The structures of education had physically 
and ideologically separated “Truth and Beauty” from “Safety First,” only underscoring 
that Miss Brodie’s culture is indeed not for everyone. Her culture, she intends, is for the 
elite, disconnected from modern society.    
 The stakes of the eleven-plus exam were inordinately high; a clever poor child 
could move up a social class by getting into a good grammar school. There are echoes of 
Mr. Tulliver here, since the grammar school and its traditional curriculum were still 
                                                
47 Richmond found these designations rather arbitrary and misinformed: “In the long series of official 
reports on British education, few passages have been quite so egregious as those to be found in Norwood’s 
phony characterizations of the grammar-school pupil (‘’who is interested in learning for its own sake and 
can hold his mind in suspense’), the technical-school pupil (‘whose interests and abilities lie markedly in 
the field of applies science or applied art’) and the modern-school pupil (‘who deals more easily with 
concrete things than with ideas’)” (71). 
 
48 Richmond, Education in Britain since 1944, 80. 
Richmond further elaborates on the intention behind the modern school: “despite Hadow’s 
recommendation to the contrary it was decided that the modern school should be free from the pressure of 
external examinations. Any suggestion of its aping the grammar school was to be avoided. Activity and 
experience, projects and centres of interest were to provide the pabulum for a ‘good all-round secondary 
education’, with any vocational bias deferred until the later stages of the course. In this way, it was hoped, 
the modern school would evolve its own distinctive life-style and justify itself as an attractive and 
worthwhile alternative to the grammar school” (80).  
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associated with upward mobility. Minister of Education Ellen Wilkinson championed this 
tripartite policy as being “essentially meritocratic”:  
People have said that by talking in terms of three types of school we are 
promulgating a wrong social philosophy. I do not agree. By abolishing fees in 
maintained schools we have ensured that entry to these schools shall be on the 
basis of merit… I cannot agree with those people who say that by setting up 
distinction of brains between people you are only producing another kind of 
distinction. I am glad to think that we are not all born the same.49 
 
Based on the “distinction” of “brains,” the eleven plus seems to offer the same pseudo-
educational advancement Bourdieu found in 1930’s France. The eleven plus system, 
Angus Calder chides, “ensured that privilege was perpetuated behind a façade of 
democratic advance.”50 The tripartite system, though defended as egalitarian and merit-
based, ignored the way in which the “distinction of brains” had developed in the first 
place as a result of years of disparate educational opportunities among classes, and only 
underscores the elitism and separateness of a curriculum of culture. 
 As their final teacher in the primary school, Miss Brodie prepares her students for 
that key decision, encouraging them to the Classical in her typically leading fashion: “I 
am not saying anything against the Modern side. Modern and Classical, they are equal, 
and each provides for a function in life. You must make your free choice. Not everyone is 
capable of a Classical education…So that the girls were left in no doubt as to Miss 
Brodie’s contempt for the Modern side” (64). Miss Brodie’s “contempt” for the Modern 
school is distinct from the charges against utilitarianism made by Arnold, Leavis, and 
even Amis. Instead of faulting utilitarian pragmatism or crass socioeconomic motives, 
Miss Brodie asserts their irrelevance to the only life that matters: her life of culture. Miss 
                                                
49Ellen Wilkinson, qtd. in Richmond, Education in Britain since 1944, 72. 
 
50Angus Calder, The People’s War, Britain 1939-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), 543.   
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Brodie’s close-minded and absolute dedication to the superiority of her own dictated 
culture leads her to a romanticized fascism. As Lodge argues, “Miss Brodie’s sympathy 
for the Fascist movements of the ‘thirties is not a reasoned political attitude, but an 
extension of her egotism and romantic sensibility.”51 Her unusual and dangerous political 
affiliation only further illustrates that culture has come to signify the division— exactly 
what Arnold had feared anarchy would produce.       
 
IV. Culture and Parody: Toward a “Desegregated Art”  
 Given the novel’s setting in a primary school, Miss Brodie’s culture is a comic re-
imagination of Little Father Time’s “Age masquerading as Juvenility.” I suggest that the 
source of Spark’s parody of culture in education is Miss Brodie’s attempt to disseminate 
the tenets of a venerable culture to students too young to grasp her lessons. Miss Brodie 
invokes much of the Oxbridge culture I have detailed throughout this project: an 
emphasis on tradition; the commitment to ancient Greek “Truth and Beauty”; and the 
Arnoldian sense of culture as a developed, transmissible, and refined inward process and 
sensibility. When Miss Brodie applies these tenets to a primary school education, though, 
she radically isolates and artificially elevates culture away from serious conversations 
about culture’s worth. The disparity between the weight of this serious cultural tradition 
and the education of a group of very young girls is jarring and laughable as Spark mocks 
the way that culture in its traditional form seems irrelevant to its surroundings. Even if 
the texts of culture still represent “the best which has been thought and said in the world,” 
the subjective nature of that “best” in light of the massive social upheaval of two world 
wars diminishes culture’s capacity as an expansive or reparative force.  
                                                
51 Lodge, “The Uses and Abused of Omniscience,” 163. 
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 Culture cannot remain at Marcia Blaine, and to imply that it can only makes 
culture appear “peculiar,” disjointed, and inaccessible—even dangerous. In fact, Miss 
Brodie’s fascism is an outcome of her romantic, aestheticizing character. Just as she 
keeps her culture isolated in a school for innocent young girls, Miss Brodie fails to 
understand fascism’s dire implications. Even in her trips to Germany and Austria before 
World War II, Miss Brodie only notices how the countries “were now magnificently 
organised” and how “Mussolini had put an end to unemployment with his fascisti and 
there was no litter in the streets” (131; 31). Culture, in the transmissible form Miss 
Brodie embodies, does not know how to apply a tradition of the past to a profoundly 
unsettled present. Her most condemning critique of Nazism comes in the passing remark 
to Sandy, “Hitler was rather naughty” (131).  
 Fascism eventually matters a great deal to Joyce-Emily, however, who leaves to 
fight for Franco at Miss Brodie’s urging and dies along the way. Joyce-Emily 
“boasts…that her brother at Oxford had gone to fight in the Spanish Civil War,” and 
“[t]his dark, rather mad girl wanted to go too, and to wear a white blouse and black skirt 
and march with a gun” (126). War for Joyce-Emily is fashion; her understanding of war 
is limited to the picture Miss Brodie brought back from Italy “showing the triumphant 
march of the black uniforms in Rome” worn by Mussolini’s marching troops (31). At 
Marcia Blaine, war was “something going on outside in the newspapers and only once a 
month in the school debating society” (126). Joyce-Emily’s death illustrates that when 
culture is separate from the tasks of peace Amis details, it risks becoming an 
irresponsible egotism. For Sandy Stranger, Joyce-Emily’s death is enough to make her 
realize that she owes Miss Brodie loyalty “only up to a point” and that her mentorship 
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ought finally to be rejected. (136). Sandy does not betray Miss Brodie on political 
grounds—Sandy finds there are Fascists “less agreeable than Miss Brodie” in the 
Catholic church she joins—or out of some concern for “world affairs,” but because she is 
interested in “putting a stop to Miss Brodie” (134). Sandy’s call for an end to mentorship 
is a call to end a cultural transmission that cannot account for a changing society with 
increasing political strife.  
 Spark’s parody is grounded in her view that ridicule is, to return to this chapter’s 
epigraph, “the only honorable weapon we have left.”52 The claim comes from her lecture 
“The Desgregation of Art,” in which she makes the case for what she calls a 
“desegregated” literature, “one that will immerse us in the facts and prevent our 
sentimental self-indulgence.”53 Spark admonishes artists’ emotional efforts to arouse 
sympathy or indignation; she advocates instead the emotionally detached forms of parody 
and satire. Emotional work provides the reader with a false sense of accomplishment in 
which one feels good for having experienced sympathy, which only further segregates 
readers from the particular plight they encounter in literature. “The Desegregation of Art” 
is Spark’s response to “a marvelous tradition of socially-conscious art” that has 
thankfully raised awareness of suffering in “social life or in family life,” but she is quick 
to point out the limitations of such efforts.54 This art can depict “the gross racial injustices 
of our world, or in the exposure of the tyrannies of family life on the individual.”55 These 
                                                
52 Muriel Spark, “The Desegregation of Art,” in Critical Essays on Muriel Spark, ed. Joseph Hynes (New 
York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1992), 35. 
 
53 Joseph Hynes, introduction to Critical Essays on Muriel Spark (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1992), 4. 
 
54Spark, “The Desegregation of Art,” 34.  
 
55 Spark, “The Desegregation of Art,” 34.  
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portrayals can be powerful and moving, evoking the strong response a reader may have 
had to the Fawley children hanging dead in a closet, or Leonard Bast crushed beneath the 
weight of the books he valued. But for Spark, such displays of emotional anger are no 
longer the most effective, “it isn’t achieving its end or illuminating our lives any more.”56 
Spark picks up on the same radical shift in perspective that Woolf had attributed to the 
effects of war. After World War II, this shift has intensified: “we have come to a moment 
in history when we are surrounded on all sides and oppressed by the absurd.”57 And 
everyone, regardless of their level of sophistication or education is “aware of this fact.” 
Therefore, the “art of ridicule is an art that everyone can share in some degree, given the 
world that we have.”58 
Spark argues in favor of parody because she believes it has the enlightening 
effects that had at one point been assigned to culture:  
Our noble aspirations, our sympathies, our elevated feelings should not be 
inspired merely by visits to an art gallery, a theater, or by reading a book, but 
rather the rhetoric of our times should persuade us to contemplate the ridiculous 
nature of the reality before us, and teach us to mock it. We should know ourselves 
better by now than to be under the illusion that we are all essentially aspiring, 
affectionate, and loving creatures. We do have these qualities, but we are 
aggressive, too. And so when I speak of the desegregation of art I mean by this 
the liberation of our minds from the comfortable cells of lofty sentiment in which 
they are confined and never really satisfied.59  
 
Miss Brodie’s version of culture fails to account for the “rhetoric of our times” that 
everyone can now speak, just as Spark claims that Arnold’s vision of self-directed 
Bildung as a means of social harmony is almost a complete charade. Culture cannot be 
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57 Spark, “The Desegregation of Art,” 36. 
 
58 Spark, “The Desegregation of Art,” 36. 
 
59 Spark, “The Desegregation of Art,” 36. 
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transmitted in ways that look toward tradition and continuity, for the absurdity of the 
postwar world cannot find significance in an art dedicated too much to its own 
preservation.   
 Although Spark and Amis share a sense of a culture that is no longer transmissible 
through education, Spark’s call for accessible and diverse forms of parody as a way to 
resist too-limited forms of culture are in stark contrast to Amis’s sharp satire. For Amis, 
culture was doomed on two fronts. An anti-modernist, he was frustrated by the 
inaccessibility of Bloomsbury high aesthetics and found that it represented a stifling and 
elitist version of culture.60 But at the other extreme, he was vocally against the 
democratization of education, a position summed up in his now ubiquitous phrase, “more 
means worse.”61 Along with C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson, Amis contributed to the “Black 
Papers” (in contrast to the government “White Papers”) of the late sixties, attacking 
especially the 1963 Robbins Report, which recommended immediate expansion of and 
access to the universities.62 Amis pokes fun at education reform in Lucky Jim in the 
characters of Beesley and Mrs. Welch, concluding both that culture has become too 
diffused to have lasting value and that culture in its traditional form is largely irrelevant. 
Like Amis, Leavis argues for the continued benefit of culture, but remains concerned that 
its widespread availability has also diminished its commitment to tradition. With his 
characteristic drama, he concludes with sadness,  “The prospects of culture, then, are very 
                                                
60See, for example, Bertram Welsh in Lucky Jim, whose pretension and snobbery prevent him from 
considering anything beyond the production of art.  
 
61 Kingsley Amis, qtd. in Zachary Leader, The Life of Kingsley Amis (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 
606. 
 
62 For an overview of the Robbins Report and the educational reform movements that followed, see Richard 
Aldrich’s anthology A Century of Education; Ken Jones’s Education in Britain: 1944 to the Present (2003); 
Clyde Chitty’s Education Policy in Britain (2009). 
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dark. There is less room for hope in that a standardised civilisation is rapidly enveloping 
the whole world.”63 
 T.S. Eliot had come to a similar conclusion in the forties. When he defines 
“culture” in Notes towards a Definition of English Culture (1949), he does so because “a 
doctrine only needs to be defined after the appearance of some heresy.”64 One form of 
“heresy,” he argues, was the diffusion of education. He resists synonymy between 
education and culture and challenges assumptions that the purpose of education is to 
transmit culture: “we must observe that the assumption that culture can be summed up as 
skills and interpretations controverts the more comprehensive view of culture” that he 
takes in his earlier chapters.65  Eliot maintains that the diffusion of education cheapens it; 
culture should remain the privilege of the select few who can understand and appreciate it 
fully.  
By arguing that the diffusion of education has a negative impact on cultural 
preservation, however, Eliot must admit a stronger link between education and cultural 
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64 T.S. Eliot, Notes towards the Definition of Culture (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), 
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Clive Bell’s Civilization: An Essay (1938) and C.J. Powys’s The Meaning of Culture (1939) make 
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65Eliot, Notes towards the Definition of Culture, 98. 
Although he does not name the 1944 Butler Act, he makes obvious his distaste for such legislation: “People 
can be persuaded to desire almost anything, for a time, if they are constantly told that it is something to 
which they are entitled and which is unjustly withheld from them…facility of education will lead to 
indifference to it; and that the universal imposition of education up to the years of maturity will lead to 
hostility towards it” (102-3). Eliot supports proposals such as those of historian R.H. Tawney, who argued 
that “public schools should be taken over by the State and used as boarding schools to accommodate for 
two or three years the intellectually abler secondary school boys from the ages of sixteen to eighteen. For 
the conditions over which he pronounces such a tearful valedictory were not brought about, either, by mere 
privilege; but by a happy combination of privilege and opportunity, in the blend he so savours, of which no 
Education Act will find the secret” (105).  
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transmission than he is prepared to admit in his denunciation of education’s “skills and 
interpretations.” Eliot returns to the subject of his earlier essay, “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent,” and in doing so finally acknowledges that cultural transmission 
depends on education: 
We know now that the highest achievements of the past, in art, in wisdom, in 
holiness, were but ‘stages in development’ which we can teach our springalds to 
improve upon. We must not train them merely to receive the culture of the past, 
for that would be to regard the culture of the past as final. We must not impose 
culture upon the young, though we may impose upon them whatever political and 
social philosophy is in vogue. And yet the culture of Europe has deteriorated 
visibly within the memory of many who are by no means the oldest among us. 
And we know, that whether education can foster and improve culture or not, it can 
surely adulterate and degrade it. For there is no doubt that in our headlong rush to 
educate everybody, we are lowering our standards, and more and more 
abandoning the study of those subjects by which the essentials of our culture—of 
that part of it which is transmissible by education—are transmitted; destroying 
our ancient edifices to make ready the ground upon which the barbarian nomads 
of the future will encamp in their mechanised caravans.66  
 
Eliot wants simultaneously to preserve tradition and to recognize its end. In a long and 
complex sentence, Eliot struggles to articulate the viability of cultural transmission: it 
depends on education, yet education may or may not be able to “foster and improve 
culture.” The decay present in The Wasteland had reached a crisis point by the forties, as 
the culture of the past manifestly ceases to be transmissible and Eliot looks to salvage 
“essentials” before they disappear. Cultural diffusion in his argument directly threatens 
cultural transmission because of culture’s already very precarious state.  
 As I have argued, however, cultural transmission as it related to education had 
long since been scrutinized by writers of the modernist age. To borrow a term from 
Raymond Williams, the breakdown in cultural transmission is its own “long revolution,” 
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a gradual move toward an expansive understanding of culture.67 Hardy, Forster, and 
Woolf associate education reform (the “diffusion” of education) with the inevitable 
failure of cultural transmission in its traditional sense, but not in the causal relationship 
Eliot posits. Instead, they offer a fuller account of culture’s intransmissibility even in the 
most elite institutions of Oxford and Cambridge. The inevitability of a break between 
culture and education that is not blamed on education reform but illuminated by it leads 
Spark to take a more sympathetic view of cultural diffusion. According to Spark, once 
culture takes into account its inherent problems of accessibility and transmissibility, it 
can finally be refigured in redeeming ways that simply no longer depend on educational 
institutions or on a tradition of the past. In granting Miss Brodie such striking 
resemblance to the sovereign educator, Spark acknowledges—like Hardy, Forster, and 
Woolf—that Arnold’s mentorship would only be possible if culture could be completely 
separate from one’s social experience, which it ultimately cannot be. Although she argues 
effectively in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie that traditional culture is too far removed 
from modern social problems, she still has faith in culture, a culture that—thankfully—
cannot be transmitted in the way Arnold had imagined for his culture. For Spark, as for 
Forster, increased educational opportunity is not necessarily anathema to culture, since 
culture can be manifested and reinvented in ways Eliot could not imagine. By 
acknowledging that cultural transmission is no longer the main consideration when the 
culture itself has lost significance, Spark sees the opportunity to rethink what culture can 
be and from where it can come.  
  
 
                                                
67See Raymond Williams’s The Long Revolution (1961).  
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Epilogue: Transfiguring Culture 
 
 In “Does Culture Matter” (1940), the essay in which Forster questions whether 
culture can be handed down, he reflects on the idea of culture in crisis. Like Amis and 
Eliot, Forster studies the effects of the postwar education boon, only he rejects the “more 
is worse” elitism and proposes instead that the diffusion of culture has finally removed 
the impediments to cultural transmission: 
Cultivated people are a drop of ink in the ocean. They mix easily and even 
genially with other drops, for those exclusive days are over when cultivated 
people made only cultivated friends, and became tongue-tied or terror-struck in 
the presence of anyone whose make-up was different from their own. Culture, 
thank goodness, is no longer a social asset, it can no longer be employed either as 
a barrier against the mob or as a ladder into the aristocracy. This is one of the last 
few improvements that have occurred in England since the last war.1 
 
Even though he would mourn in Howards End the loss of a traditional culture, Forster 
here makes it clear that such “loss” has also the potential to bring enormous gain. The 
diffusion of culture is to its benefit, not its terminal detriment.  
  To illustrate that gain, though, he must ask the same question Amis does: “what 
have we got worth passing on?”2 His answer looks back at the problems of culture I have 
identified throughout this project: he first imagines the ways in which culture has become 
the material transmission Woolf implicates: “What we have got is (roughly speaking) a 
little knowledge about books, pictures, tunes, runes, and a little skill in their 
interpretation. Seated beside our gas-fires and beneath our electric-bulbs, we inherit a 
tradition which has lasted for about three thousand years.” He goes on to identify the 
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privileged past from which culture emerged and, as does Hardy, Forster associates this 
privilege with cultural capital: “In the past, culture has been paid for by the ruling classes; 
they often did not know why they paid, by they paid, much as they went to church; it was 
the proper thing to do, it was a form of social snobbery, and so the artists sneaked a meal, 
the author got a sinecure, and the work of creation went on.”3 He concludes with the 
shortcomings of culture Spark reveals in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie: “Today, people 
are coming to the top who are, in some ways, more clear-sighted and honest than the 
ruling classes of the past, and they refuse to pay for what they don’t want; judging by the 
noises through the floor, our neighbour in the flat above doesn’t want books, pictures, 
tunes, runes, anyhow doesn’t want the sorts which we recommend.”4 Using Forster’s 
overview, it is clear that each of the novels in this project is a kind of locus for culture 
and its transmission, a piece of transmitted culture that creates a usefully generative 
tension. Forster reminds us that it is the reader’s responsibility to respond the particular 
engagement with culture that the author offers—and that this action is in and of itself a 
form of cultural transmission.  
  An author weighted down by a lengthy literary tradition, Forster looks to the 
possible reader and asks, “Ought we to bother him?” Ought high culture be handed to 
those who might not seem to want or appreciate it? To make culture worth passing on, 
Forster suggests that the problem in transmitting culture had come from trying to transmit 
culture as it had always been. If one tries to transmit the same old version of traditional 
culture, the effect is meddlesome, “like a maiden-aunt.”  “Our arms, as it were, full of 
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parcels,” Forster claims, alluding to how an author might try to transmit cultural artifacts 
culled from ancient to modern times: “I was given these specially to hand on to you… 
Sophocles, Velasquez, Henry James… I’m afraid they’re a little heavy, but you’ll get to 
love them in time, and if you don’t take them off my hands I don’t know who will… 
please… please… they’re really important, they’re culture.”5 If one focuses too much on 
passing down Arnold’s “the best which has been thought and said in the world,” then 
culture will, in the end, never be able to be transmitted at all. Culture in Arnold’s 
construct is ultimately too limited, too removed from the society it was intended to 
benefit. Unable to be the restorative force Arnold imagined, culture could not be 
transmitted in the ways he suggested. Authors must come to terms with the 
intransmissibility of a particular cultural tradition. 
 In “The Desegregation of Art,” Spark agrees with Forster and concludes that the 
“masterpieces of the past” should not be the lone litmus test of culture.6 Instead she 
encourages “the special calling of arts and letters,” believing that “Literature infiltrates 
and should fertilize our mind. It is not a special department set aside for the entertainment 
and delight of the sophisticated minority.”7 Here, literature is poised definitively as the 
new transmitter of culture. Not in the sense that Leavis would have it, however. Whereas 
Leavis wanted a literary curriculum that would preserve past culture in traditional ways, 
Spark imagines a literature that constantly reexamines what culture is. While she would 
not agree with Arnold’s version of culture as a classical curriculum, she, too, insists that 
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culture should aim to reach everyone. Her version, as did Leavis’s, includes special 
attention to arts and letters, but her position is more inclusive. In agreement with the 
cultural studies movement that had gained popularity in the sixties, she includes 
journalism, speeches, and any form of writing that responds in a meaningful way to the 
same social inequalities that culture could not account for in its restricted earlier 
iterations.8 In a refutation of Amis’s “more is worse,” Spark exclaims: “We are living in 
times when there are fewer great artists, fewer great writers, but more and better art, 
better and more lively, and a greater volume of writing.”9 In this sense, Hardy’s, 
Forster’s, and Woolf’s novels ensure some form of cultural transmission even—and 
especially— as they explore its limitations. 
 Forster and Spark both believed in the power of the author to continue to transmit 
culture, and they relocate cultural transmission from the old institutions and into the texts 
themselves. Filling The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie with her own re-writings of “The 
Lady of Shallott” and the poets who comprise Hugh Carruthers, Spark, in a postmodern 
gesture, reappropriates the canon for new and individual purposes. Miss Brodie, too, 
inspires her girls to write their own version of her story. Even Sandy Stranger, who 
ultimately betrays Miss Brodie, succeeds in adapting Miss Brodie to her own life. When 
she writes The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, Sandy writes her own version of 
culture, an invitation to “transfigure” the “common currency” of words so that they might 
“fertilize our mind[s].”10 Removed from the isolation of Miss Brodie’s confining culture, 
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Sandy is finally able to relate in meaningful ways to the world around her: contemplating 
salvation outside St. Giles’ Cathedral or the Tolbooth, “[a]ll she was conscious of now 
was that some quality of life peculiar to Edinburgh and nowhere else had been going on 
unbeknownst to her all the time, and however undesirable it might be she felt deprived of 
it; however undesirable, she desired to know what it was, and to cease to be protected 
from it by enlightened people” (115). No longer the entitlement of the enlightened, 
culture can look even to the commonplace, for culture is now that which is transfigured 
rather than transmitted.    
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